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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Problems with Pesticides 
The soil in the American midwest is thick, rich and black. You can 
sense its fertility just by looking at it. The vast, open terrain allows 
tilling of huge tracts of land, and together these two features have led 
to the apt reference to the midwest as "America's breadbasket." 
\ 
The system of farming in the midwest is known as monoculture, or 
farming of one crop to the exclusion of others. Corn is the primary crop 
in much of the midwest, although it is often rotated on a yearly basis 
with soybeans. Monoculture is an anathema to the diversity of nature, 
and nature lets us know it. When large tracts of land are dedicated to 
one crop, insects, fungi and diseases which prey upon that particular 
crop can attack, causing tremendous damage. 
In earlier times, farmers tended to diversify crops to control 
pests. Other methods included picking bugs off the plants, and use of 
toxic substances such as arsenic. Most often farmers just accepted the 
losses incurred by pests. The development of modern pesticides in the 
1930s, and their application to farming in the 1940s and beyond meant 
that farmers no longer had to accept these losses, but could now try to 
control damages caused by pests. The farmer's dream of pest eradication 
seemed like it could become a reality. 
Today, the reality is more like a nightmare. First, many 
formulations (even entire groups of formulations) no longer work on 
target pests, because these pests have developed a resistance to the 
pesticides. Worse, use of pesticides and other chemicals in agriculture 
has led to environmental contamination, and threats to the health of 
humans and other life forms. For example, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency reports that agriculture alone is responsible for the 
degradation of 41 percent of the nation's rivers, and 23 percent of its 
lakes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1990). In Iowa, spring 
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rains often wash such high levels of nitrates into drinking water 
supplies that alerts may be sounded warning against drinking by infants 
(Keeney, 1991). In addition, a study by the National Academy of Sciences 
in 1987 found that the total risk from 28 carcinogenic pesticides used on 
food crops could result in about 6 cases of cancer per 1,000 persons 
exposed over a lifetime (National Research Council, 1987). Risks are 
likely to be higher for groups such as farm workers, who have greater 
exposure to these chemicals than the general population (Bureau of 
National Affairs, 1987). Just as alarming.is the recent report by the 
General Accounting Office that the Environmental Protection Agency could 
take fifteen years or more to ban a pesticide after its detection in 
groundwater (Des Moines Register, 1991) 
Also sad is the dependence that U.S. agriculture now has on these 
chemicals. While labor inputs have fallen in real terms since the late 
1940s, use of agricultural chemicals has increased sixfold during the 
same time period (U.S. Department of Agriculture, various years), New 
breeds of plants have been developed for high yield potential; these 
breeds are generally very dependent on fertilizer inputs. Often 
naturally occurring pest resistance has been sacrificed for higher yields 
(Doyle, 1986). Agricultural policies have tended to reinforce these 
trends (Reichelderfer and Phipps, 1988). 
As a consequence of changes in agricultural practices, the 
agrichemical industry has blossomed. The value of pesticide products 
shipped in 1987 was approximately $6.3 billion (U.S. firms only), while 
$2.4 billion worth of nitrogen products were shipped that same year (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1987). There are currently more than 50,000 
pesticide products registered for sale by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and each year the EPA processes an additional 15,000 registration 
applications (Shapiro, 1990) . Market concentration in this industry is 
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also fairly high, with the four largest firms controlling forty-four 
percent of the market (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1982) . 
Therefore, pesticides represent an important component of the 
economy, both in terms of their production and the ultimate use in the 
control of agricultural pests. Partly because of their use, U.S. 
consumers spend only 17 cents of each dollar on food (McConnell and Brue, 
1990) . However, external costs associated with their use are very high 
in terms of health and environmental consequences, and appear to be 
escalating as more and more evidence of these consequences become known. 
Consumers and environmentalists have become, and will continue to be, 
vocal in their concern about the negative effects of pesticides and calls 
for more effective regulation. But the huge vested interests of the 
agricultural and chemical industries will not take threats of regulation 
lying down. The issue of pesticide regulation is an extremely important 
policy issue, and promises to continue to be important in the future. 
General Remarks on Economics and Regulation 
Economic analysis of natural resource and environmental issues (such 
as pollution from pesticides) is to a large degree an applied study in 
market failure. Since Pigou, economists have wrestled with the problem 
of addressing external costs (externalities) such as environmental 
pollution and overexploitation of common property resources. Pigou's 
solution was to impose a tax upon those responsible for the generation of 
externalities which is equal to the level of the damage of the 
externality at the margin. While a simple and classic response to the 
externality problem in theory, Pigovian taxes are exceedingly difficult 
to apply in the real world. Information about the external costs of 
pollution is very difficult to obtain, because the polluter has an 
incentive to underestimate the damage caused by pollution. Similarly, 
the person affected by the pollution has an incentive to overestimate the 
damage. While information on the true extent of pollution damage is not 
revealed in the market because of the market failure, the incentive 
problem means that economists also cannot rely on revealed preferences 
for information about damages. Therefore, the incentive problem makes a 
Pigovian tax scheme difficult to implement. In addition, policy 
responses such as Pigovian taxes implicitly assume that the government is 
a benevolent force, operating without cost and functioning perfectly. 
The reality is far removed from this assumption. 
The field of public choice employs the methods of economics to 
analyze issues in political science (Mueller, 1989). A main theme in the 
public choice field is that while market failures exist, the government 
is also subject to failures. Neglect of this fact may lead to cures 
which are worse than the disease. Public choice economists seek to 
understand the political process and its outcomes by assuming that 
government and political players are economically motivated (i.e., they 
act in their own self-interest), rather than being motivated by concerns 
about public welfare. Hence, assumptions about perfect and costless 
operation of the government, and its benevolence are rejected. 
By understanding the basic concepts of public choice, economists can 
more fully assess the true welfare costs of policy responses in areas 
like resource and environmental economics. In the following research, 
public choice analysis will be applied to the pesticide issue in 
environmental regulation for the purpose of furthering the understanding 
of public choice concepts. 
Of particular importance in the field of public choice is the study 
of how interest groups compete to receive artificially imposed transfers 
(referred to as "rent") from the government. This study is known as the 
theory of rent-seeking (Tollison, 1982). In the past two decades, a 
large volume of work has been developed in the theory of rent-seeking. 
The objectives of this work primarily involve understanding how interest 
groups attempt to influence policy-makers, and how the consequences of 
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this activity affect the economy. For example, much of the empirical 
literature focuses on how economic interests influence legislators' votes 
on selected bills. A similar type of research is conducted in this 
thesis. 
Unfortunately, in analyses of legislator voting, it is often the 
case that there is no specific theoretical framework that is being 
tested. Instead, a very general underlying theoretical model is assumed, 
with the result that the reduced forms that are analyzed are by necessity 
ad hoc specifications. The benefits of this approach include a great 
deal of flexibility in empirical estimation. However, it is unfortunate 
that no specific theoretical framework is being tested, because in such 
ad hoc specifications statistical criteria become the primary 
determinants in the estimated equations. In addition, the antecedent 
assumptions and applicabilities of the theory are not always clear. 
Purpose of Study and Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to test a model of rent-seeking as 
developed by Appelbaum and Katz (1987). In much of the rent-seeking 
literature, rent is generally considered to be exogenous to the model. 
However, in the Appelbaum and Katz framework, rent is endogenously 
determined at the margin through the interaction of: firms (or a 
coalition of firms), which seek to influence a regulator; the regulator, 
who seeks support of the electorate while benefitting from the rent-
seeking activities of the firms; and the voting public, who may suffer 
(or gain) from the policies determined by the regulator. Thus the 
Appelbaum and Katz model represents a unique departure from the 
literature. The Appelbaum and Katz model will be tested by applying it 
to the issue of pesticide regulation. A brief digression on the nature 
of the pesticide regulation issue is necessary in order to understand how 
the model was adapted to address this issue. 
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The issue of pesticide regulation is extremely complicated. 
Pesticides are complex compounds which have often unknown impacts on the 
environment and human health. The long run effects of pesticides in 
particular are unknown. These uncertain effects of pesticides make 
regulation more difficult. Because pesticides are used as inputs in the 
production of agricultural goods, the productive nature of pesticides 
contributes to the complexity of pesticide regulation. Agricultural 
products are produced more cheaply with pesticides (a substitute for 
relatively more expensive labor), and more appealing goods are often the 
result (e.g., apples without wormholes). The competitive nature of the 
farming industry means that consumers are ultimately the beneficiaries of 
welfare changes associated with pesticide use. 
Economic interests have historically dominated the regulation of 
pesticides. Lack of information about the adverse effects of pesticides 
in the environment initially made consumers and environmentalists 
relatively indifferent to their use. At the same time, obvious benefits 
such as reduced labor costs to agricultural producers, and cheaper and 
more attractive food items to consumers increased support for their use. 
Agricultural and chemical interests were the primary players in pesticide 
policy determination from the immediate post-war period until the early 
1970s. 
Today all that has changed. Advances in detection technology have 
provided greater awareness of the extent of pesticides in the 
environment. More information is also available about the impact of 
pesticides on the environment and human health. Therefore, many costs 
are no longer hidden. Opposition to the overuse of pesticides has been 
mobilized, and support for stringent policies to regulate pesticides has 
increased. Pesticide policy is no longer dominated by the narrow 
economic interests of the agrichemical lobby. Consumer and environmental 
groups have significant influence, and thanks to various institutional 
7 
changes, are now able to lobby in support of their own interests. Hence, 
any public choice analysis of pesticide policies today should include 
consumer and environmental interests. 
In applying the Appelbaum and Katz framework to the pesticide policy 
issue, we need to make several extensions. For example, two coalitions 
are assumed (an agrichemical coalition and an environmental coalition) in 
order to address the reality of diverse interests involved in pesticide 
regulation. An impure public goods model is also employed in analyzing 
the voter component of the model, in order to reflect both the private 
and public effects of pesticide regulation on consumers and society. 
Finally, a generalization is made to the model to accommodate the case 
where a policy change can have a positive (negative) effect on the voting 
public, as well as a positive (negative) effect on the coalition. This 
is the opposite of the case originally discussed by Appelbaum and Katz, 
which assumed that a policy which has a positive (negative) effect on a 
rent-seeker has a negative (positive) effect on the public. Each of 
these extensions represents a unique contribution of this research to the 
theory of rent-seeking. 
Reduced forms show that the optimal level of rent determined by the 
regulator is a function of regulator's income as a regulator, salary in 
an alternative occupation, size of the coalition engaged in rent-seeking, 
and share of the rent-seeking activities of the coalition that the 
regulator is able to capture. Rent-seeking activities of the coalition 
are found to be a function of coalition size and the level of rent set by 
the regulator. 
In the case of pesticide policy, legislators are the regulators. 
Therefore, legislators' votes serve as a proxy for the level of rent set 
by the regulator. Two votes (in the House of Representatives) on 
pesticide policy during the 1985/1986 session of Congress are analyzed. 
Both votes are related to the issue of whether or not states have the 
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right to regulate pesticides more stringently than the federal 
government. As a proxy for rent-seeking activities of the two 
coalitions, campaign contributions from selected environmental, 
agricultural and chemical lobbying organizations to U.S. Representatives 
are analyzed. 
While not part of the theoretical framework, political party 
affiliation and regional dummies are included as exogenous variables in 
the empirical estimation, because they are viewed as likely to be 
relevant in both the legislator and coalition models. 
Results 
Results of the theoretical analysis show that the Appelbaum and Katz 
framework is easily extended to the case where more than one coalition 
engages in rent-seeking activities. Coalitions which seek to capture a 
positive level of monopoly rent engage in more rent-seeking activities as 
the level of rent increases, while coalitions which seek to avoid having 
a negative rent imposed upon them engage in more rent-seeking activities 
when the level of negative rent is high. The effect of an increase in 
coalition size on the amount of rent-seeking activities of both types of 
coalitions depends on the marginal costs of rent-seeking as size 
increases. If free-riding is a problem in a coalition, increases in 
coalition size may increase the marginal costs of rent-seeking, thereby 
decreasing the level of rent-seeking activities. Alternatively, 
decreases in marginal costs of rent-seeking (as could occur when 
transactions costs and free-riding problems are low) could increase the 
amount of rent-seeking activities of the coalition. Complexities in the 
model to determine legislators' votes led to difficulties in the 
assignment of comparative static signs. Therefore, the effects of the 
independent variables on votes must be determined empirically. 
Empirical results suggest that legislators had a strong tendency to 
vote along party lines. When votes are analyzed conditional on party 
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affiliation, the Appelbaum and Katz framework performed very well for 
Democrats, but not as well for Republicans. Therefore, Republicans may 
be influenced by ideological factors, or perhaps economic interests that 
are not included in the model. The subgroup of legislators who voted 
against their party's position are also analyzed. The results show that 
support for economic interests was a strong factor influencing the votes 
of these legislators. 
The analysis of the rent-seeking activities of the coalitions shows 
that the level of rent set by the regulator is the most important 
explanatory factor for both the agrichemical and the environmental 
coalitions. Overall, model performance was quite good for the 
agrichemical coalition, but not as good for the environmental coalition. 
Weaknesses in data are likely to be the cause of this outcome. 
Hence, results of the analysis show a mixed, but very interesting 
outcome. These results suggest that the Appelbaum and Katz framework 
provides a useful foundation for analysis of rent-seeking activities. 
However, application of the model to legislative decision-making may 
necessitate some further research. 
Plan of the Study 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: A review of the 
literature is presented in Chapter II. The theory of rent-seeking is 
described, and an historical overview of the theory's development is 
given. Three schools of thought within the theory of rent-seeking are 
defined and compared. The literature review also discusses theoretical 
and empirical applications of rent-seeking theory, with a focus on 
applications to the area of resource and environmental economics. 
The third chapter provides an extensive history of the development 
of federal pesticide policy from the post-World War II era to the current 
period. This chapter shows how pesticide policy has evolved due to 
changes in technology, information about pesticides in the environment, 
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and institutions. The result has led to a broadening of involvement of 
various lobbies and committees in the pesticide issue. That is, while 
agricultural and chemical interests virtually controlled pesticide policy 
through the late 1960s, various changes have led to greater involvement 
of groups representing public safety and the environment. An analysis of 
pesticide policy should include these interests. 
The theoretical model developed by Appelbaum and Katz is presented 
and extended in Chapter IV. The case of a coalition which seeks to 
capture monopoly rent via rent-seeking activities is extended and 
generalized to accommodate the particular policy problem we are 
addressing. As described above, two coalitions are now considered. We 
assume one coalition seeks to capture rent in the form of a public good 
(enhanced environmental quality), while the other seeks to avoid having a 
negative rent (e.g., tax) imposed upon it. Comparative static 
relationships are then derived. Unfortunately, comparative static signs 
cannot be determined a priori because of the level of complexity of the 
model. Therefore, the effects of explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable must be determined empirically. ' 
Statistical methods and data to be employed in the empirical 
estimation of the model are described in the following chapter. A probit 
specification is used to analyze legislators' votes on pending pesticide 
legislation. Probit analysis is qualitative in nature, and easily 
addresses the statistical problems inherent when the dependent variable 
is dichotomous (e.g., vote for or against a bill). Tobit analysis is 
used to examine the rent-seeking activities of the two coalitions, which 
are approximated by campaign contributions made by the coalitions to the 
legislators. Data used in the analysis consist of a variety of 
information describing legislator, constituency, and coalition 
characteristics. 
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In Chapter VI, results of the empirical analysis of the model are 
provided. (Highlights of the results were described above.) The final 
chapter presents concluding comments. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The theory of rent-seeking involves the study of how individuals 
compete for artificially contrived transfers, and how that competition 
affects the welfare of society (Tollison, 1982). Rent-seeking theory 
evolved in response to problems that arose within the field of welfare 
economics in the 1950s and early 1960s. Specifically, very low empirical 
measurements of the welfare costs of monopolization to society elicited 
concern about the theory underlying those measurements. The theory of 
rent-seeking was a result. 
The theory of rent-seeking asserts that resources which are used by 
economic agents to obtain monopoly power should be considered as "wasted" 
resources. Monopoly power entails reduced output to society. Resources 
used to obtain or prevent monopoly power are thus not engaged in output-
enhancing activities. From the perspective of the rent-seeking 
theorists, these resources are not productive. The measure of the loss 
to society from using these resources in rent-seeking activities is their 
opportunity cost, or the value of output forgone. 
Rent-seeking is distinguished from profit-seeking in that rent-
seeking arises from artificially imposed monopoly power, while profit-
seeking arises from competitive processes. Rent from artificially 
imposed sanctions is a long-term phenomenon, existing as long as the 
sanctions are imposed. Profit tends to be a relatively short-run 
phenomenon, and it serves a function as a signal about reallocations of 
resources in the market. Rent from artificially imposed sanctions serves 
no such purpose (Buchanan, 1980b). 
The theory of rent-seeking can be broadly grouped into two 
categories: normative and positive rent-seeking theory. Normative rent-
seeking theory considers the measurement of the costs of rent-seeking, 
whether or not these costs dissipate the full amount of the rent accruing 
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to seekers, and what policy measures can be used to reduce these costs. ' 
Positive rent-seeking theory considers the sources of rent in the 
society. It focuses on who the rent-seekers are, what their 
characteristics are, and how their actions affect policies which lead to 
or prevent rent (Tollison, 1982). 
There are three schools of thought with respect to the theory of 
rent-seeking. The public choice school emphasizes the importance of the 
political process in the theory of government, and proposes that the best 
way to limit rent-seeking is to limit government (Colander, 1984). The 
public choice school has contributed much to the development of the 
normative aspects of rent-seeking theory, and has contributed much 
empirical work in the positive area. The second school of thought is the 
directly-unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) school, which developed from 
the field of international trade. This school imposes a more rigid 
structure on the theory of rent-seeking than does the public choice 
school (Brooks and Heijdra, 1988; Rowley, 1988). It distinguishes 
between the different types of restriction-seeking activities. The DUP 
school has made contributions only to the normative area of rent-seeking 
theory. The Chicago school has developed the positive theory of rent-
seeking. This school emphasizes the efficiency aspects of political 
market behavior (Crew and Rowley, 1988b). 
Normative Theory of Rent-Seeking 
In 1954, Harberger attempted to measure the welfare effects of 
monopoly in the U.S. for the time period 1924-28. His estimate of 0.1 
percent of GNP as a measure of welfare loss caused concern about the 
implications of such a low estimate. However, for several years no 
attempt was made to re-evaluate the theoretical underpinnings of his 
model. 
Thirteen years later, Gordon Tullock made the first attempt. In his 
landmark article, Tullock disputed Harberger's results by asserting that 
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Harberger ignored some of the social costs of monopoly, which included 
the costs of gaining, and the costs of preventing monopoly power. He 
used theft as an analogy, stating that real resources are used in both 
preventing and conducting theft. Hence, there is a loss to society from 
theft, and that loss can be measured by the opportunity cost of the 
resources used in theft. 
A graphical analysis can be used to demonstrate Tullock's point. 
Figure 2.1 represents a "snapshot" representation of the economy at a 
point in time. The cost curve is perfectly elastic, hence marginal costs 
are equal to average costs throughout. Demand is downward sloping. The 
competitive market price is Pc, and the competitive quantity is Qc. 
However, monopolization leads to a higher price, Pm, and a lower 
Price 
P, m B 
—inal Cost= 
rage Cost A 
Demand 
0 Qjn Qc Quantity 
Figure 2.1. The social costs of monopoly power 
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quantity, Qm, thus resulting in a loss to society. This loss is equal to 
the triangle ABC, commonly referred to as the deadweight loss triangle 
(also referred to in the rent-seeking literature as the Harberger 
triangle). This is the welfare loss Harberger measured. 
However, Tullock's argument is that the loss to society from 
monopoly exceeds this triangular area when resources are used to compete 
for and prevent monopolization. He states that the rectangular area 
(PcPmBA) to the left of the triangle represents returns for which the 
monopolist is willing to expend productive resources. Therefore, the 
waste to society should include the.rectangular area, and total resources 
lost to society from monopolization is represented by the trapezoid, 
PcPmBC. 
Anne Krueger (1974) made the next significant contribution to the 
theory of rent-seeking, and coined the term in the process. Considering 
the case of rent-seeking for import licenses, she estimated losses to 
society to be 7 percent of GNP for India, and 15 percent of GNP for 
Turkey. Assuming a two-good world, Krueger compared the welfare 
implications of three scenarios: free trade, import restriction without 
rent-seeking, and import restriction with rent-seeking. She found that 
including rent-seeking in the analysis altered some of the conclusions of 
trade theory. 
Posner (1975) attempted to estimate the social cost of monopoly 
using the rent-seeking framework. Posner assumed that the cost of 
obtaining a monopoly is competitive activity, and that these costs have 
no socially valuable by-products. With these assumptions and a perfectly 
elastic input supply function, Posner made explicit the concept of full 
dissipation of monopoly rents by the costs of rent-seeking. Thus, the 
cost to society of rent-seeking activities is assumed to be exactly equal 
to the rent which the monopolist acquires (the Tullock rectangle). 
Posner also considered the effect of uncertainty on the rent-seeker's 
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behavior. He assumed a risk neutral rent-seeker would expend the amount 
of rent potentially attainable times the probability of obtaining that 
rent. Posner concluded that Harberger's estimate of monopoly power was 
undervalued by 3 percent of GNP. Posner's work, along with Tullock's and 
Krueger's, laid the foundation for the theory of rent-seeking. 
Public Choice School 
Much of the theory of rent-seeking literature as developed by the 
public choice school focuses on the issue of rent dissipation, i.e., do 
the costs of obtaining a monopoly via rent-seeking activities fully 
dissipate the returns from that monopoly? 
In another insightful article, Tullock (1980) disputed the 
assumption that the rectangular area left of the deadweight loss triangle 
(PcPmBA) in Figure 2.1 is always a measure of the costs of rent-seeking. 
Assuming an upward sloping factor supply curve, Tullock employed a 
game-theoretic approach to determine bids for a monopoly. Tullock 
assumed identical players, who would recognize a correct strategy, if it 
exists, and who assume everyone else would recognize that strategy. 
Tullock identified a model for bidding based on the probability of 
winning, which was a function of the nature of the marginal cost curve 
and the number of players. In a simulation of the game, he showed how 
underbidding and overbidding are more likely to occur than perfect 
dissipation. Even perverse situations of bidding more than the rent were 
possible. 
As a result of this article, several authors tried to solve the 
problem posed by the failure of equilibrium. Corcoran (1984) specified a 
long-run version of this model, with players who compared rates of return 
from rent-seeking to alternatives. Corcoran and Karels (1985) suggested 
a minimum bet be imposed on the model for the case of decreasing or 
constant costs (where there is potential for the number of rent seekers 
to be negative). For the case of increasing costs, they consider two 
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types of preemptive bidding: hit and run competition and hardball 
competition. Higgins, Shughart and Tollison (1985) also attempted to 
solve the problem Tullock posed by making the number of rent-seekers in 
the Tullock model endogenous, requiring a non-refundable entry fee and 
allowing a mixed bidding strategy. 
Tullock (1984; 1985) responded by stating that none of these 
suggestions solved the problem. Under certain marginal cost conditions, 
overbidding will still occur. In addition, some solutions will lead to 
integer problems, where unrealistic solutions to the problem exist, which 
involve fractions of people. 
Michaels (1988) attempted to address the indeterminacy of the 
Tullock game by introducing a political process. A politician is 
introduced into the model who supplies the primary input (influence) 
needed for the rent-seeking competitor. This model allows incorporation 
of the institutional structure, and by setting up a theoretical structure 
for analysis of the derived demand for political inputs and their 
properties, Michaels developed a framework which could be used 
empirically. Tullock has not yet responded to this model. 
During the same period, the issues of rent dissipation were being 
tackled with other approaches. Rogerson (1982) considered the case of 
firms with differential advantages (different fixed organization cost, as 
well as incumbency advantages) and developed a model to show that 
differences in these advantages lead to less than complete dissipation. 
Hillman and Katz (1984) considered the effects of risk aversion on 
bids for small and large rents. Their model suggested that rent 
dissipation decreased as the number of bidders increased, as the size of 
the rent increased, and as the degree of risk aversion increased. They 
also considered a strategic bidding game, and found that more rent was 
dissipated under the competitive game than under the strategic game. As 
the number of bidders increased, the two games coincided. 
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Jadlow (1985) considered uncertainty in maintaining'monopoly power 
once attained, and suggested that as the probability of maintaining a 
monopoly decreased, rent dissipation decreased. He also suggested that 
policies which decrease the bidder's expectations of maintaining the 
monopoly over time will decrease rent-seeking costs. 
Appelbaum and Katz (1986) considered the rent dissipation issue by 
looking at the Tullock model from an industrial organization standpoint. 
Their comparative static analysis showed that under certainty rent 
dissipation decreased as the number of rent seekers decreased, and as the 
degree of collusion increased. 
Hence, the rent dissipation issue can be summarized as follows: 
uncertainty in maintaining a monopoly, risk aversion and large numbers of 
bidders tend to decrease the amount bidders are willing to bid in 
rent-seeking efforts. Also, as collusive behavior increases, or if there 
are implicit advantages in the bidder's position there is less need for 
investing resources. However, empirical work is needed to verify these 
hypotheses. The difficulty is that a measure of rent-seeking involves 
computing costs that are both obvious (e.g., bookkeeping) and hidden 
(bribes, payments in kind) (Tullock, 1988b; Cowling and Mueller, 1978) . 
Until such a measure is developed, economists can only theorize about the 
nature of rent dissipation. 
PUP School 
In response to Krueger's conclusion that some results of theory are 
altered by incorporation of rent-seeking costs into the analysis, 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980; 1982) developed the directly unproductive 
profit-seeking (DUP) theory to analyze the impact of these activities on 
the economy. 
Assuming a second best world, where a small, importing country has 
an economy distorted by a tariff or quota, Bhagwati and Srinivasan state 
that if the shadow prices for resources used in DUP activities are 
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negative, then DUP activities can lead to welfare increases, not 
decreases. Thus, Bhagwati and Srinivasan tie the concept of DUP 
activities to the concept of "iitimiserizing growth." Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan developed the model with a formal structure, and showed that 
as opposed to Krueger's conclusions, tariff and quota equivalence can 
still exist when including DUP activities into the analysis. 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan distinguished between the different types of 
DUP activities. Figure 2.2 shows this breakdown. All activities listed 
are DUP activities. However, they distinguish between 
intervention-seeking activities (which involve how to get the profit in 
the first place) and intervention-triggered activities (how people try to 
obtain an intervention or avoid costs). Triggered activities are further 
broken down by distinguishing between DUP lobbying (obtain profit) and 
intervention-evading DUPs. All DUP activities are further broken down by 
types of policies (quantity vs. price constraints). The DUP theory so 
far has only been applied to area of international trade. 
Positive Theory of Rent-Seeking 
In his pioneering work on the theory of organizations, Olson 
considered organizations as mechanisms through which individuals can 
obtain collective goods. He suggested that large organizations are, in 
general, less efficient in obtaining collective goods than are small 
organizations. He also suggested that organizations with heterogeneous 
members will be more successful at obtaining public goods, because there 
will be some members who gain more benefits from the goods than others, 
and will thus be more likely to invest in their provision. Therefore, 
the members with the greatest gain are likely to bear a disproportionate 
share of the costs of the good's provision. 
Following along these lines, Stigler (1971) developed his theory of 
economic regulation. Earlier theories of economic regulation included 
the public interest theory which speculated that regulation was supplied 
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Figure 2.2. Policy-intervention-related DUP activities (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1982) 
21 
in response to a demand for correction of market failures. Implicit in 
this assumption was costless government regulation. A second theory 
(really more an observation than a theory) was the "capture theory" which 
postulated that the regulators' interests were coincident with the 
regulated (Posner, 1974). Stigler hypothesized that groups seek to 
obtain cartel powers from the government. Prohibitive information costs 
reduce the incentive for many individuals to be informed and attempt to 
influence policy. This allows access of the group seeking regulation to 
the provider (the political party). By providing resources to the party, 
the group can influence its policies. Stigler acknowledged the free 
rider problem in forming groups and speculated that more concentrated 
industries would provide more resources. In a later paper (1974), he 
addressed the free rider problem more specifically, and, like Olson, 
found that asymmetry within the group should increase the probability of 
collective action. 
Generalizing Stigler's theory, Peltzman (1976) developed a formal 
model of the supply and demand for regulation. In his model, the 
regulator sets a policy such that the marginal political return from a 
transfer equals the marginal political cost of the associated tax. 
Hence, Peltzman acknowledged political constraints on the regulator, 
although he did not consider the motives of the regulator in this 
process. 
However, Niskanen (1975) did consider the motives of the regulator 
in his article on bureaucrats and politicians. He postulated that 
bureaucrats maximize utility which is a function of the discretionary 
budget of the bureau. In a bilateral monopoly relationship, bureaucrats 
demand a budget and supply bureau services, while legislators demand 
services and supply a budget. Legislators monitor bureau activities, but 
free riding and committee oversight lead to a tendency for high cost and 
for large output of bureau services. 
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Becker (1983) developed a formal model of pressure groups which 
compete for political influence. He assumed a budget equation such that 
the total amount raised in taxes equals the total amount available for 
subsidies, implying that thé sum of all influences is zero. Each group 
maximizes the income of its members via Nash-Cournot behavior. Political 
equilibrium is found to be a function of the efficiency of each group in 
producing pressure, the size of the pressure group relative to the group 
taxed, and the dead weight costs of taxes and subsidies. Policies that 
increase efficiency are likely to gain support. 
Integration of the Positive and Normative Theories 
Recent developments in the theory of rent-seeking have involved an 
integration of the positive and normative theories. Hence, both the 
process of obtaining rents, and the impact of rents on society can be 
considered in one model. 
McChesney (1987) discussed a model with politicians as brokers in 
the rent extraction and creation process. Using their property rights as 
legislators, they can extract rents through actual or threatened 
policies, or they can create them. Bureaucrats provide legislators with 
information about the conditions which influence the relative gains of 
rent creation and extraction. McChesney described five sources of costs 
to society that occur as a result of rent creation and extraction: the 
deadweight loss triangle; resources used in rent-seeking; costs of 
compliance with regulation; diversion of resources to less valuable, but 
unregulated uses; and resources used in rent avoiding. 
Appelbaum and Katz (1987) developed a theoretical framework for a 
political-economic model of rent-seeking. They assumed a three-person 
game (consumers, firms and regulators), each seeking to maximize their 
welfare in a noncooperative fashion. Consumers are assumed to be the 
classic diffuse interest group, and so are followers in the game. Three 
settings are analyzed: 1) the short run (no entry or exit of firms); 2) 
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the long run (with entry and exit of firms); and 3) sophisticated 
rent-seeking (firms make conjectures about each other and the 
regulators). In the first setting, regulators are leaders and consumers 
and firms are followers. The major policy implication is that making 
rent-seeking more costly will not necessarily increase or decrease 
welfare. In the second case, regulators are again the leaders. Policy 
implications suggest that no matter what the policy, consumers always 
lose because they are captive. Firms neither win nor lose, and 
regulators gain by using the firms to transfer wealth from consumers to 
themselves. However, the more responsive consumers are to rent-seeking 
(via voting behavior), the lower the transfer. In sophisticated 
rent-seeking, either regulators or firms can be leaders, and in a 
Stackleberg disequilibrium "situation, they can both vie for leadership. 
Both firms and regulators are enemies of consumers, but regulators are 
less so. Hence, consumers are relatively better off when regulators 
lead, or when there is a Stackleberg disequilibrium. Social waste is 
greatest when regulators lead. 
In addition, Michaels (discussed above) incorporates positive and 
normative elements in the development of his model. 
Applications of the Theory of Rent-Seeking 
Theoretical Applications 
A logical application of the theory of rent-seeking is to the area 
of deregulation. McCormick, Shughart, and Toilison (1984; 1986) showed 
that when monopoly rents are fully dissipated in a contest for a durable 
monopoly, deregulation will not lead to the return of rent-seeking costs 
to society. Thus, gains from deregulation may be less than the costs. 
Cherkes, Freidman and Spivak (1986) disputed this conclusion but pointed 
out that even if costs are dissipated, the redistribution of income that 
occurs may be desirable. Crew and Rowley (1988a) expanded the analysis 
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of deregulation, using McCormick, Shughart, and Tollison's model as a 
special case. They found that in when dissipation of rent is ongoing, 
there are gains to be made from deregulation. 
In the area of resource economics, the theory of rent-seeking has 
been applied-, although as yet little empirical work has been done. 
Buchanan (1980a) examined the policy implications of rent-seeking under 
external the cases of specialized and nonspecialized resources. 
Assessing the distribution of property rights through an auction, 
assignment of rights, and bribeiry, Buchanan found the greatest potential 
for gain to society through use of the auction, which is not frequently 
used. 
Abbott and Brady (1990) showed how rent-seeking activities can 
actually enhance welfare, provided two conditions exist. The first 
condition is that there are institutional barriers to cost-reducing 
innovative products and processes. The existence of coalitions which 
might be able to organize and overcome these barriers is the second 
condition. Abbott and Brady applied their analysis to the case of the 
Best Available Technology requirements of the Clean Air Act. They showed 
that the net result of such rent-seeking is a social surplus because of 
gains in technological and allocative efficiency. However, transactions 
costs and free-riding are possible disincentives to coalition-building. 
The case of rent-seeking for public goods was examined by Katz, 
Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990). Using the model developed by Tullock in his 
1980 paper, they found several very interesting results. Assuming all 
individuals in all groups are identical, they concluded that groups spend 
the same amount on rent-seeking for pure public goods regardless of group 
size. They also found that the total rent-seeking activities of t groups 
is equal to (t — l)/t times the benefit of the public good to one person. 
They then examined rent-seeking outcomes with different individual and 
group characteristics. Groups with wealthy members were found to spend 
25 
more on rent-seeking for a public good (thereby increasing their chances 
of obtaining it), while risk averse individuals decreased total and 
individual rent-seeking. Finally, assuming decreasing risk aversion and 
identical individuals, they found that large groups spend more on rent-
seeking than small groups. 
In an application of rent-seeking theory to the theory of property 
rights, Anderson and Hill (1983) argued that the definition and 
enforcement of property rights can lead to rent-seeking behavior that 
dissipates gains in efficiency. When residual claimants are involved in 
the process of definition and enforcement of property rights, they have a 
greater incentive to conserve resources in this process than when it is 
imposed on them exogenously. To prove their point, the authors describe 
two cases of settlement of the American West, where definition and 
enforcement of property rights occurred under residual claimant rules, 
and rules established by the Homestead Act. Rent dissipation was greater 
under Homestead Act rules. 
Rucker and Fishback (1983) also examined an historical issue in 
their analysis of the 1902 Federal Reclamation Act. They found that 
western irrigators gained through subsidized irrigation projects. The 
Bureau of Reclamation itself engaged in rent-seeking activities by 
attempting to capture more funding for projects, which they claimed were 
self-financed (but often weren't). Rent was differentially distributed, 
because large farmers gained proportionately more than small farmers via 
loopholes and non-enforcement of statutes. 
Another article dealing with rent-seeking and common property 
resources was by Katz and Smith (1988). Considering the optimal 
regulation of a replenishable resource, they found that the socially 
optimal quota increases with the amount of rent-seeking activity. 
Therefore, policy recommendations would tend to be more laissez-faire 
than Buchanan (1980a) determined. In particular, when rents are fully 
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dissipated, the role of the regulator is simply to ensure biological 
efficiency. 
Maloney and McCormick (1982) built on Stigler's theory of 
regulation, and applied it to the area of environmental quality 
regulation. They explained that producers' and environmental interests 
may coincide because of output reductions which result from regulations. 
Thus, profitability can increase at the expense of consumers. 
Differential standards may be used to prevent entry and maintain profits. 
These differential standards will also impact on firms within the 
industry in different ways, leading to interindustry transfers. Maloney 
and McCormick specified cost conditions necessary for the existence of 
profit enhancing regulation. They then empirically tested their theory 
about differential impacts from regulation, using cotton textile and air 
quality regulations as examples. The evidence supported their 
hypotheses. 
Misiolek (1988) showed that when rent-seeking costs are added to a 
model of a polluting monopolist, the appropriate discharge tax is not 
necessarily less than the competitive rate. This implies simple 
discharge tax structures may be optimal. Lee (1985) also considered the 
impact of rent-seeking costs on pollution taxes. He showed that the 
optimal pollution tax varies according to the tax elasticity of demand. 
However, in his model, it is not exactly clear what the tax elasticity of 
demand represents. 
Empirical Studies 
One of the earliest empirical studies using the theory of 
rent-seeking was Cowling and Mueller's (1978) study of the social costs 
of monopoly in Great Britain. They used a cost measure of monopoly power 
in a partial equilibrium framework to estimate gains to society from 
eliminating monopolies of seven percent of gross corporate product for 
the United States, and three percent for the United Kingdom. To the 
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extent that firms sell in differentiated markets and use monopoly power, 
the gains would be thirteen and seven percent, respectively. 
Changes in budget spending were used by Katz and Rosenberg (1989) to 
estimate rent-seeking costs to society, in their analysis of 20 
countries. Specifying the model in several ways, they found some 
evidence that less developed countries are more prone to rent-seeking 
activities than developed countries, but the degree of difference 
depended on the measure used. In a cross-section analysis of state 
budgets, V^rick and Arnold (1989) found that earmarking specific revenues 
to a specific activity resulted in less rent-seeking activities (although 
rent-seeking when the earmarking policies were developed was not 
considered in the analysis). 
Rowley, Shughart and Tollison (1987) considered the effect of 
interest groups on the U.S. budget deficit. In a state level cross 
section model, they tested for relationships between differences in 
borrowing patterns and interest groups sizes in 1982. They found strong 
evidence of such a relationship. Interest groups were also found to have 
a positive influence on government size. 
Stigler (1977) considered the effect of interest groups on the sizes 
of legislatures. He noted that representative governments are 
characterized by responsiveness to interest groups, jointness of 
representation, and a minimum demand necessary for representation. He 
found legislative size to be stable and similar throughout the world. He 
also found that the number of interest groups does not increase rapidly 
with area or population, and that the quality of representation is 
insensitive to the number of interest groups. 
Grain and Tollison (1977) extended Stigler's analysis by accounting 
for seniority in representation. Using various specifications of the 
model, they found significant effects of seniority on expenditures within 
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a Congressional district at the national level for 1972. They also found 
decreasing returns to seniority. 
McCormick and Tollison (1981) used Stigler's insight to develop a 
formal model of the demand for legislative services by interest groups. 
Lobbying efforts are modeled as a function of votes, legislative size and 
community characteristics. The lobbying group is hypothesized to spend 
resources on influencing votes until the ratio of marginal benefits from 
vote influences between the two houses equals the ratio of marginal 
costs. By developing a vote production function, they examined the 
impact of lobbying, legislative size and state characteristics on three 
types of legislative activities at the state level: economic regulation, 
occupational regulation and bills enacted. They found that legislative 
size and the ratio of legislative size influence the ability of interest 
groups to capture rents. The rest of their analysis developed the supply 
side of legislative services. They modeled legislatures as wage cartels, 
and found significant differences in pay between states that set pay by 
constitutional provisions, and those that set pay by statute. They found 
differences in occupational composition as level of pay varies. In 
addition, they considered the effect of extra pay on competition for 
leadership within the majority party, and found evidence of such a 
relationship. Grain, Shughart and Tollison (1988) used a similar vote 
production function to show that incentives exist for interest groups to 
invest in bill production by encouraging voters to vote. 
Kau and Rubin (1979) set out to empirically test Stigler's theory of 
regulation (1971). They explored three reasons why congressmen might 
vote for a bill: concern about the economic interests of his 
constituents, logrolling and ideology. Using U.S. Representatives voting 
on twenty-six bills from 1974 as the dependent variable, Kau and Rubin 
built a logit model which included an ideology measure, party and 
constituent characteristics. They found they could not reject ideology 
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as a significant variable, and concluded that Stigler's theory of 
regulation was not complete. Holmes (1988) applied a model similar to 
Kau and Rubin's to voting on the Iowa Groundwater Bill. He also found 
ideology important. 
In response to studies that test ideology as a factor influencing 
voting on legislation, such as Kau and Rubin's, Peltzman (1984) suggested 
that ideology might actually represent constituent interests not 
explicitly included in the model. Using various constituent 
characteristics, he distinguished between average constituents, 
supporters, and contributors in his analysis of U.S. Senate voting in 
1979-1980. He calculated goodness of fit statistics with these variables 
and measures of ideology to explain voting on 331 issues. Peltzman found 
that interest variables were important sources of explanatory power, 
especially with respect to economic issues. 
Kalt and Zupan (1984) criticized Peltzman's conclusions because his 
analysis was based on multiple issues rather than a single issue. Using 
a series of votes on the strip mine issue in the 95th Congress, they 
tested for evidence of "shirking" (reliance on ideology) in the 
legislative process. They found that ideology had significant and 
positive influences on voting. Testing for left-out constituents, they 
found none. They concluded that for single issue voting, where positive 
information and policing costs exist, shirking occurs and should be 
included in analyses. 
Other studies based on Stigler's theory of regulation include 
Maloney and McGregor's study (1988) in which they hypothesized that the 
dominant industry in a state attempts to manipulate the unemployment tax 
rate structure. Using industry share of unemployment and unionization to 
explain minimum and maximum tax rates, they found evidence to support 
their hypothesis. Pittman (1977; 1988) found a significant relationship 
between national regulation and campaign contributions in highly 
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concentrated industries, but Zardkoohi (1985; 1988) and Esty and Caves 
(1983) found no such relationship. 
Keim and Zardkoohi (1988) examined the relationship between U.S. 
Representatives attributes and campaign contributions, and obtained 
unsatisfactory results for business contributions. They rejected the 
notion that campaign contributions have a significant impact on 
politicians. Their results support research conducted by Chappell (1979; 
1981; 1982), which showed using votes on various issues that when models 
explaining legislators' votes are estimated simultaneously with models of 
campaign contributions, contributions do not have a significant effect on 
voting. The same outcome was yielded by Abler (1991) in his analysis of 
voting on agricultural legislation. 
Hersch and McDougall (1988) used a naive principal-agent model to 
consider votes on three constitutional issues in Kansas (parimutuel 
betting, liquor-by the drink and lottery). Constituent preferences 
(represented by referendum voting), ideology and campaign contributions 
were specified as explanatory variables in the simultaneous probit-Tobit 
model based on the work of Chappell. Hersch and McDougall found ideology 
important. In addition, they found campaign contributions were 
significantly influenced by legislator stature, ideology and expected 
voting position. 
Jacobson and Emerson (1989) considered votes on dairy provisions, 
and concluded that campaign contributions were significant determinants 
of votes. However, they did not analyze contributions simultaneously 
with votes, as Chappell and Abler did. In an analysis of voting on strip 
raining controls, Durden, Shogren and Silberman (1989) employed 
ideological and economic factors. They found evidence that strong, well-
organized groups such as economic groups influence regulation. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence of Stigler's theory of regulation 
is mixed. Solid evidence has supported both sides of the debate on 
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whether ideology is important, or whether it simply represents 
unspecified economic interests. Clearly economic issues are relevant 
sources of influence, but whether or not they are the only important 
factor seems to be a matter of perspective. While not solved in the 
following research, this issue will prove to have relevance here, as 
well. 
Getting away from the ideology debate. Mounts, Sowell and Lindley 
(1985) examined rent-seeking of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
They examined tenure as a function of age, previous experience and 
chairmanship. They found that younger governors and those with private 
experience had shorter tenure. 
Many articles have been written recently that review historical 
events in the new light of the rent-seeking theory. For instance, 
Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast (1989) examined the impact of railroad, 
farm and non-farm interests on voting on the Interstate Commerce Act 
(ICA) of 1887. Their results showed that the ICA represented a 
compromise between the various groups. Implications of their work 
include the need to consider multiple interest groups to understand 
developments in regulations. (They therefore rejected the simplified 
model of regulation that Stigler put forth.) 
Baysinger, Ekelund and Tollison (1980), Ekelund and Tollison (1981; 
1982) and Tullock (1988a) all have considered the mercantilist policies 
from a rent-seeking perspective to examine issues such as the success of 
French mercantilism compared to the British, implications of mercantilist 
policies, and the impact of institutional changes on mercantilism. 
Marvel (1977) suggested that passage of the Factory Act of 1833 was 
less a humanitarian bill to restrict child labor than an attempt to place 
a differential burden on textile manufacturers. Anderson and Tollison 
(1988) questioned the dominant role of ideology in the repeal of the Corn 
Laws and pointed to the role of competition between interest groups. In 
a similar vein, Coase's (1979) study of payola in radio and television 
broadcasting suggested regulation was less a moral concern about payola 
(and the evils of rock and roll) than an economic concern about failure 
to cartelize an industry. Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988) 
considered the behavior of the Federal Reserve Bank during the great 
contraction as being receptive to the interests of its members at the 
expense of nonmember banks, while Shughart (1988) reviewed the Banking 
Act of 1933 as the product of banking and securities interests. 
In a sad reversal of the usually negative implications of 
rent-seeking, Anderson, Rowley and Tollison (1988) discussed the effect 
of U.S. slavery importation restrictions in the early 1800s. 
Restrictions reduced the number of slaves imported, and so increased the 
value of those already here. They suggested this may have enhanced the 
welfare of these slaves, by hastening the fall of the institution of 
slavery. Bredal, Schmitz and Hillman (1987) considered the failure of 
U.S. and Mexican tomato producers to organize or cooperate with their 
governments in bilateral negotiations on tomato importations in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
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CHAPTER III. HISTORY OF U.S. PESTICIDE POLICY 
Introduction 
In order to fully understand the rise of pesticide use in the U.S., 
and the development of pesticide policy, the social, economic and 
institutional factors affecting these phenomena must be understood. This 
chapter seeks to explain these phenomena, and to present a discussion of 
pesticide policy development to date. 
Between 1946 and 1986, the index of total agricultural output rose 
from 60 to 111 (1977 = 100), nearly doubling in four decades (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, various years). While the total input index 
changed little during this time period, as seen in Table 3.1, the mix 
changed considerably, with the index of labor falling from 340 to 80 (a 
325 percent decrease), and the index of agricultural chemicals rising 
from 16 to 109 (a 581 percent increase). In addition, the index of farm 
real estate inputs remained relatively constant, while the index of 
machinery inputs increased (but not as dramatically as the index of 
agricultural chemicals). Clearly, agricultural chemicals, including 
pesticides, have contributed to a movement away from labor intensive 
farming, and no doubt have significantly contributed to the overall 
increase in production. 
The benefits of pesticides were immediately recognizable to farmers, 
processors and consumers. Pesticides could destroy pests before a 
farmer's eyes, resulting in increased yields and higher quality produce. 
Fewer insects and diseases also led to decreased waste in processing, and 
more appealing produce. However, as Cochrane (1979) describes, the net 
economic benefits largely accrued to consumers over the long run, who 
benefitted from cheaper, more abundant food. For farmers, the long run 
effect was increased operating costs due to pesticide purchases, while 
profits were bid away over time as more farmers adopted the new 
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Table 3.1. Indices of total output, total input, and selected inputs 
for agriculture^ (U.S. Department of Agriculture, various 
years) 
Total Total Agricultural 
Chemicals 
Farm Real 
Machine Year Output Input Labor Estate 
1946 60 94 16 340 107 48 
1947 56 94 17 324 108 52 
1948 62 95 17 316 109 59 
1949 62 96 19 304 109 65 
1950 61 96 21 284 110 68 
1951 63 98 22 286 111 73 
1952 65 97 24 272 110 76 
1953 66 97 25 262 110 78 
1954 66 97 27 250 110 78 
1955 68 97 27 240 111 79 
1956 69 96 28 226 108 79 
1957 67 94 29 208 107 78 
1958 72 94 30 198 105 79 
1959 73 97 33 194 105 80 
1960 75 96 34 184 104 79 
1961 76 96 35 178 104 78 
1962 77 96 38 170 103 79 
1963 79 97 43 168 104 80 
1964 80 97 47 159 105 81 
1965 81 95 50 143 105 83 
1966 79 95 56 134 104 87 
1967 83 97 66 130 105 87 
1968 85 97 69 126 104 88 
1969 85 96 73 121 103 88 
1970 84 96 76 117 103 87 
1971 91 97 82 116 101 88 
1972 93 97 86 111 100 88 
1973 88 98 90 109 100 90 
1974 88 98 92 109 99 92 
1975 95 97 83 106 97 96 
1976 97 98 96 100 98 98 
1977 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1978 104 102 107 100 100 104 
1979 111 105 123 99 103 104 
1980 104 103 123 96 103 101 
1981 118 102 129 96 104 98 
1982 116 99 118 93 102 92 
1983 96 97 105 97 101 89 
1984 112 95 121 92 97 85 
1985 118 92 121 85 95 81 
1986 111 87 109 80 93 76 
^ 1977 = 100 
Includes pesticides, lime and fertilizers from 1959 to 1986, lime and 
fertilizers only before 1959. 
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technology and markets adjusted to greater output. (This phenomenon is 
referred to as the technological treadmill, and is particularly a problem 
in markets with relatively inelastic supplies, such as agriculture.) In 
addition, external costs of pesticides, including pest resistance, 
secondary pest outbreaks^, environmental contamination, and health risks, 
which were not apparent in the first years of pesticide use, would 
eventually be recognized. 
Maclntyre (1987) identifies six factors that contributed to 
increased use of pesticides in American agriculture during this period. 
They are as follows; 
1. The competitive nature of commercial agricultural production 
(risk-averse, profit-seeking producers facing an inelastic demand for 
food; the technological treadmill), and the role of the state in 
providing research toward techniques to address production, climate and 
pest uncertainties, and in providing policies which often encouraged 
intensive agricultural practices; 
2. The nature of pesticide production, use and consequences. High 
development costs led to production emphasis on broad-spectrum 
pesticides. Relatively inexpensive pesticides were substituted for 
labor, without acknowledgement of the hidden costs. These factors and 
others led to overdependence on pesticides (the biological treadmill), 
and overexploitation of pest susceptibility (a common property resource); 
3. Preferences of consumers and processors for cosmetic perfection 
in food; 
4. Obstacles to alternatives (e.g., biological controls) and to 
public research. Such obstacles include patent laws, narrow markets, 
risk-averse farmers and complexity of alternative controls; 
^ Secondary pest outbreaks occur when pests which were previously minor 
pests increase in number because of the ecological imbalance created by 
pesticide use. 
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5. Hurdles to restricting pesticides already in use, such as 
unresolved technical uncertainty (e.g., difficulty in proving cancer risk 
with certainty), the law of nuisance (which places the burden of proof of 
pesticide dangers on the government), and the difficulty of gathering 
information about environmental risks; 
6. Institutional biases encouraged by the pesticide subgovernment, 
and a poorly mobilized citizenry. 
The following discussion largely addresses the last factor, and 
shows how changes in these institutional biases over time have 
contributed to the evolution of pesticide policy. Of particular 
importance for this analysis is how interest groups have changed, thereby 
altering the institutional biases, and decreasing the influence of the 
pesticide subgovernment. 
History of U.S. Pesticide Policy: 1910-1960 
In the late nineteenth century, farmers in the U.S. began using 
pesticides intensively. The pesticides were simple compounds such as 
copper sulfate, lead arsenic, and nicotine. Highly toxic, expensive, and 
difficult to use, these pesticides were not used in widespread manner, 
but their use was sufficient to warrant concern about protection of 
farmer's interests (National Research Council, 1980; Connor et al., 
1983) . The Federal Insecticide Act of 1910 was the first legislation to 
regulate pesticides for interstate sale. It addressed both insecticides 
and fungicides. Strictly a labeling law, it required a statement 
regarding the percent of active ingredients, and created a bureau in the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for its enforcement (Maclntyre, 
1987) . 
In the late 1930s, DDT was developed. After World War II, as DDT 
and other pesticides began to be utilized in agriculture, it became 
apparent that a new statute was needed for pesticide regulation. Again, 
the issue was protection of pesticide consumers (primarily farmers) from 
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unscrupulous dealers. As in the 1910 act, such a statute would alsb 
protect pesticide manufacturers by assuring their customers of an 
effective product. 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) was 
passed in 1947 as another pesticide labeling act, with the scope expanded 
to include rodenticides and herbicides.^ The USDA was given 
implementation and enforcement authority for FIFRA. FIFRA required 
pesticides to be registered prior to marketing for interstate sale, which 
meant manufacturers were to submit the product's name, a copy of its 
label, and a statement about its effectiveness (Bosso, 1987) . Warnings 
and safety instructions were required on labels, and coloration was 
required to insure against mistaking pesticides for flour, sugar, or 
other food products. USDA had the authority to reject a product for 
fraud and mislabeling, or if no amount of labeling could insure the 
safety of man or beneficial animals or vegetation (Connor et al., 1983). 
However, manufacturers were given the right to register products "under 
protest," which required the USDA to take court action to prevent the 
pesticide's sale. The burden of proof was then placed on the USDA to 
prove a product adulterated or mislabeled. Hence, FIFRA originally gave • 
USDA little enforcement authority. Since few concerns were expressed at 
the time about the impact of pesticides on the environment, little or no 
demand was placed on pesticide regulation for environmental protection. 
After World War II, Americans were concerned with re-establishing a 
peaceful existence. Food production was an important priority, as 
Americans participated in the rebuilding of economies devastated by the 
war. Pesticides, such as DDT, which had proved so important in 
controlling disease-carrying insects during the war, were hailed as a new 
technology which could enhance agricultural production. Extremely 
In 1959, FIFRA was expanded to include desiccants, defoliants, 
nematicides and plant regulators. 
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effective with low acute toxicity to humans, these chemicals were also 
thought to be safe, especially when compared to pre-World War II 
alternatives (Blodgett, 1974). (To this day, old newsreels can be seen 
on television of soldiers dousing each other with insecticides, so safe 
were these chemicals viewed at the time.) Problems such as pesticide 
persistence and mobility in the environment, concentration of pesticides 
in living tissue, and pest resistance to pesticides were unforeseen in 
the immediate post-war period. 
By the early 1950s, some concern began to be expressed about the 
safety of pesticide residuals on food. Two amendments were made to the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) which affected pesticide regulation. 
In 1954, the Pesticide Residue Amendment (PRA) added Section 408 to the 
FDCA, which required the Food and Drug Association (FDA) to establish a 
tolerance for any pesticide which leaves a residue on raw agricultural 
commodities. Any commodity with a residue which exceeds this tolerance, 
or for which a tolerance has not been set is considered to be 
contaminated, unless that pesticide was exempted from the tolerance 
requirement. Tolerances were set by the FDA based on information 
submitted by the manufacturer (such as data on toxicity, application 
rates, residue levels, and methodology used in data development). In 
addition, this amendment required the FDA to consider an opinion by the 
USDA on the pesticide's usefulness when setting tolerances. This marked 
the beginning of a policy approach which would require risk/benefit 
considerations in policy making. This policy approach would dominate in 
years to come, and is still in effect today. 
Concerns about cancer and about whether pesticide residues should be 
considered food additives entered into the debate on regulating 
substances in processed foods. Pesticides were viewed as a "necessary 
evil" in this debate (as compared to other food additives such as 
coloring, which were viewed as having no socially redeemable value). The 
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result of the debate was compromise legislation that would eventually 
lead to inconsistent and confusing standards for pesticides in food. The 
1958 Food Additives Amendment added Section 409 to the FDCA, which 
authorized FDA to regulate food additives (including pesticides) in 
processed food on a strictly risk-based level. No consideration of 
benefits was allowed, hence an implicit inconsistency with Section 408 
resulted. Sponsors of the additive were required to prove that no harm 
would result to consumers (National Research Council, 1987). Under 
Section 402 of the FDCA, however, residues in processed food are 
permitted to be exempt from this provision, given that these residues do 
not concentrate, i.e., are no higher than residues on raw food. Finally, 
to make things more complicated, at the last minute, the famous Delaney 
Clause was added. The Delaney Clause prohibited an oncogenic (cancer-
causing) substance from being approved under Section 409. Therefore, 
different risk standards applied in setting tolerances. For instance, if 
a pesticide didn't concentrate, or was used only on raw food, a 
risk/benefit approach was used, even if the pesticide was oncogenic. 
However, if a pesticide concentrated even slightly and was oncogenic, no 
tolerance could be allowed for it. Future legislation would lead to 
greater inconsistencies in this policy. 
As pointed out by several authors (Bosso, 1987; Maclntyre, 1987; 
Reichelderfer and Hinkle, 1990), pesticide regulation from the 1940s to 
the 1960s was the province of what is termed the pesticide subgovernment 
or "iron triangle." An alliance of Congressional leaders (particularly 
the House Agricultural Committee, and the House Appropriations 
subcommittee on Agriculture), agency (USDA) representatives, and economic 
(agricultural and chemical) interests. This iron triangle set pesticide 
policy, with little or no input from outside influences. 
Bosso describes many institutional factors that contributed to the 
ability of the subgovernment to prevail. In the legislature, the method 
of apportionment led to a bias toward rural and agricultural districts, 
at the expense of urban districts. One party rule in the south led to 
greater seniority for southern Democrats, which was translated into 
greater legislative power for these legislators in the seniority system 
of Congress. As the south tended to be more rural and agricultural, 
additional biases in influence occurred. Southern agriculture happens to 
be more heavily dependent on pesticides (at one time forty-seven percent 
of all insecticides were used on cotton). Hence, southern Congressmen 
had a vested interest in protecting pesticides from what they viewed as 
excessive regulation. 
Biases in the tax law permitted private economic interests to lobby 
Congress, but prevented non-profit, public interest groups from similar 
activities for fear of losing their tax-exempt status. Few environmental 
groups existed through the mid-1960s, and those which did were limited in 
their political activities to public education and little else. For 
example, the tax-exempt status of the Sierra Club was revoked in 196$ 
because the 1RS considered their political activities "excessive" (Bosso, 
1987). Therefore, tax code biases resulted in the ability of private 
interests to make their influence felt in Congress, but not those of 
public interest groups. 
Judicial access was also limited at this time. The concept of a 
class action suit was not yet developed, hence a citizen seeking action 
for the benefit of society was not permitted court standing. Instead 
standing was permitted only to those who could show a direct and adverse 
effect resulting from the actions of another (Bosso, 1987). Damages 
caused by pesticides are complex and difficult to attribute, and may 
affect a large group of people. Hence, strict interpretation of standing 
resulted in institutional biases in favor of pesticide manufacturers and 
users, and against those affected negatively by pesticide use. Also, as 
stated above, the burden of proof for pesticide adulteration and 
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mislabeling was placed on the USDA, putting it on the defensive in 
enforcing PIFRA. 
Finally, administrative biases existed. USDA was the enforcement 
authority, but it was given little power. Even if it had more power, it 
had little incentive to strictly enforce FIFRA. USDA was the client 
agency for a group which perceived pesticides to be safe and effective 
inputs in the production process.^ 
History of U.S. Pesticide Policy: 1960-1980 
Throughout the 1950s, evidence was being gathered about the effects 
of chemicals in the environment. Problems resulting from pesticide use 
such as pest resistance and resurgence, and secondary pest outbreaks were 
beginning to be noticed. Controversies arose in the late 1950s when 
contaminated cranberries were discovered, and when largely ineffective 
spraying programs for gypsy-moths and fire-ants were implemented. Safety 
concerns were increasingly being expressed as the mood of the public 
shifted from open to cautious acceptance. 
Then in 1962, Rachel Carson published the landmark book "'Silent 
Spring." Indicting profligate pesticide use, she pointed out actual and 
potential hazards to the environment, and suggested caution. Reactions 
to the book ranged from shock and concern on the part of the public to 
indignation and outrage on the part of those promoting pesticide use. 
Carson's book had a profound impact on society, and is credited with 
helping to mobilize the subsequent environmental movement. However, 
despite the impact of the book, pesticide regulations changed little 
^ For example, two General Accounting Office reports and Congressional 
hearings in the late 1960s showed that the USDA consistently failed to 
report violations of FIFRA to the Justice Department, even when 
violations repeatedly occurred, or when violations were not corrected. A 
1964 interagency agreement was completely ignored by the USDA, e.g., in a 
one year period, the Public Health Service objected to 252 products which 
the USDA approved (Blodgett, 1974). Therefore, many biases existed in 
favor of lenient regulation of pesticides. However, over the years, as 
conditions would change, so would the biases. 
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throughout the decade of the 1960s. While major policy changes were 
called for, the only amendment to FIFRA was made in 1964. Protest 
registration was ended [although Maclntyre (1985a) argues that this 
wasn't really accomplished until 1971, when court action was taken], and 
authority was given to USDA to suspend registration of any pesticide 
posing an imminent hazard. However, registrants were given the right to 
appeal this decision. 
As Bosso (1987) and Maclntyre (1985b) have mentioned, the true 
legacy of "Silent Spring" was the research on the environmental and 
health effects of pesticides initiated in response to the book. By the 
end of the 1960s, increasing evidence resulting from this research showed 
the vast level of pesticides accumulating in the environment, and the 
subsequent level of exposure to the human population. At the same time, 
older pesticides such as DDT were becoming less effective because of pest 
resistance. In addition, other environmental crises, such as the 
pollution of Lake Erie, chronic air pollution problems, and the rising 
threat of endangered species (including the bald eagle) sensitized the 
public to this issue. The rising level of wealth experienced by the 
average American enabled a "quality of life" issue to be addressed. 
Concerns about the environment fit well into the spate of other social 
issues being considered in the 1960s, such as civil rights, women's 
liberation, and Vietnam. By the end of the 1960s, the time was ripe for 
major policy changes on a multitude of environmental issues, including 
pesticide regulation. 
In the late 1960s a group of lawyers and scientists attempted to 
influence pesticide policy by seeking court action to have DDT banned 
under the Delaney Clause (Bosso, 1987; Maclntyre, 1985a). Largely 
unsuccessful at first, the cases they brought at federal, state, and 
local levels did draw attention to the environmental and health problems 
associated with DDT use. Eventually this group (by then known as the 
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Environmental Defense Fund) successfully petitioned a D.C. circuit court 
to require the USDA to consider cancellation of all uses of DDT. This 
case, EDP vs. Hardin, also succeeded in transferring the burden of proof 
for a pesticides safety for the USDA to the registrant when "any 
substantial question of safety ... trigger[ed] the issuance of 
cancellation notices" (439 F.2d 593). The fact that USDA had previously 
canceled some uses of DDT was cited as proof that there existed a 
substantial question of safety. The impact of this case was not 
immediately felt (DDT was not banned until 1972). However, the success 
of an environmental group in this case and in other cases (to be 
discussed below) signaled greater judicial response to environmental 
issues. This would influence the nature of pesticide regulation in the 
years to come (Maclntyre, 1985a). 
In addition, new evidence was leading to greater realization of the 
problems inherent in pesticide regulation at this time. The Mrak 
Commission, appointed by Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Robert Finch, issued a report calling for effective veto power over USDA 
decisions by the Departments of Interior, and Health, Education and 
Welfare. The report suggested that most uses of DDT should end within 
two years (Blodgett, 1974; Bosso, 1987). A General Accounting Office 
report criticized the USDA for failure to enforce FIFRA, and for ignoring 
interagency agreements for pesticide regulation (Blogett, 1974). By the 
late 1960s, it had become clear that FIFRA was a failure as a policy to 
protect health and the environment, and that the USDA was not capable of 
regulating pesticides while at the same time overseeing agricultural 
interests. 
Richard Nixon, seeking to capitalize on the environmental issue, 
released Executive Reorganization Plan Number 3 in 1970, thereby creating 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA was given authority to 
regulate pesticides, which eliminated USDA from the iron triangle. 
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However, agricultural and chemical interests and their allies in Congress 
would remain a significant factor in pesticide policy determination. 
EPA was initially constrained in regulating pesticides by an 
outdated statute which gave it no authority to control pesticides in the 
pre-market stage, and little authority to cancel the registration of 
those pesticides already on the market (Maclntyre, 1985b). Prompted by 
court actions of groups such as the EDF, the EPA embarked on a policy to 
remove older, persistent pesticides (generally organochlorines such as 
DDT, aldrin, dieldrin and mirex) from the market. Cancellation 
proceedings were begun on seven such pesticides in the early 1970s. 
Cancellation of these pesticides was to prove time-consuming, costly, and 
highly controversial (Maclntyre, 1985b; McGarity, 1979; Spector, 1976). 
The results (discussed below) were to have an impact on EPA to years to 
come. 
While EPA was proceeding with the cancellation of DDT and similar 
pesticides, major changes finally were made to FIFRA. The Federal 
Environmental Protection Control Act (FEPCA) was passed in 1972, 
completely revamping FIFRA (but the latter name still applies). The 
basic structure of FEPCA remains today, although revisions have been made 
to the statute. 
FEPCA made pesticide registration the primary regulatory tool. EPA 
was given authority to register a pesticide if it does not impose 
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," which is given to mean 
"any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide" (6 Federal Statute § 136). Therefore, FEPCA explicitly 
required the balancing of risks and benefits in the assessment of every 
pesticide for registration. This is the crux of the regulatory system 
for pesticides to this day. 
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FEPCA gave EPA authority to register pesticides for general ot 
restricted use. General use pesticides were deemed to not pose an 
unreasonable risk when applied according to label directions. If an 
unreasonable risk may occur to the applicator or the environment, the 
pesticide could be registered for restricted use. In this case, it was 
required be applied by or under the supervision of a certified applicator 
(Wolf, 1987).4 
Pesticide registration was changed from a permanent status to a 
five-year renewable basis, and pesticides sold intrastate were now 
regulated by EPA. All pesticides registered prior to FEPCA's passage 
were to be re-registered by 1975. EPA was to determine the data needed 
for registration and re-registration. Data submitted by registrants 
would be accessible to the public thirty days after a registration 
decision was made, but trade secrets were to be protected. Experimental 
use permits were authorized to allow registrants to develop data on newly 
developed products. In the event that a pesticide was banned (i.e., its 
registration was canceled), indemnity payments were required to be paid 
by EPA to all holders of the banned product (providing EPA with an 
incentive to not ban pesticides). 
Overall, the EPA was given broader authority for enforcement under 
FEPCA. Labeling requirements were maintained, so EPA could still declare 
adulterated or misbranded pesticides unlawful. Additionally, EPA had the 
authority to require registration of pesticides sold intrastate, and 
registration of establishments which produced pesticides. Producers of 
pesticides were required to maintain records necessary for EPA's 
enforcement of FEPCA, and to allow EPA access to facilities and records 
4 Whether a pesticide is registered for restricted or general use depends 
on data submitted by the registrant regarding dermal and oral lethal 
doses, eye and skin irritation, etc. (40 CFR 15). A given pesticide may 
have both types of registrations, i.e., it may be registered as a general 
use pesticide for some uses, and as a restricted use pesticide for other 
uses. 
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for inspection. EPA was permitted to stop sale, use or removal of 
illegal pesticides, to seize illegal pesticides, and to obtain state 
cooperation in enforcing FEPCA (Connor et al., 1983). Judicial standing 
was denied to citizens,' but states were permitted to set more stringent 
standards for pesticide residuals in food and the environment than those 
set by the EPA. EPA was given authority to establish food tolerances on 
raw food, while FDA still had authority for standards on processed food, 
and USDA had authority for meat product tolerances. 
While FEPCA may have looked good on paper, implementation of at 
least some provisions of FEPCA proved extremely difficult. By far, the 
most difficult requirement was re-registration of about 35,000 pesticide 
formulations (National Research Council, 1980). In addition, the 
attempts by EPA to take a tough stand on banning pesticides drew 
criticism from agricultural and chemical interests, and their 
sympathizers in Congress. 
As the cancellation hearings on the organochlorines proceeded, 
generally culminating in the cancellation of registrations, EPA drew fire 
from the chemical lobby and their supporters in Congress. This posed a 
particular problem for EPA, since FIPRA was only authorized through 1975. 
In fact. Congressional response to cancellation proceedings was so 
intense that an amendment to reauthorization legislation for FIFRA was 
offered that would have given USDA authority to veto EPA actions 
(Reukauf, 1977). Fortunately for EPA, this amendment was defeated. 
The Congressional and industry outcry over the cancellation hearings 
forced EPA to develop another policy approach to pesticide regulation. 
However, this was not the only factor influencing change. Cancellation 
hearings were time-consuming (lasting an average of three and a half 
years), and even if successful would result in only one canceled 
registration, with literally thousands of other pesticides to review 
(Maclntyre, 1985b; Spector, 1976; McGarity, 1979). EPA soon began to 
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realize that a generic procedure to target pesticides likely to be 
harmful was necessary. Hence, the Rebuttable Presumption Against 
Registration (RPAR) procedure was developed. RPAR was a procedure used 
to identify the most hazardous pesticides products. Certain criteria 
such as evidence of health hazards could initiate the RPAR process. 
Registrants were given the chance to show that: 1) EPA was in factual 
error; 2) a health hazard did not exist; or 3) benefits of use exceeded 
the risks (National Research Council, 1980). If the registrant could not 
prove any of the above, cancellation hearings were initiated. The policy 
change resulted in the "demotion" of the Office of General Consul 
(comprised of younger, activist lawyers who represented EPA at 
cancellation hearings), and the "promotion" of the Office of Pesticides 
Policy (comprised of technical staff with more moderate views on 
pesticides and more experience in regulating them). The change in status 
of the two groups helped to soothe the ruffled feathers of Congress and 
industry interests, and at the same time helped to consolidate a new 
policy emphasis which would enable EPA to address the monumental task of 
re-registering older pesticides (Maclntyre, 1985b) 
The result of the controversy was a compromise amendment to FIFRA 
(passed in 1975), in which a Scientific Advisory Panel was mandated to 
review cancellation actions and proposed regulations. USDA was to be 
given advance notice of bans, and EPA was to consider the effect on 
agriculture by conducting an economic impact assessment. Re-registration 
was delayed until 1976. 
However, the delayed deadline wasn't sufficient. While EPA did have 
a significant amount of data on file regarding pesticides, it did not 
have an adequate amount of data to re-register the vast majority (if not 
all) of pesticide products registered at the time. Most of what was on 
file did not measure up to current data standards. A scandal that 
developed during this time revealed that International Biotest, the 
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nation's largest private chemical testing company, engaged in data 
falsification and questionable testing procedures. Data on file for 
about 200 pesticides were brought into question (Bosso, 1987) . 
Registrations were temporarily halted. 
In addition, a double standard was viewed to exist between older 
chemicals, registered prior to FEPCA, which were still on the market, and 
newly developed chemicals, which were subject to the newer, more 
extensive registration requirements. Concerns were expressed that this 
double standard might result in a lack of competition, higher prices, 
reduced incentives for new product development, lack of alternatives for 
farmers, and ironically, reduced safety. (Safety concerns were expressed 
because newer, safer pesticides could be withheld from the market because 
of the more stringent requirements, while older, more dangerous 
pesticides could stay on the market until re-registered.) This created 
an even greater inconsistency in the FDCA tolerance setting procedures. 
Legislative response to these issues was forthcoming in 1978. 
Conditional registration was authorized, so that EPA could address the 
double standard issue. Conditional registrations are granted to products 
which have the same active ingredients as pesticides already registered, 
but which don't meet all the current data requirements (Aidala, 1987). 
In addition. Congress authorized RPAR, which had been in use since 1975. 
In order to implement RPAR and conditional registration, Congress 
relaxed the trade secret protection requirements included in the 1972 
act. This allowed EPA to analyze pesticides by groups of active 
ingredients, a process known as generic registration. This process was 
intended to reduce the volume of re-registration decisions. For example, 
while there were about 35,000 older products that needed to be re­
registered, there were only about 1500 different active ingredients, and 
only 600 of these were considered to be commercially important (Aidala, 
1987) . Since data submitted for one product might be needed to assess 
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another product with the same active ingredient, Congress allowed data 
sharing to reduce duplication of efforts. However, each registrant was 
given ten years of exclusive data use, and the right to compensation by 
those using the data thereafter. Registrants were allowed to determine 
among themselves the level of compensation, or to request arbitration. 
The issue of data compensation was to become a sensitive issue, and to 
cause friction between larger chemical companies, which tended to develop 
new pesticides and the required data, and smaller chemical companies, 
which often sought to use the data developed when attempting to gain 
registration for similar products.^ 
By the end of the 1970s, Congress was still dissatisfied with EPA's 
review process. In the 1980 Amendment to FIFRA, Congress established a 
bicameral congressional veto of any rules or regulations proposed by EPA, 
gave more authority to the SAP, and required peer reviews of EPA studies 
to determine changes in classification, suspensions, or cancellation of 
pesticides (Connor et al., 1983). 
As described above, between 1910 and 1960, the pesticide 
subgovernment prevailed, leading to policies largely determined by the 
iron triangle of agricultural and chemical interests, relevant 
congressional committees, and the USDA. However, by the end of the 
1970s, various changes had occurred, forcing other changes in pesticide 
policy. 
First, the size and influence of the agricultural block declined. 
In 1947, when FIFRA was passed, nineteen percent of the U.S. population 
were farmers. By 1987, only two percent of the population were farmers 
(USDA, various years). The U.S. population had become more urban and 
^ Smaller companies often do not have the resources to develop new 
pesticide products. Many firms market products composed of previously 
developed active ingredients which can be applied to specialty crops (a 
market larger companies often ignore). Hence, data sharing is a very 
important issue to the smaller companies, as they also may not have the 
resources to produce their own data. 
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affluent, and Congress also began to reflect thesé characteristics. A 
series of reapportionment decisions by the Supreme Court from 1958 to 
1964 led to the requirement that congressional districts be of equal 
size. By 1966, 258 districts were redrawn in 31 states, with urban and 
suburban populations gaining greater representation at the expense of 
rural populations (Bosso, 1987). The seniority system of Congress was 
weakened as House liberals, aided by the influx of young liberal 
Democrats (the "class of 1974"), maneuvered to have several powerful 
committee chairs replaced (including House Agricultural Committee chair, 
William Poage). As Congress became younger, more liberal, and its 
seniority power was weakened, southern Democratic influence waned. Hence 
many of those who were the strongest supporters of pesticides lost some 
influence. For example, Jamie Whitten, Democratic representative from 
Mississippi and chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Agriculture since 1949, was forced to relinquish his authority over 
environmental and consumer protection appropriations in order to maintain 
his committee chair position. Whitten, who had been referred to as "the 
permanent Secretary of Agriculture,° held the purse strings for the USDA, 
and later all environmental and consumer protection programs. An ardent 
supporter of pesticides, he was a primary player in the pesticides 
subgovernment who exerted his authority to control pesticide regulation 
for two and a half decades. However, his power was diminished by the 
mid-1970s, even though he later acquired the post of Appropriations 
Chair. 
Finally, a variety of reforms in the early 1970s changed the way 
Congress does business (Smith, 1988; Bosso, 1987). Such reforms led to 
increased power of subcommittees, more access by the public to 
Congressional policy-making (via the open government trends and the 
Legislative Reorganization Act), and decreased influence of committee 
chairs. A wider perspective of committee jurisdiction took hold, and as 
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a result, more committees expressed interest in pesticide policy 
development, which threatened traditional Agricultural Committee 
dominance. 
Other important changes have occurred that have led to increased 
participation of environmental and public interest groups in the policy 
process. This increased access first began in the courts. In 1965, the 
case Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission 
broadened the concepts of judicial standing and aggrieved party. The 
result of this decision was that the plaintiff was not required to show 
direct and adverse injury for judicial access. Instead, he or she needed 
to show that the actions of the defendant had impacted on interests 
protected under statutory or constitutional law. Environmental groups 
also benefitted from a 1970 decision (Sierra Club v. Hickel) in which the 
concept of "class action" was developed, allowing the plaintiff to claim 
damages for the whole of society. Another important decision was 
delivered in the 1971 case, Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee et al. 
V. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. This case required the enforcement of 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), thereby ensuring 
consideration of the environment in decisions regarding government 
projects. 
Enforcement of NEPA would also pave the way for greater involvement 
of environmental groups on the administrative front (Bosso, 1987) . 
Starting with NEPA, other federal statutes including the Clean Air Act, 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act required that environmental interest groups participate in policy 
development at both the state and federal level (Ingram and Mann, 1989) . 
This ensured an active role for environmentalists, and guaranteed access 
to the policy development process. 
Changes in the tax code were made with the 1976 Tax Reform Act. The 
act loosened restrictions somewhat on the ability of non-profit groups to 
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engage in lobbying, thereby allowing greater access to the legislature 
(Mitchell, 1979). 
These changes, as well as a greater level of concern by the public 
about the environment, and a substantial amount of seed funding from 
private philanthropic foundations, led to a dramatic increase in the 
number and size of environmental groups in the early 1970s (and again in 
the 1980s). For example, Mitchell (1979) states that there are now about 
75 national environmental organizations, and as many as five million 
adult Americans contributed to these groups between 1974 and 1975.. 
Sierra Club alone has expanded dramatically in size. In 1960, its 
membership was 15,000, and in 1970, membership was 107,000. In 1977, it 
had grown to 180,000 members, and by 1985, was 369,000 strong (Mitchell, 
1979; Ingram and Mann, 1989). 
History of U.S. Pesticide Policy: 1980 to the Present 
The above discussion shows that as various political institutions 
and societal factors have changed, development of pesticide policy has 
become open to a wider number and variety of players. While 
theoretically, these changes could have resulted in a more democratic 
environment for pesticide policy development, the end result seems to be 
that coalition building in Congress has become more difficult. As 
Hedrick Smith (1988) states (p.26) 
In sum, proliferation of power in Congress, and loosening 
discipline, have made it far harder for any administration or any 
congressional leaders to pull together coalitions to pass major 
legislation. Votes have to be gathered up much more laboriously; it 
takes marathon bargaining. 
This characterizes pesticide policy development in the 1980s. 
Throughout the 1980s, Congress attempted several times to make 
significant changes to FIFRA, with little success. Major legislation was 
attempted in 1986, and was almost passed, but several major issues held 
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up its passage at the last minute. Finally, in 1988, FIFRA was amended, 
but only by ignoring some of the most controversial issues (hence the 
nick-name for this legislation, "FIFRA-Lite"). They remain unresolved. 
This section addresses the legislation considered throughout the 1980s, 
and the issues that influenced this legislation. 
Probably the most important issue of the decade was the re-
registration issue. To date, less than two percent of the active 
ingredients have been re-registered. At the current rate, re-
registration might not be completed until 2024 (Davis, 1988). Concerns 
also arose about the regulation of inert ingredients in pesticides, some 
of which had proved to be dangerous, and which EPA had little authority 
to regulate. In addition, the length of the Special Review and pesticide 
cancellation processes came under criticism. Special Review had replaced 
the RPAR process in 1981. Although similar. Special Review involved 
greater industry participation than RPAR (as was mandated by the Reagan 
administration). Like RPAR, if the results of the review led to the 
conclusion that the registration should be canceled, the registrant was 
permitted to request an administrative hearing (and generally did). At 
the administrative hearing, the results of the Special Review were not-
automatically entered into the record. Hence EPA was required to present 
its case as a new record and as if no decision had been made. This drew 
out the cancellation process and in effect created two cancellation 
proceedings. 
Several issues were of concern to pesticide manufacturers, primarily 
trade secret protection, data compensation, and patent term restoration. 
These three issues are closely related, and the latter two have caused 
friction between different types of pesticide producers. Trade secret 
protection concerns stem from the requirement that manufacturers submit 
data on chemical characteristics to EPA in order to make the registration 
decision. Manufacturers have consistently argued that such data are 
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trade secrets and need protection, thereby justifying their position that 
data should not be made available to the public. 
Related to this concern is the issue of data compensation. Since 
many pesticides are composed of the same active ingredient, use of data 
submitted by earlier registrants is desirable by manufacturers of similar 
products (referred to as follow-on applicants). This also facilitates 
EPA's decision-making, and is therefore desirable to the agency. 
Compensation for use of such data is allowed under FIFRA, and gives the 
original registrant an incentive to share data. However, agreement on 
the size of compensation is difficult to achieve. For example, friction 
developed when arbitrators awarded Stauffer Chemical Company an estimated 
$15,988,000 for use of its data by PPG Industries, Inc. (Aidala, 1987; 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1987). Such a large award set a precedent 
and was viewed as likely to discourage those seeking to use data. 
The issue of patent term restoration is important to chemical 
companies because the process of developing data and registration is very 
time-consuming. Pesticides might not reach the market for four to seven 
years after development because of this process, thereby reducing the 
patent's effective life. Patent term restoration extends the patent's 
life, thus compensating for lost revenues. However, since patent term 
restoration would lengthen the period of time that developers are given 
for exclusive rights to market the pesticide, chemical companies which 
produce "generic" pesticides (likely to be smaller, with fewer resources 
for research and development) would be delayed in entering the market for 
a given chemical. This issue generates additional friction between the 
different types of chemical producers. 
New environmental issues also arose. In 1979, the pesticide 
aldicarb was discovered in groundwater supplies on Long Island, New York 
(Holden, 1986). Within a few years, 74 pesticides would be detected in 
the groundwater of 38 states (National Governor's Association, 1989). 
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Such evidence was particularly distressing because in the past, 
pesticides were not considered to be a threat to groundwater if used as 
directed. In addition, such evidence was more likely to be forthcoming 
in the future, as advances in technology made pesticides easier to detect 
on food and in the environment. 
Concern about groundwater contamination led to demand for policy 
action, but at the federal level, this action was not forthcoming. 
Funding problems, the federalist policies of the Reagan administration, 
difficulties in amending FIFRA, and the localized nature of the 
groundwater contamination problem all contributed to this lack of 
initiative at the federal level (Batie and Diebel, 1989) . While EPA did 
release its Groundwater Protection Strategy in 1984, and its Proposed 
Pesticide Strategy in 1987, these programs tended to rely heavily on 
state implementation (U.S. EPA, 1984; 1987). Therefore, pressure was 
placed on the states to initiate their own programs to control pesticide 
contamination of groundwater. Between 1987 and 1988, about 100 bills 
were introduced in various state legislatures for this purpose (Wise and 
Johnson, 1991). 
Farm groups have been particularly leery of the groundwater 
contamination issue, especially because contamination events often seem 
to be the result of legal use (i.e., according to label directions). In 
1982, Connecticut passed the Potable Water Act, which could have made 
farmers liable for drinking water contamination even if they applied 
pesticides legally—the farm lobby's nightmare. Eventually, this statute 
was toned down, so that farmers were no longer liable for contamination 
if pesticides were applied legally (although manufacturers still are) . 
But the liability issue has put fear into the farm lobby at the state and 
federal levels since the early 1980s. 
Concerns about pesticide residues in food also prompted state 
action. Massachusetts and Maine both had set tolerances for the plant 
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growth regulator daminozide (alar) at lower levels than those set by EPA. 
In addition, eight states had already set zero tolerances for the soil 
fumigant ethylene dibromide (EDB) in baby food by 1984, when EPA finally 
set tolerances for the chemical (Bureau of National Affairs, 1987). 
State actions caused concern on the part of the chemical, agricultural, 
and food processing lobbies, because of fear of a "patchwork quilt" of 
regulations. Consumer and environmental groups supported states' rights 
to set their own tolerance levels. These positions are ironic, given the 
more commonplace assumption that states may be more willing to forego 
environmental concerns for economic concerns than the federal government 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
These concerns and others finally became so problematic that in 1985 
a coalition of both environmental and chemical interests came together, 
and put forth compromise legislation. Introduced in March of 1986, the 
bill eventually became H.R. 2482. Although the original compromise 
legislation did not address the groundwater, tolerance or liability 
issues, amendments were eventually added to address them. A long and 
complicated bill, it passed both houses, but the differences between the 
House and Senate versions proved to be difficult to resolve. Before the 
session ended, the coalition of chemical and environmental interests fell 
apart, and the bill died (Aidala, 1987). 
H.R. 2482 would have required the re-registration process to be 
completed within nine years. It would have accelerated this process by 
requiring the registrant to identify data gaps and provide the relevant 
data within four years. EPA would have eighteen months to review the 
data, and one year to make the re-registration decision. Review of the 
pesticide data would occur in a three-group staggered fashion (hence the 
nine year time limit) so that not all the decisions would be made at 
once. Registrants would pay for the re-registration process through a 
one time fee of $150,000. 
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H.R. 2482 also gave EPA authority to regulate inert ingredients in 
pesticide formulations, and to develop testing protocols for the 
manufacturers of inerts, who are required to submit the data. Time 
limits would have been imposed on the Special Review process. The data 
compensation issue was addressed by allowing pesticides to be used for 
testing purposes during the last two years of the patent period, and to 
allow follow-on applicants one opportunity to walk away from arbitration 
procedures that they find unsatisfactory. 
Provisions were included to speed up the cancellation process. 
Specifically, a time limit of 300 days for the hearing was established 
(with a six month extension if needed), and results of the Special Review 
would have been allowed to be entered into the hearing record. 
H.R. 2482 would have allowed EPA to impose groundwater monitoring 
requirements (subject to judicial review) on registrants if the pesticide 
was found to have contamination potential, or if contamination over a 
certain level was found. The bill authorized EPA to establish 
"Groundwater Residue Guidance Levels" (GRGLs), which would have been the 
same as Maximum Contaminant Levels required under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA).^ The bill also would have amended the SDWA to ensure 
consistency in regulation. H.R. 2482 required EPA to ensure that 
contamination above the GRGL would not occur, and to take action to 
prevent further contamination if thirty percent of the GRGL is reached. 
Anyone adversely affected could request an administrative hearing 
(Aidala, 1987). 
Two amendments were presented during the debate regarding states' 
rights to set tolerances for pesticide residuals in food. The Panetta 
amendment would have required the EPA to show the need for national 
® The Safe Drinking Water Act ensures that public drinking water supplies 
(serving twenty-five or more people, or with fifteen or more hook-ups) 
meet minimum quality standards. MCL's are enforceable standards which 
set the maximum contamination level of potentially hazardous chemicals 
that may be present in public drinking water supplies (U.S. EPA, 1986). 
uniform tolerances, otherwise, states would have'the authority to set 
their own standards. It was defeated, and in its place the Roberts-
Stenholm amendment was incorporated, which did allow federal pre-emption 
of state tolerances. States were only permitted to set their own 
tolerances for pesticides with incomplete data requirements, and in the 
event of circumstances unusual to the state (e.g., dietary differences or 
imminent hazards). 
H.R. 2482 was assigned to the Agricultural Committee. Hearings were 
held in March of 1986, Deliberations continued on the bill into June. 
June 18, the bill was reported to the House, and from September 17-19, 
the bill was considered by the House. On September 19, votes were taken 
on the Panetta amendment (157-183), the Roberts-Stenholm amendment (214-
121), and the final version of the bill (329-4). The Senate companion 
bill was S. 2215, which was also introduced into the Agriculture 
Committee. Hearings were held in April of 1986. Using the House 
Committee bill as a mark-up vehicle, the bill was reported as S. 2792 to 
the Senate. On October 6 it was passed by voice vote. The text of S. 
2792 was substituted for H.R. 2482, and was sent back to the House. The 
House Agriculture and Energy and Commerce Committees developed a 
compromise bill which passed unanimously on October 16. The Senate never 
had time to consider it; Congress adjourned October 18 (Aidala, 1987) . 
Although there were thirty-nine differences between the House and 
Senate bills, the tolerance, liability, groundwater, data compensation 
and patent term restoration issues proved to be the five most contentious 
issues in the debate. The House tended to favor federal pre-emption of 
state tolerances, while key Senators planned to strike this language, had 
they gotten the opportunity. Jurisdictional issues entered into the 
debate about groundwater, as committees responsible for the SDWA (the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee) sought control. Most of these issues were 
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resolved, but some definitional problems remained with the groundwater 
provisions (Aidala, 1987). The House and Senate both agreed on farmers 
being exempted from groundwater contamination liability, but couldn't 
agree on who might be liable. The House and Senate could not agree on 
the issue of how to determine the level compensation for data (the House 
didn't really address it). The length of the patent term extension 
wasn't resolved; the House wanted a much longer extension than the 
Senate. 
The coalition of environmental and chemical interests fell apart in 
the 99th Congress before the session ended. When the 100th Congress 
convened, the coalition was not brought back together. Each group held 
its ground, and it was not until 1988 that a reform measure was again 
considered. 
The bill that finally passed, described as a "bare bones" bill, 
dropped the most controversial provisions of the 1986 bill. Groundwater 
contamination, farmer liability, data compensation and federal pre­
emption of state tolerances were all dropped from or ignored in the 1988 
amendment. This bill kept the provision that required re-registration to 
be completed within nine years (including the staggered re-registration 
approach), and it assessed the $150,000 re-registration fee (lower for 
certain products, such as those not used on food, or used only on 
specialty crops). It stopped automatic indemnification for canceled 
pesticides, except for end-users (farmers). It did allow for line-item 
indemnification for manufacturers under Congressional approval. Any 
indemnification payments made are to come out of a general fund for 
judgments, not EPA's budget. It also gave EPA more authority to regulate 
the storage, disposal, and transportation of banned pesticides, and 
required manufacturers to largely bear the costs of such activities 
(Davis, 1988). Primarily the product of the Agricultural Committees in 
both houses, this bill was given the support of farm, chemical, and 
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environmental groups, even though these groups had interest in those 
issues not addressed. 
Summary 
In order to summarize the discussion presented above. Table 3.2 
shows a chronology of events. The table is meant simply as a review of 
the eight decades of events covered in this chapter. 
To tie together the events described in this chapter, it is useful 
to consider the work of Ahmad, (1966) on induced innovation, and of 
Ruttan (1971) and Runge (1987) on induced institutional innovation. The 
induced innovation hypothesis suggests that resource allocations of 
countries affect the types of technology developed in those countries, 
i.e., technological development is endogenously determined by resource 
allocation. In the case of the U.S., labor has been a relatively scarce 
(and therefore expensive) factor. The introductory discussion showed the 
extent to which agricultural chemicals (fertilizer and pesticides) were 
substituted for labor in the post-war period. Various other factors, 
described by Maclntyre (1987), contributed to this trend, including the 
institutional biases that were discussed in detail in the second section 
of this chapter. 
But also relevant is the theory of induced institutional innovation, 
which describes potential consequences of induced innovation (Ruttan, 
1971; Runge, 1987). This theory argues that when negative external costs 
of technological changes occur, and as these costs are eventually 
realized, demands will be placed on institutions to address and correct 
these negative externalities. Realization of the external costs of 
pesticides was discussed largely in the third section of this chapter. 
Various institutional changes were also discussed in this section. 
However, as the fourth section showed, changes are still occurring, and 
demand for even more changes continues. In fact, the most difficult 
issues, likely to result in the most significant institutional changes. 
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Table 3.2. Chronology of events 
1910 Federal Insecticide Act passed (required correct labeling of 
insecticide containers in interstate trade) 
1938 DDT developed 
1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) passed 
(expanded labeling requirements to herbicides and rodenticides, 
required pesticides sold interstate to be registered by the USDA) 
1954 Pesticide Residue Amendment passed (added requirement that 
standards for pesticide residues on raw food be. set by FDA) 
1958 Food Additives Amendment (added requirement that standards for 
pesticide residues in processed foods to be set by FDA, added the 
Delaney Amendment which disallowed standards to be set for 
oncogenic substances) 
1958-1964 Series of Supreme Court decisions leads to equal 
apportionment of legislative districts 
1962 "Silent Spring" published 
1964 FIFRA amended (protest registration ended, USDA g.jven authority" to 
suspend registration of pesticides which pose an "imminent 
hazard") 
1965 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference vs. Federal Power Commission 
(broadened concepts of judicial standing and aggrieved party) 
1966 Tax-exempt status of Sierra Club revoked for "excessive" political 
activities 
1968 General Accounting Office report issued (revealed USDA's failure 
to enforce FIFRA) 
1969 Mrak Commission report released (called for DDT use to end within 
two years) 
1970 Environmental Defense Fund vs. Hardin (switched burden of proof 
for pesticides of questionable safety to manufacturers) 
1970 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created under President 
Nixon's Executive Order Number 3 
1970 Sierra Club vs. Hickel (concept of class action suit created) 
1970 EPA initiates aggressive cancellation policy with respect to 
organochlorine pesticides 
1971 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee et al. vs. U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission (required enforcement of the National 
Environmental Policy Act) 
Table 3.2. (continued) 
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1972 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act passed (greater 
enforcement authority given to EPA, required registration of 
pesticides for intrastate sale, allowed pesticides to be 
registered for general and restricted use, streamlined 
cancellation procedures, allowed indemnification for canceled 
pesticides, required consideration of the environment in making 
registration decisions) 
1972 Most uses of DDT stopped 
1974 "Class of 1974" enters Congress. This and other changes lead to 
weakening of Congressional seniority system, decrease in committee 
power, increase in subcommittee power, "open" government 
1975 PIFRA amended (established Scientific Advisory Panel to review 
cancellation actions, required USDA notification for 
cancellations, required economic assessment of cancellations on 
agriculture) 
1975 Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration (RPAR) procedure 
implemented 
1976 Tax Reform Act (loosened restrictions on lobbying by nonprofits) 
1978 PIFRA amended (authorized conditional registration and RPAR, 
relaxed trade secret protection requirements thereby allowing 
generic registration, allowed data sharing with some exclusive use 
and compensation) 
1979 Aldicarb discovered in Long Island, New York groundwater 
1980 PIFRA amended (allowed bicameral congressional veto of EPA 
regulatory decisions, required peer reviews of cancellation 
decisions) 
1981 RPAR replaced by Special Review 
1985 Coalition of environmental and chemical groups organize to develop 
compromise legislation to amend PIFRA 
1986 Compromise legislation introduced to amend PIFRA (would have 
accelerated the re-registration process, financed via one-time fee 
on registrants of $150,000, given EPA authority to regulate inert 
ingredients, accelerated cancellation process, provided for 
groundwater monitoring, arbitration and data compensation); 
Panetta amendment defeated (would have required EPA prove the need 
for uniform standards in food); Roberts amendment upheld (would 
have allowed federal pre-emption of state standards in food). 
Legislation died at session end. 
1988 PIFRA amended ("FIFRA-Lite") (accelerated re-registration, 
authorized $150,000 registration fee, eliminated automatic 
indemnification) 
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remain to be addressed. The fourth section suggested that as more groups 
have become involved in policy making (because of the greater awareness 
of the indirect effects of pesticides on them), policy making has become 
more difficult. Drastic changes in pesticide policy in the future 
therefore may not be likely. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to give an overview of the 
development of pesticide policy, and the various factors influencing its 
development. While earlier stages of pesticide policy were influenced 
primarily by agricultural and chemical interests, a much larger group of 
interests influences pesticide policy today. No serious study of 
pesticide policy development can ignore these influences. 
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CHAPTER IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
The theoretical model to be employed draws on and expands the work 
of Appelbaum and Katz (1987). Appelbaum and Katz (AK) have developed a 
political-economic model of rent-seeking, with rent being endogenous to 
the system. Firms engage in rent-seeking activities' in order to obtain a 
monopoly privilege which bestows a rent. Regulators receive a share of 
this rent, while the remaining portion is wasted. Regulators determine 
the optimal level of rent by balancing their marginal benefit of income, 
obtained from rent-seeking activities of firms, with their marginal cost 
of decreased political support. Voters (who are referred to as consumers 
in the AK paper) enter the model via their probability of support for 
regulators. 
AK consider three different scenarios with respect to this model. 
The first scenario casts firms as competing with one another to obtain a 
given level of rent, which can be positive or negative. In this 
scenario, AK demonstrate that positive rent yields the same amount of 
rent-seeking as an equal level of negative rent. They also show that the 
level of rent is a function of regulator's income as a regulator, income 
received in an alternative occupation (i.e., opportunity cost), the 
number of firms engaged in rent-seeking activities, and the share of 
firms' rent-seeking activities captured by the regulators. These 
conclusions result from a short run version of the model, where exit and 
entry are not permitted. In the long run, with exit and entry, AK show 
that firms neither gain nor lose from rent-seeking, while voters, who 
have no exit option, clearly lose (gain) in the case of positive 
(negative) rent. Regardless of the sign on rent, regulators gain. AK 
also consider the case of collusion between firms, which leads to 
sophisticated rent-seeking, where regulators and a coalition of firms 
anticipate each other's actions. AK show that when regulators and the 
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coalition are both strong (i.e., each tries to dominate the other), the 
outcome is the best from the voters' perspective. 
The AK framework provides an interesting and useful framework for 
the analysis of rent-seeking and policy development. For application to 
the pesticide policy problem, several extensions of the model are, 
however, necessary. In the first section of this chapter, the AK 
framework for the sophisticated rent-seeking scenario is presented. In 
the second section, three extensions are made to the model. The voter 
component of the model is extended to allow a more complex analysis of 
the policy impact on voters, via utilization of an impure public goods 
framework. An impure public goods framework permits an analysis in which 
production of a good yields both private benefits to voters (from 
consumption of agricultural goods) and public costs (pollution due to use 
of pesticides). Sophisticated rent-seeking is assumed in order to 
analyze rent-seeking in pesticide policy since firms collude when 
attempting to influence pesticide regulations (as discussed in Chapter 
III). Hence the firm component is represented by a coalition model which 
is generalized to consider the case where more than one coalition 
attempts to influence regulators. Such a modification is necessary in 
order to analyze the influence of both the agrichemical lobby and the 
environmental lobby (the latter having greater influence on pesticide 
regulation with the institutional changes described in Chapter III). An 
extension is also made to the regulator component of the model to include 
the case where the policies determined in the model have the same 
qualitative impact on voters as they do on the coalition. A situation of 
this type could arise when either a policy harms both the coalition and 
voters, or when the policy benefits both the coalition and voters. These 
changes will make the AK framework suitable for analysis of pesticide 
policy development. 
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The Appelbaum and Katz Framework 
Voter Component 
Voters are assumed to enter the model through their support for the 
regulator. Support for the regulator is a function of voters' 
perceptions about the impact of the regulator's actions on their welfare, 
which can be positive or negative. Therefore, letting W represent the 
change in welfare due to the regulator's policies, and B represent the 
probability of support, we can express this function as 
B = B(W), where B'(W) >0, and B"(W) < 0. (4.1) 
Voters are assumed to behave atomistically because of the high costs of 
organization. Therefore, they are followers in the regulatory setting, 
and are not directly active in policy decisions. 
Coalition Component 
As described above, we consider the case where firms form a 
coalition in order to influence the regulator. The coalition of firms 
and the regulator are assumed to anticipate each other's actions in 
optimizing their objective functions. The coalition seeks to maximize an 
objective function, E(Jt), which represents the expected returns to the 
coalition from rent-seeking activities. The underlying utility function 
has properties required by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. It is 
assumed that the coalition is risk neutral, with only one coalition 
considered for the moment. The coalition may engage in either rent-
seeking behavior, where it attempts to acquire the rights to a positive 
level of monopoly rent, or rent-avoiding behavior, where the coalition 
tries to avoid having a negative rent (e.g., tax) imposed upon it. 
Case 1; First consider the positive rent case (S > 0), where the 
coalition engages in rent-seeking behavior to acquire monopoly rents, S. 
A cost function for a coalition of firms engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior can be defined by a convex function of the general form 
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C = C{R,N), 
where R is the level of rent-seeking behavior by the coalition (to be 
determined) and N is the number of firms in the coalition (which is 
exogenously determined). The first-order partial derivatives are given 
by 3C/3R > 0 and 3C/3N > 0, implying that costs increase as the level of 
rent-seeking and the size of the coalition increase. Costs are also 
assumed to increase at an increasing rate, therefore, the second-order 
conditions, 3^C/3R^ > 0 and 3^C/3N^ > 0, hold. The cross-partial term, 
3^C/3R3N, is of unknown sign, and remains to be determined empirically. 
This term can be interpreted as the effect of an increase in coalition 
size on the marginal cost of rent-seeking. 
If there is uncertainty that the coalition will be able to obtain a 
policy that creates rents, the probability that the coalition will 
successfully obtain a fixed level of rent, S, will be p(R), where 
0 < p(R) < 1, p'(R) > 0, and p" (R) < oP Hence, the probability function 
is increasing in R, but at a decreasing rate. The coalition will seek to 
maximize an objective function given by the expected profit function for 
the coalition, E(jc), or 
Maximize E(7C) = p(R) [S - C(R,N) ] + [1 - p(R) ] [- C(R,N) ] 
= Sp(R) - C(R,N). 
The level of rent is set by the regulator, and is therefore exogenous to 
the coalition model. The objective function describes a case where the 
coalition is either successful in acquiring the fixed level of rent, S 
[with probability p(R)], or it acquires nothing. The coalition engages 
^ This specification differs slightly from that given by Appelbaum and 
Katz in their sophisticated rent-seeking model. In their model, p is 
fixed, and equal to one, while S was allowed to vary with R. However, 
for our purposes, given the type of data and empirical model to be 
employed, the opposite case was more realistic. 
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in rent-seeking activities up to the point where the expected marginal 
benefits from rent-seeking are equal to the costs of rent-seeking. 
Therefore, it determines the optimal level of rent-seeking activities 
where 
^  =  = 5 | - i = « -  ' 4 - 2 '  
Here the expected marginal benefit from rent-seeking activities is 
defined as Sdp/dR, and the marginal cost of rent-seeking activities is 
dC/dR. 
The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied when 
0 .  
3R2 3R2 
When the second-order condition is met, the comparative static 
properties of the model can be considered using the first-order condition 
as a basis upon which to apply the implicit function rule (Chiang, 1974, 
pp. 368-371, 397) . From the implicit function theorem a reduced form 
equation for R can be derived as 
R*(S,N). (4.3) 
Substituting (4.3) into the first-order condition (4.2) yields 
„3p[R*(S,N)] ac[R*(S,N),N] S ^ ^ = 0. 





>  0 ,  
N S3^P/3R^ - 3^C/3R^ 




3^C/9R9N < 0, when 3^C/3R9N > 0, and 
S Sd^p/dR^ — 3^C/3R^ > 0, when 3^C/3R3N < 0. 
Therefore, an increase in the level of rent will lead to higher levels of 
rent-seeking activities. This is to be expected, since everything else 
equal, a higher level of rent gives the coalition more incentive to 
invest in rent-seeking activities. An increase in the size of the 
coalition will have a negative effect on the level of rent-seeking when 
the cross-partial term is positive (i.e., an increase in N leads to 
higher marginal costs of rent-seeking), and a positive effect on rent-
seeking activities when the cross-partial term is negative (increases in 
N lead to lower marginal costs). Without a theoretical rationale for the 
sign of the cross-partial term, the effect of coalition size on rent-
seeking must be determined empirically. 
Case 2: S < 0. When a policy is considered which would result in 
rent being taken away from a coalition of firms, the coalition will 
engage in activities in order to avoid the negative rent. In this case, 
the coalition seeks to maximize an expected utility function which is 
given by. 
Maximize E(7C) = p(R) [- C(R,N) ] + [1 - p(R) ] [S - C(R,N) ] 
= [1 - p(R)]S - C(R,N), 
where p(R) is the probability that the coalition will successfully avoid 
having the level of negative rent, S, being imposed on it (S is fixed 
here as well). The first-order condition with respect to the endogenous 
variable, R, is 
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Again, the optimality condition states that the coalition will engage in 
rent-avoiding activities to the point where the expected marginal benefit 
from rent-avoiding activities, — Sdp/dR, is equal to the marginal cost of 
rent-avoiding activities, 3C/3R. 
As above, the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied when 
= A . 
dR^ dR^ dR^ 
Here again we can derive a reduced form equation for R as 
R*(S,N). (4.5) 
Substituting (4.5) into first-order condition (4.4) yields 
ap[R*(S,N)] ac[R*(S,N),N] 
- S 0. 
gR dR 







<  0 ,  
N -sa^p/aR^ - d^C/dR^ 
d^C/dRdN < 0, when a^C/aRaN > 0, and 
S -Sd^p/dR^ - d^C/dR^ > 0, when a^C/aRDN < 0, 
In this case, the relationship between changes in rent-avoiding and the 
level of rent is negative, because rent is negative. That is, as the 
size of the negative rent becomes larger (e.g., a larger tax is imposed 
on the coalition), there is greater incentive for the coalition to engage 
in more rent-avoiding activities. The outcome for the effect of a change 
in coalition size on the level of rent-avoiding is the same as in Case 1 
above, i.e., rent-avoiding activities increase with an increase in N when 
the cross-partial of the rent-avoiding cost function is negative, and 
decrease with an increase in N when the cross-partial term is positive. 
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Case 3: S = 0. In this case, the objective function for the 
coalition would be given by the negative of the coalition's rent-seeking 
cost function, or 
- C(R, N). 
Hence, a corner solution would result, and the coalition would not engage 
in any rent-seeking activities (R = 0). 
Regulator Component 
Regulators seek to maximize their expected utility, E(U), with 
functions which satisfy the von-Neumann-Morgenstern criteria. Regulators 
are assumed to be risk neutral, and they seek to maximize 
E(U) = B(W)[I + aR*(S,N)] + tl-B(W)]A, (4.6) 
where I is the regulator's salary, A is the alternative income forgone, 
and aR (S,N) is the transfer from the coalition to the regulator. This 
is obtained from the assumption that a represents the share of rent-
seeking/avoiding activities, R*(S,N), engaged in by the coalition that 
the regulator is able to capture, where 0 < a < 1. The remaining 
portion, (1 — a)R (S,N) is socially wasted. It is assumed that 
I — A + aR (S,N) > 0, or else the regulator will change occupations. 
Following AK, we assume that W = — S,® in order to make S endogenous to 
the model, and for ease in model solution. We also make the assumption 
that B(W) = B(S), where B'(S) < 0, and B°(S) > 0. Therefore, positive 
rent has a negative (and equal) effect on voter's welfare, as well as a 
negative effect on the probability that voters will support a regulator. 
The converse holds for negative rent. 
g 
Appelbaum and Katz do not address the case where W does not equal — S. 
However, the model can easily address the case where W is a simple 
monotonie transformation of S, i.e., yw = — S. 
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For the positive rent case, regulators maximize (4.6) subject to 
(4.1) and (4.3), to determine the optimal level of rent, S. For the 
negative rent case, regulators maximize (4.6) subject to (4.1) and (4.5). 
The first-order condition for regulators' welfare maximization for both 
cases is 
The first term in (4.7) represents the marginal political cost to 
regulators of rent-seeking. Because regulators receive a share of the 
rent-seeking activities which impose a cost on society, regulators may 
lose the support of voters. The first term thus represents the cost of 
this loss in support. The second term represents the marginal benefit 
which regulators expect to receive from the rent-seeking activities of 
the coalition. Therefore, regulators determine the optimal level of rent 
at the point where the expected marginal benefit of rent is equal to its 
marginal political cost. Appelbaum and Katz show that in the negative 
rent case this condition is not likely to be fulfilled, because both 
terms are negative. The implication is that in the negative rent case, 
there are no marginal political costs, as consumers gain from transfers 
to them, while regulators gain from the rent-avoiding activities of the 
firms. Hence the optimal solution in such a case is to set rent as high 
as possible. 
The second-order condition with respect to S for both the positive 
and negative rent cases is assumed to be 
= [I - A + aR*(S,N)]^ + B(S)C^ = 0- (4.7) 
a^E(U) [I - A + aR*(S,N)]^ + 2a^ ^  
3s^ ds ds as2 as2 
for all S. The second-order condition is negative, which, given (4.7), 
is the sufficiency condition for a maximum. 
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As above, we can derive the comparative statics by first using the 
implicit function rule to derive a reduced form for S, defined as 
S*(I,A,a,N). Plugging this into the first-order condition, we obtain 
{I - A + aR*[S*(I,A,a,N)])3B[S (I^A,a,N)] 
+ B[s*(i,A,a,N)]a^^ (i^A,a,N),N] ^  
from which we can derive the following comparative statics, 
ds* \ - as/as . „ 
= I H I < 
as* I as/as 





— R*aB/as — B(S*)aR*/as ? O, when s > 0, and 
I,A,N ~ r~H I < 0, when S < 0, and 
- a(dB/dS) (dR*/d.S) - aB(S*)a^R*/asaN „ „ 
I TT I • ^ ' I, A,a 
where | H | = d^E{U) /ds^ < 0. Therefore, an increase in income, I, has a 
negative effect on the level of rent, while an increase in alternative 
income. A, has a positive effect on rent. These relationships hold true 
for both the positive and negative rent cases. Changes in both the share 
of rent-seeking that regulators receive, a, and coalition size, N, have 
an ambiguous effect on rent.® When rent is negative, a change in the 
regulator's share of rent-seeking activities has a negative effect on the 
level of rent (i.e., as a increases, S becomes a larger negative number). 
g 
Appelbaum and Katz consider a specific functional form for the optimal 
level of rent-seeking activities, R = S(N — 1)/N, which is then 
substituted into the regulator's model. Using this specific functional 
form, they show by substituting the elasticity of the probability of 
support function with respect to rent, 6 = — (dB/dS){S/B), into (4.7) 
that the signs of dS/da (in the positive rent case only) and as/dN both 
depend on the size of this elasticity. However, the dependence of 
comparative statics signs for these two variables on elasticity does not 
apply in the general form presented here. 
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However, when rent is positive, the effect of'an increase in a is 
ambiguous, and depends on the relative size of the terms in the 
numerator. The comparative static term for the impact of a change in 
coalition size on rent is ambiguous for both positive and negative levels 
of rent, as the sign of 3^R*/3s3n is unknown a priori. Therefore, the 
signs of the third and fourth comparative statics terms are unknown, and 
must be tested empirically upon application of this model. 
Extensions of the Model 
Three extensions will be attempted so as to apply it to the 
particular policy setting in which we are interested. The first involves 
an extension of the voter model, in which we consider the case where a 
policy can have both positive and negative effects on the welfare of 
voters. In the pesticide policy setting, a good (agricultural output) is 
produced which has a positive effect on the utility of voters, but whose 
production leads to external costs on the environment (pollution). A 
Pigovian tax on the externality-generating input (pesticides) used to 
produce this good may lead to welfare losses from reduced consumption of 
the good, but also yields welfare gains from increased environmental 
quality. An impure public good model developed by Cornes and Sandler 
(1986) will be utilized to analyze such a situation. 
The second extension involves the coalition component. The AK 
framework is extended to consider the case where more than one coalition 
are involved in rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding activities. Such a 
case may occur when environmental groups form a coalition to capture 
welfare gains (positive rents) from reduced use of an externality-
generating input, and farm and chemical company groups form a coalition 
to prevent increased pesticide regulation (negative rents) . 
Finally, the regulator component is extended to consider the case 
where the probability of support function has a positive slope, 
indicating that a policy has the same qualitative effect on voters as it 
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does on a coalition (i.e., a positive effect on both, or a negative 
effect on both). Such a case may occur when reduced use of the input 
leads to producer and voter welfare losses. It also occurs when both 
voters and environmentalists gain from enhanced environmental quality. 
Extension 1: Voter Component 
Voters are assumed to maximize utility via the consumption of three 
characteristics, x, y, and Z. Utility functions are assumed to be 
strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave, continuous and twice-
differentiable everywhere. Two commodities, x and q, are purchased, with 
X generating the purely private characteristic, while q generates private 
and public characteristics. One unit of the private good, x, generates 
one unit of its consumption. (For simplicity, the private good will be 
used as the numeraire.) One unit of q is assumed to generate a units of 
y, and b units of Z, where a and b are exogenous to the system. Because 
Z is a public characteristic, consumption is equal to the sum of this 
characteristic over all voters, therefore, 
Z = + zg + . . . + Zm, 
where = bq^. Consumption of q has three effects: on individual i's 
consumption of y, on individual i's consumption of Z, and on total 
consumption of Z. A utility function for voters can be specified as 
U = U(x, y, Z) = U(x, aq, bQ), 
where Q is the total level of provision of •;he public good, and is equal 
to Q + q (Q represents the rest of the community's provision of Q, or 
Q — q). Voters maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, x + 
Pqq = I, where the price of x is normalized to 1, the price of q is Pg, 
and I is income. The optimization problem for an individual voter then 
becomes. 
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Maximize L = U[x, aq, b(Q + q)] + X(I — Pgq - x). 
Alternatively, the dual of this function can be specified as a restricted 
expenditure function, e, which is subject to a given level of utility, 
U®, The voter's optimization problem now becomes. 
Minimize e = p^q + x + |1{U° — U[x, aq, b(Q + q)]). (4.8) 
The first-order conditions are derived to yield, 
3# = Pq -
^ = U° - U[x, aq, b(Q + q)] =0. 
From (4.9), the following condition can be derived. 
qx-
The bordered Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the voter's 
optimization problem is of the form, 
"xx "^xy + "x 
^Uyx + BUGX (a^UYY + 2abUy2 + h\^) aU^ + bU^ 
aUy + bUg 0 
which is assumed to be symmetric and positive-semidefinite, thereby 
insuring a quasi-convex expenditure function. Hence, the diagonal terms 
are all less than or equal to zero. 
Consider a policy which leads to an increase in the price of q. How 
can a measure of the change in voter's welfare be derived? One such 
measure is the compensating variation. The measure for compensating 
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variation for the private characteristic will differ from that for the 
public characteristic, because private goods are characterized by price 
constraints, while public goods are characterized by quantity 
constraints. Therefore, measures of compensating variation must reflect 
this difference. 
For an increase in the price of q, we can measure the compensating' 
variation for the private characteristic as the minimum amount of money 
bhat must be paid to an individual to accept a higher price for q. The 
compensating variation for the public characteristic is the maximum 
amount of money that voters would be willing to pay for a decrease in the 
quantity of Q (a negative externality) rather than relinquish the 
decrease. In analyzing the net effect of a policy to increase Pg, both 
aspects must be considered. 
The compensating variation for both the private and the public 
characteristics can be calculated from (4.8). Johanssen (1987) shows 
that the CV in private goods space for an increase in p^ , holding all 
else constant, is given by 
CVy = e(p°, Q, U°) - e(pl, Q, U°) (4.10) 
1 1 
= '^^ |e_(Pg, Q, U°)dpg = q(Pg, Q, U°)dpq, 
Pq °Pq Pq 
where the superscripts 0 and 1 denote initial and final levels of the 
variables, respectively. The term in (4.10) represents the area between 
price levels p® and p^ , and below the compensated demand curve for the 
initial level of utility, u". 
An increase in the price of q also affects voters welfare by 
affecting the level of q consumed. However, in public goods space, where 
quantity is the constraint, the measure of compensating variation will 
differ. Randall and Stoll (1980) showed that welfare impacts from 
quantity-constrained goods were an important consideration, and that the 
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procedure for measuring these welfare changes is analogous to the price-
constrained model. Therefore, compensating variation in public goods 
space is measured as, 
CVG = E(PQ, Q°, U°) - E(PQ, Q^, U°) (4.11) 
= /nâê(Pa' 0' U°)dO = J nH3u(p , Q, U°)dQ, 
where (4.11) represents the area between the initial and final quantities 
of the public good, and below the inverse demand curve for Q (which is 
represented by |I3U/3Q, the marginal willingness to pay for Q). 
The CV measures given above represent welfare measures associated 
with changes in the respective characteristics. Therefore, 
Wy = CVy, and Wg = CVg. 
This analysis is similar to the analysis given in Just, Heuth and 
Schmitz's (1982) description of compensating variation in a private goods 
model with quantity restrictions, and is also similar 'to Brito and 
Oaklands' (1980) model of monopolistic provision of excludable public 
goods. 
Extension 2: Coalition Component 
The coalition component extension is a straightforward extension of 
the model discussed above. Here we consider the case where two 
coalitions attempt to influence the regulator--one coalition is a rent-
seeker and the other is a rent-avoider. The rent-seeking coalition is 
attempting to capture a gain in welfare in the form of an improvement in 
environmental quality, such as would occur with more restrictive 
regulation of pesticides. The rent-avoiding coalition is trying to avoid 
having a negative rent being imposed upon it, which could also occur with 
more restrictive pesticide regulation. 
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It-is assumed that neither coalition considers the rent-seeking 
activities of the other in making their own decision regarding the 
optimal level of these activities, i.e., Nash behavior is assumed between 
the coalitions. However, following a previous assumption, each coalition 
anticipates the behavior of the regulator, and vice versa. In such a 
case, both the coalition and regulator models are the same as described 
above, with the difference that the two coalitions can be distinguished 
by subscripts on the variables. 
The new objective function for the rent-seeker becomes 
Maximize E(mi) = p(R^ ) [S^  — CfR^ .N^ )] + [1 — p(R2^ ) ] [-C(Rj^ ,Nj^ ) ] 
with the first order condition 
MzEiI = = 0. 
dR^ dR^ aRl 
Likewise, the new objective function for the rent-avoider is expressed as 
Maximize EXMg) = pfRgit-CfRgJNg)] + [1 - pfRgiJfSg — CfRg,^^)] 
= [1 - pfRglJSg - CfRg.Ng) , 
with the first order condition 
3E(jt, ) BpfR?) 9c 
—  =  -  S g  0 .  
9R2 9R2 9R2 
The comparative statics for the expanded coalition component will 
follow directly from the discussion of cases one and two of the coalition 
component. Therefore, the comparative statics terms for the effect of 
changes in rent-setting policies on the levels of rent-seeking and rent-




SSjL SJ^ 3^ P/3RI - 3^C/3R^ 
3R2 SpZ&Rg 
3S2 Ng -SgS^p/SR^ - d^C/dR^ 
>  0 ,  
<  0 .  
Comparative statics for the effect on coalition size also follow directly 







Si32p/3R^ - 32c/3R^ 
3^ C/3R23N2 
®2 -S29^ P/9R2 ~ 9^C/3R| 
?  0 ,  
?  0 .  
Therefore, signs for the comparative statics effects of coalition size on 
the level of rent-seeking activities must be determined empirically. 
Reduced form equations for the extended coalition component are specified 
as 
R^ tS^ , N^ ), and (4.12) 
2^ ~ ^ 2 ^®2' 2^%' 
which will be empirically estimated in Chapter VI. 
In summary, two coalitions are assumed, one rent-seeker and one 
rent-avoider. The rent-seeking coalition attempts to acquire an increase 
in welfare from enhanced environmental quality, which is the result of 
more strict regulation of pesticides. More strict regulation of 
pesticides leads to increased costs for the rent-avoiding coalition. 
Therefore, the rent-avoiding coalition is assumed to lobby against strict 
regulation of pesticides. 
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The impact of a change in rent on rent-seeking activities for the 
first group is positive, while, a change in rent has a negative effect on 
the rent-avoiding activities of the second group (i.e., greater negative 
rent results in more rent-avoiding). Changes in coalition size are not 
known a priori, and must be determined empirically. 
Extension 3: Regulator Component 
The third extension of the AK framework involves a generalization of 
the regulator component to include the case where the policies set by the 
regulator have the same qualitative impact on voters as on the 
coalitions. Hence, in the two coalition case, this implies and 
BS/SSg >0. As above, we assume d^ B/dS^  and d^B/dS^ < 0. The sign of 
3^B/3Sj^9S2 = remains unknown as this point in time, and will 
be addressed later. 
Extension of the model to two coalitions will also affect the 
regulator component. Regulators will include the contributions of both 
groups in making rent-setting decisions, and changes in welfare from 
rent-setting decisions will be expanded to include both positive and 
negative effects. 
Rent-seekers attempt to capture a gain which comes in the form of an 
increase in a public good (enhanced environmental quality from more 
stringent regulation of pesticides). Rent avoiders attempt to thwart a 
policy which leads to more restrictive regulation of pesticides, and 
which will subsequently have an adverse effect on production and 
consumption of a private good, agricultural output. Following the 
assumption made by AK that changes in consumers' welfare equal the level 
of rent sought by a coalition (W = S), we can tie the three components 
together and simplify solution of the model with a similar assumption. 
That is, we assume the gain in welfare from enhanced environmental 
quality (brought about by stringent regulation of pesticides) is equal to 
the level of rent sought by an environmental coalition (coalition one). 
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Likewise, the decrease in welfare from reduced consumption of a private 
good (agricultural output) is assumed to be equal to the level of rent 
being avoided by an agrichemical coalition (coalition two). Therefore, 
from results obtained in the discussion of'extensions to the consumer and 
coalition components, we assume Wy = $2 and Wg = . 
The objective function for the maximization of regulators' welfare 
can be derived as 
Maximize E(U) = BfSi.SgiCI — A + + O^R^^Sg.Ng)] + A, 
j=l,2. 
The new first-order conditions are 
= [I - A + aiRi(Si,Ni) + a2R2(S2»N2)(4.13) 
+ B(Si,S2)aj^ ^  0^ 
 ^(I - A + aiRi(Si,Ni) + agRgfSg.Ng)]^^ 
dSg 5sJ 
3R.* 
+ B(Si,S2)a2^ ^  0^  
where SlR^/^Sg = dR2/dSj^ = 0 by assumption (to make the analysis less 
complicated). As in the rent-avoiding case for the regulator model 
above, the first equation in (4.13) above may not be satisfied because 
both terms in this equation may be positive. In such a case, the optimal 
solution will be to set as high as possible. In the extended model 
presented here, determination of the two levels of rent is made 
simultaneously. 
We can again use the implicit function rule to derive reduced form 
equations for and ^ 2. Specifically, we yield 
2^ — ( I, A, , (%2 f 2^ ) ' (4.14) 
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2^ — ^2 ( I f Af / (X2 * N2 ) • 
These forms are substituted into (4.13) above. Differentiating to solve 
for the partial derivatives, we obtain the Hessian matrix of second order 
derivatives, I H I, which is given by 
(1-A+aj^R^  +«2^ 2 + 2aj^ ® ^ 1^ 
as^  
+ aiB(Si ,3, % 
3sf 
(I—A+Ct^ R^  +#2^ 2 ) * • d^B 
+  o i&B aRi + a  as aR* 
asgasi as^ asg 
as^asi 
(I-A+a^Ri +«2*2 ) ^  ^  
as^asg 




as aRc (I^ A+CCq^ R^  +#2^ 2 ) 2€(2^^ 2 
as| ®^2^ ®2 
+ agBfSi ,82 )3^ *2 
as| 
The next step is to employ Cramer's rule in order to derive the 
comparative statics. In order to make the analysis easier to follow, we 
substitute the following for terms in the Hessian matrix. 
I H I = hii hj^ 2 
2^1 ^22 
, where 
2 "" (I^ A+oc^ RQ^  +#2^2 ) ^ ^  
as? 
+ 2a. aB dR 1 + ttiBCS, ,S, ) 
as^ asi 
* ,a^R 2=* 
as 4 
h-|^2 — ( I^A+Otj^R^ +#2^2 ) ^  ® + 3^ 1 + aJ^ 3*2 
dSj^ dS2 dS2dSj^ as^asg 
h22 ~ ( I""A+(Xj|^ Rj^  +K2R2 ) d^B 
382881 






, *  .a^ B as aRr (I-A+a^ RÏ •*•"2*2 Z22 + GgBCSÎ ,82 *2 . 
2=* 
as| 3S23S2 3s| 
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For the second-order condition to hold, ^ 11^ 22 ~ ^12^21  ^ must be true. 
From above derivations of signs and by assuming 9^ R2 ^ ^^2 ^ 
it can be determined that the sign of h22 is unambiguously negative. 
Since the sign of h^  ^must be the same as that of h22 for the second-
order condition to hold, it is clear that h^  ^< 0 (hence we implicitly 
assume that /3s^ < 0). The sign of h22 (which is equal to h22 by 
Young's theorem) is ambiguous. Because of this ambiguity, it is 
impossible to determine the signs ex ante of any of the comparative 
static equations. Therefore, it is necessary to consider those 




I "1 I = 






-OB/3Sj^ )h22 + OB/aS2)h]^2 
m ? 0, 
I H I 
ds I H, I 
_2 = 







_ — hii3B/3S2 + bgidB/dSi 
?  0 .  
H 
I H I 
The effect of a change in regulator's income on the level positive and 
negative rents is ambiguous, and hinges on the sign of hig (= 2^1) . 
Since hn and h22 are both negative, and the slopes of the probability of 
support functions are both positive, then if hi2 is positive, both the 
comparative static equations will have a positive sign. If hi2 is 
negative, but the second term in the numerator of both equations is less 
than the first term in absolute value, both comparative static equations 
will still be positive. Otherwise, they will be less than or equal to 
zero. Therefore, if hig is negative, the signs are both ambiguous. 
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^ = I Hi I ^ 







(B/aSi)h22 - (9B/aS2)hi2 
? 0, 
I H I 
as2 
dA 
I Hg I 






hj^ dB/9S2 — h2i9B/3Si 
" m ?  0 .  
I H I 
As above, the sign for these terms rests largely on the sign of h-^ 2 ( = 
h2i). Here, if h^2 positive, then a change in the regulator's 
alternative income will have a negative effect on the level of rent 
determined by the regulator. Again if h^ g is negative, but the second 
term in each of the two numerators considered here is lower in absolute 
value than the first term, the signs of the comparative static equations 
will still be negative, otherwise, they will be greater than or equal to 
zero. If hi2 is negative, the comparative statics signs are 
indeterminate. However, it can be noted that the comparative statics 
terms are exactly the negative of the terms for changes in I. Therefore, 
whatever signs result empirically, the changes in I and A will have 






B(Si ,S2 )3^ 1 
_R * as 
'12 
'22 
I H I 
-[(aB/aSi)Ri +B(Si ,S2 )dR^ /dS^]h22 + (aB/as^ lRi hi2 




2 = I H2 I 
I H I 
111 
'12 
- Ri _ B(Si ,S2 
3s. 
,3*1 
_R * 3B 
1 3sl 
-hiiOB/3Si)Ri + hi2[0B/aSi)Ri +B(Si .Sg )9Ri /9SI] 
_ ?  0 .  
Once again, the sign of the comparative static equations rests on the 
sign of the hi2 (and h2i) term. Since the slopes of the probability and 
rent-seeking functions are both positive, and the levels of probability 
and rent-seeking functions are positive as well, then if hi2 is positive, 
these equations will also be positive. If hig is negative, the sign of 
the comparative static equations will depend on the relative magnitude of 
the signs in the numerator. 
as* ^ I Hi 
^ I H 
_ R * aB 2 3So 






-(AB/ASGJRG HGG + [(AB/AS2)R2 +B(SI ,S2 IARG /ASGLHIG 
I H I 
?  0 ,  
as 2 = I H2 I 
I H I 
"11 
h 21 
_ R as 2 5So 
-R* ^ -B(Si ,S2 
oS^ 2 
I H I 
-hiiI{aB/aS2)R2 +B{Si ,33 jaRg/^ Sg] + hgifas/aSgiR^ 
I H I 
? 0. 
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Here the sign of the comparative static equations is less clear, even if 
hi2 is positive. In such a case, the comparative static signs depend on 
the signs of the terms in brackets in the numerators of both the 93^ /9ct2 
and 3S2 equations. For each equation, if the term in brackets is 
positive and h^2 is positive, then the sign of the comparative static 
equations will be positive. Otherwise, the signs will again depend on 
the relative magnitude of the two terms in the numerator. 
as* = I Hi I ^ 
3N, I H I 
- a dB 
_ a  dRi 
^12 
'22 
I H I 
- a^ OB/asixaRi /aNi)h22 + aiOB/as2)ORi /aN^ ihig 
I H I 
as 2 = I H2 I 
I H I 
*11 
'21 




I H I 
7 0, 
- hiiOitaB/asgitaRi /aN^ ) + h2iai(aB/asi) OR^  /aN^ ) 
?  0 .  
Recall that the sign of aR^ /aN^ is unknown. It may be the case that a 
coalition such as the environmental coalition, which is seeking to 
capture rent in the form of a public good, is likely to experience free-
riding problems. In such a case, marginal costs of rent-seeking increase 
as coalition size increases, and the sign of aR^ /aN^ is negative. 
Hence, the first term in both these equations is unambiguously negative. 
Once again, the sign of the second term in each equation, and the signs 
of the comparative static equations, depend on the sign of h^2- If 1^2 
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is positive, then the comparative static equations shown here will be 
unambiguously negative, implying that an increase in the size of 
coalition 1 leads to a decrease in the amount of rent determined. 
However, if h.^ 2 negative, then the signs of the comparative statics 
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For the agrichemical coalition, it is possible that free-riding costs are 
low. If this is the case, marginal costs of rent-avoiding decrease as 
coalition size increases, and dR^   ^^  - The sign of the first term 
in the numerator of both equations is unambiguously positive, hence the 
sign of the comparative static equations depends on the sign of iii2' 
this term is positive, then the numerator in each equation will be 
unambiguously positive, and the comparative statics signs will be 
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positive. Otherwise, the comparative statics signs are ambiguous and 
depend on the relative magnitude of the numerator terms. 
Therefore, the signs of the comparative statics equations depend 
almost entirely on the sign of the h]^2 (= hg^) term, which is unknown a 
priori. Some of the components of this term can be signed, as the 
signs of (Ss/Bsg) /Bs^) and ag known, 
(positive and negative, respectively). However, because the signs 
differ, and the magnitude of each is unknown, their net effect remains 
unsigned. The signs of 3 B^/3S29S2 and 9^B/9S29S2 (which are equivalent 
in sign and magnitude by Young's Theorem) are also unknown. These terms 
represent the effect of a change in the marginal probability of support 
function for the regulator's position on one group's rent due to a change 
in the other group's level of rent. A priori, there is no way to 
determine the sign of these variables. Hence, the h^ 2 term remains 
unsigned, and the comparative statics signs for the regulator model must 
be determined empirically. 
Summary 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework to be employed. The 
model is based on a framework developed by Appelbaum and Katz, which is a 
rent-seeking model with the level of rent endogenously determined. 
Voters, coalitions and regulators interact in this model to determine the 
optimal level of rent. Extensions were made to the model in order to 
more fully capture the complexities of the pesticide policy setting to be 
addressed. Comparative static equations were derived, however, the signs 
of these equations must be determined empirically. 
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CHAPTER V. ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND DATA 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the background for an empirical analysis of 
the model described in the previous chapter. Unfortunately, data to 
empirically test the theoretical model described in Chapter IV do not 
exist in an ideal form for the particular policy issue we are addressing. 
Ideal data for an empirical test of the AK framework and its extensions 
would permit the determination of optimal levels of rent in a continuous 
and smooth fashion. An example would be data which allows the estimation 
of the optimal level of registration fees which are assessed on 
registrants of pesticides. However, when legislators are regulators (as 
is the case with pesticide policy), such data may be unobservable in 
reality. Instead, legislators generally are presented with a bill which 
includes a predetermined level of rent, and which, after some 
deliberation they accept or reject. Therefore, what is observable is a 
discrete choice (e.g., support or do not support a bill), not a 
continuous choice. For this reason, the empirical model of rent 
determination must involve a qualitative choice model. 
In addition, the empirical models of the levels of rent-seeking and 
rent-avoiding activities by the coalitions are also constrained by data 
availability. Interest groups make contributions to the campaigns of 
those legislators they support, and make no contributions to those they 
do not support. Hence, observable data have a censored distribution 
(i.e., the observations are not less than 0), and censored choice models 
must be used for empirical estimation. More detailed description of 




Qualitative choice models are used when the dependent variable is of 
a discrete (dichotomous or polychotomous) nature. In such a case, a 
dummy variable can be used to represent the choice made by an economic 
agent. For instance, if a legislator faces the decision whether or not 
to support a given bill, the choice variable can be represented as; 
S = 0 if the legislator does not support the bill 
S = 1 if the legislator supports the bill, 
where S is a dummy representing the legislator's (observable) choice. 
Estimation of a qualitative choice model by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
can lead to problems such as heteroskedasticity (and therefore loss in 
efficiency), and predicted values which lie outside the 0-1 range. 
Therefore, to estimate the model, one can assume that the observable 
variable, vote, is a proxy for an unobservable variable, the probability 
of support for the bill. Probabilities are generally expressed as 
varying between 0 and 1, and they can be approximated by a cumulative 
distribution function. One commonly employed model of this type is the 
probit model, which assumes that the errors are normally distributed, 
with mean zero, and variance o^ . 
Assume that the legislator faces the choice 
Uio = U(x q^) + e^Q = Po^ io + ^iO 
"il = Û(Xii) + = Pl i^l + Gil 
where U^ g and represent the utilities associated with the two choices 
(0 and 1, respectively), U(") represents a utility function general to 
the population, X^ q and Xj^  ^ represent vectors of characteristics 
associated with individual i and choices 0 and 1, Pq and P^  are parameter 
92 
estimates associated with and Xj^ , respectively, and and 
random disturbance terms. If S = 0, then U q^ > and if S = 1, then 
Uii > U^Q. Therefore, the probability, P, of legislator i voting no on a 
bill is 
P.(S.=0) = Pi{U.o > Uii) 
= — e^ Q) < [û(x£g) — ûfx^^)]} 
= Pi{(Eii - Gio) < (PoXjo - Pl^il) 
= F(PoXio - PiXii) 
= F(- px.) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of — E^q), Xj^  
is the vector of independent variables used to explain [U(x q^) — Ûtx^^)], 
and p is the vector of parameter estimates associated with x^. Assuming 
that the errors are independent and normally distributed with mean equal 
to zero, the CDF can be expressed by 
F(- Px.) = exp-^ /^ [ (^ i ~ x)/G]^ d(x), 
^ -oo G(2n)l/2 
where x represents the mean of x, and a represents the standard 
deviation. The probability of voting yes on a bill is expressed as 
PI(SI=L) = PI(U.I > U.Q) 
= Pi{(Gio - Gil) < [U(Xii) - U(X^ q)]) 
= PitfGiO - Gil) < (Pl^ il - Po^io) 
= FtP^ x^ i - PoXiQ) 




To estimate the parameters of this model, the maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) procedure is generally used. The likelihood function 
for this model is 
L = n F(- Px. )®i n [1 - F(- PXi)](l ~ ®i^ 
i=l 1 i=l ^ 
and its natural logarithm is 
n n 
In L = Z, S.lnF(- Px• ) + E (1 - S.)ln[l - F(- Px• ) ] . i=l 1 1 i=l 1 1 
This function is optimized at 
^ = f S, pxi)xi - f (1 - s . )  £ ( - p X i ) x .   ^ (5.1) 
3P F{— px^) ^=1 [1 — F(— Px^) ] 
where f(— Px^) represents the density function of the standard normal 
distribution evaluated at — Px^, and is given by 
G(2%)l/2 
The maximum likelihood estimator, ^  , is a solution of equation (5.1) . 
Because the log-likelihood function is globally concave (and therefore 
has a single local maximum), the solution is unique (Amemiya, 1981). The 
maximum likelihood estimator is obtained by an iterative process which 
employs the Newton-Raphson method (Maddala, 1983). 
Data 
The data needed to empirically test the AK framework are derived 
from a variety of political and economic sources. As described above in 
the theoretical model, regulators (who are legislators in our analysis) 
set the level of rent as a function of factors such as regulators' 
income, coalition size, and share of rent the regulator receives from the 
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rent-seeking activities of the coalitions. Reduced form equations that 
were derived from the theoretical analysis in the previous chapter can be 
recalled. For the optimal levels of rent as determined in the regulator 
(here the legislator) component, the reduced forms were given in (4.14) 
as : 
~ S^ d, A, a^, N^ , ag, Ng), and 
S2 — ^2^^' ' ^2^ * 
The variables and represent the optimal levels of rent which are 
* 
set by the legislator. From the discussion in Chapter IV, recall that 
is rent sought by the environmental coalition which is in the form of a 
public good (environmental improvement). Alternatively, Sg is the level 
of negative rent (regulation that increases operating costs) that the 
agrichemical coalition attempts to avoid. Both variables are functions 
of the legislator's salary as a legislator (I), salary in an alternative 
occupation (A), the share of rent-seeking activities engaged in by the 
coalition that the legislator is assumed to capture (a^  and Qg)/ and 
coalition size (N^  and Ng). As signs of the comparative static 
relationships were not determined, the effects of changes in the 
independent variables on the dependent variables are unknown a priori, 
and must be determined empirically. A description of the data to be used 
in the empirical models is now given. 
Because only votes on legislation are observable, legislator roll 
call votes on proposed legislation to amend FIFRA will be employed as 
proxies for the levels of rent, and Sg, determined by legislators. 
The first vote to be analyzed (S^) is a vote in the House of 
Representatives on an amendment to pending legislation which would have 
updated FIFRA. The Panetta amendment would have required the EPA to 
justify pre-emption of federal environmental standards over state 
standards. This amendment, as recalled from Chapter III, would have 
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permitted states to set more strict standards for pesticide residues in 
food than those set by the federal government. The environmental 
coalition supported states' rights to set standards because of the 
aggressive stance many states have recently taken. Hence, a vote for the 
Panetta amendment is a vote for the environmental position. 
The Roberts amendment is used as a proxy for negative rent imposed 
on the agrichemical lobby, $2. This amendment would have required EPA to 
issue uniform national standards for pesticide residues in food, as 
supported by the agrichemical lobby. A vote against the Roberts 
amendment is a vote for the imposition of negative rent on the 
agrichemical lobby (caused by increased costs due to more strict and 
varied state standards). Data regarding roll call votes in the House was 
obtained from the 1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1986). Summary statistics for each of the two votes are given 
in Table 5.1, which gives total vote count for the House, and total vote 
by political party. 
Table 5.1. Summary statistics for vote data 
(Congressional Quarterly, 1986) 
Panetta Amendment (S-, ) 
For Against 
All Representatives 157 183 
Republicans 22 118 
Democrats : 
All 135 65 
Northern Democrats 111 25 
Southern Democrats 24 40 
Roberts Amendment (S^) 
For Against 
All Representatives 214 121 
Republicans 115 24 
Democrats : 
All 99 97 
Northern Democrats 45 90 
Southern Democrats 54 7 
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Table 5.2 shows the number of legislators who voted against their 
party's position (Democrats who opposed the environmental position, and 
Republicans who supported the environmental position) for each of the two 
bills considered. 
Table 5.2. Number of legislators who voted against their party's 
position (Congressional Quarterly, 1986) 
Republicans Democrats 
Panetta Amendment (S^ ) 23 65 
Roberts Amendment (E^ ) 24 64 
With the exception of the Speaker, and the House majority and minority 
leaders, all of whom receive extra compensation for their positions, 
legislator salaries do not vary between legislators in the House of 
Representatives. Therefore, salary data cannot be used as an explanatory 
variable, and the variable income (I) will be dropped from the analysis. 
Alternative salaries. A, were calculated as follows: Occupations of 
legislators were obtained from the 1986 Almanac of American Politics. 
Salaries were assigned to these occupations by obtaining information from 
the 1980 Census of Population on income by occupation, and then adjusting 
them to 1986 levels using information on increases in wage levels obtained 
from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1987d). 
Data on the share of rent-seeking/avoiding activities of each 
coalition that legislators receive, and Kg' are not observable; 
therefore proxies must be used for these variables. The share of rent 
legislators receive from the environmental coalition, a^, is approximated 
by the percent of total income from non-farm sources in each legislator's 
district for 1987, which is available from the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1987c). This information is available at the county level, and is then 
aggregated to the district level. For the agrichemical coalition, 
agricultural pesticide use (for 1982) in terms of pounds of active 
ingredient is employed as the proxy for the share of rent-seeking/avoiding 
activities that legislators obtain, 0.2• Pesticide use data are obtained 
from the Pesticide Use Data Base, compiled by Resources for the Future 
(Gianessi, 1986). It is also county level data which is then aggregated 
to the district level. 
Sierra Club membership information is used as a measure of the 
environmental coalition size (N^ ). Sierra Club was by fa,r the largest 
contributor to legislators of all the environmental and consumer lobbyists 
involved in the pesticide debate (discussed in more detail below). 
Membership by chapter for 1988 was provided by the Sierra Club (Sierra 
Club, 1989) . Unfortunately Sierra Club chapters are not formed by 
legislative district or even by county. Some chapters are organized by 
state, however, other chapters include members from two or more states. 
In such a case, membership was split evenly between the states involved. 
A total membership for each state was then derived, and district 
membership was determined by dividing total membership by the number of 
districts in the state. Therefore, membership by district was distributed 
in the same proportion as total population. 
Size of the agrichemical coalition is measured by membership in the 
American Farm Bureau Federation (subsequently referred to as the Farm 
Bureau). The Farm Bureau is the largest agricultural lobbying 
organization in the U.S. It was active in the pesticide debate, and it 
supported the chemical industry stand on uniform regulation of pesticide 
residues in food. Farm Bureau membership in 1988 was obtained directly 
from the organization at the state level. Membership by district was 
calculated by multiplying state Farm Bureau membership by the percent of 
the state's farms that lie within the district. Therefore, Farm Bureau 
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membership is distributed in the same proportion as the number of farms 
within the state (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987a). 
Two variables are included in the empirical model to account for 
additional influences on legislators' voting habits. On the votes 
analyzed, Democrats were more strongly associated with the environmental 
position, while Republicans tended to support the agrichemical position. 
A dummy variable is specified for a legislator's political party, with 0 
representing Republican legislators and 1 representing Democratic 
legislators. This variable is included to reflect differences in voting 
due to party affiliation. 
Another variable is intended to address regional differences in 
positions of legislators. As described in Chapter III, legislators from 
the "Deep South" have traditionally been in favor of more lenient 
regulations of pesticides, primarily because of the large agricultural 
constituencies they represent. Legislators from these southern states 
(shown in Figure 5.1) are assigned a dummy variable value of 1, while all 
other states' legislators are assigned a dummy variable value of 0. The 
selection criteria for this variable was politically based, i.e., states 
considered to be part of the traditional southern coalition were included 
in the southern region (Clausen, 1973). 
In summary, the empirical models for the legislator component are now 
specified as 
S 2 ~ 5^ (1, A, , (X2, , PY, NS ), and 
S 2 — S2 ( I, A, 0^2, ' ^ 2 ' ^2 ' ), 
where PY represents the dummy variable for party affiliation, and NS is 
the variable for region. Probit analysis will be used to estimate these 
equations. 
Finally, it should be noted that while comparative static signs cannot 
be determined from the theoretical framework as described in 
Figure 5.1. States in the southern region 
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Chapter IV, some statements can be made regarding plausible relationships 
between changes in at least some of the independent variables and the 
dependent variables. For example, it is likely that a high percent of 
income from non-farm sources in a legislator's district would lead to a 
higher probability of support for the environmental position, and lower 
probability of support for the agrichemical position. The same could be 
true for districts with high levels of Sierra Club membership. However, a 
large number of Farm Bureau members in a legislator's district would 
likely be associated with support for the agrichemical position, and 
opposition to the more stringent regulation of pesticides, as supported by 
the environmental coalition. Democratic party membership could be more 
likely to have a positive effect on support for the environmental 
position, because of its history of support for liberal causes (although 
southern Democrats are often associated with conservative positions). 
Hence, Republicans can be expected to support the more conservative 
agrichemical position. Legislators from southern states probably would 
support the agrichemical position, because of the importance agriculture 
has traditionally had in southern state economies, as well as the 
importance of pesticides in southern agricultural production (recall 
Chapter III). The pesticide use variable could take either a positive or 
a negative sign, because high levels of use are likely to be associated 
with high levels of support for the agrichemical position. However, high 
levels of pesticide use could also be associated with high potential for 
reaction against pesticides from environmentalists and the general public. 




To estimate the coalition models, a censored regression specification 
is needed. The censored specification is used when a data set is 
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incomplete because many of the observations on the dependent variable take 
the value of zero (implicitly assumed with this specification is the idea 
that observations are zero because for various reasons, these variables 
cannot take a negative value). This problem was first addressed by Tobin 
(1958), who analyzed the demand for consumer durables. The model which 
bears a variation on his name (Tobit), is as follows 
Rj = Pxj + Ej if Rj > 0 
= 0 otherwise. 
Of the total J observation in the system, the first Jq observations have a 
dependent variable which is equal to zero, and the remaining 
observations have a dependent variable which is greater than zero. For 
this system, assume that Gj are independent and normally distributed, with 
mean zero and variance o^ . Estimation of this model is complicated by the 
fact that the conditional expectation of the error term for this model is 
not equal to zero, even when only the positive observations are 
considered. Therefore, OLS yields biased and inconsistent estimators 
(Amemiya, 1984) . Again, MLE is a better estimation procedure. The 
probability, P, that coalition j chooses not to support (contribute to) a 
legislator is given by 
Pj(Rj=0) = P(ej < - Pxj) = F(- Pxj). 
Here F(— Pxj) represents the standard normal CDF defined above as 
o(2n)i/2 
F(- Px^) = j ^ ^^ "Yygexp 1/2 [(Xj. x)/0]^d(x). 
where x represents the mean of x, and a represents the standard deviation. 
We can also define the standard normal density function evaluated at — Px^  
as 
f(- Px.) = L_ exp-l/2[(- Pxi)/a] _ 
G(2%)l/2 
1.02 
Hence, the probability that coalition j does contribute to a 
legislator is given by 
Pj(Rj=0)f(Rj|Rj>0) = F(- Pxj)f(Rj - Pxj) 
F(- |iXj) 
= f(Rj - Pxj) 
G(2n)l/2 
The likelihood function is expressed as 
L = IlF(— Px^)nf(Rj — Px• ), 
0 J 1 J •> 
where the first product on the right hand side is over the Jq observations 
for which Rj = 0, and the second product is over the observations for 
which Rj > 0. The natural logarithm of the likelihood function is 
In L = SlnP(- Pxj) + 2ln[f(Rj - Pxj)] 
. f * P°^ T7ï -iM 14 - P-l)'-
G(2n)i/2 2a^ 
The first-order conditions for a maximum are 
L ^  _ £f(- Pxjix. + S(Rj - Pxi)x. ^ 0 
ap F(- px^) 
ain L _ 1 If(- Px.)(- px,) _ Ji  ^1 Z(BU - Pxi)2_ . 
da^ F(— Px^ ) 2a^ 2a^  
As above, maximum likelihood estimators are obtained by solving the first-
order equations for p. The likelihood function of the tobit model also 




Recall from the previous chapter that the optimal level of rent-
seeking and rent-avoiding activities by the coalitions is a function of 
both coalition size and the amount of rent set by the regulator. The 
specification of this relationship was given in (4.12) as 
1^ ~ N^ ), and 
2^ ~ ^ 2(^2' Ng). 
As described in Chapter IV, represents the optimal level of rent-
seeking activity engaged in by the environmental coalition, while Rg is 
the optimal level of rent-avoiding activities of the agrichemical 
coalition. The level of rent sought by the environmental coalition 
(environmental quality) is determined by the legislator and is given by 
the variable S^. represents the size of the rent-seeking 
(environmental) coalition. Similarly, S2 is the level of negative rent 
imposed on the agrichemical coalition, while N2 is the agrichemical 
coalition size variable. 
Rent-seeking and rent-avoiding activities, and Rg, respectively, 
are approximated by the political action committee (PAC) contributions 
made by various concerned interest groups to legislators in the 1985/86 
legislative term. This information was obtained from the Federal Election 
Commission (1985/1986). Environmental groups form the first coalition. 
Contributions to legislators were obtained from the PACs associated with 
three organizations' in this coalition: Sierra Club, League of 
Conservation Voters and Friends of the Earth. The coalition of chemical 
and farm (agrichemical) interests is composed of the following 
organizations: the Farm Bureau (as represented by various state level 
PACs), the National Grocers' Association, Chemical Specialties 
Manufacturers Association, United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, 
and various chemical companies (Monsanto, Ciba-Geigy, FMC, Union Carbide 
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and American Cyanamid). Summary statistics are provided in Table 5.3 for 
PAC contributions from each of the coalitions. Contribution statistics 
are given by political party for each coalition. In addition, 
agrichemical PAC statistics are broken down into categories for chemical 
interests and farm interests. 
Table 5.3. Summary statistics for campaign contributions data 
(U.S. Federal Election Commission, 1985/1986) 
, Standard, , b h 
Recipient Number Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Total 
Environmental PAC Contributions (R^ ) 
Democrats 65 1392.2 1925.5 1.0 10991.0 90491.0 
Republicans 14 1642.9 2011.7 2.0 7379.0 23000.0 
Total 79 1436.6 1930.2 1.0 10991.0 113491.0 













150.0 4750.0 129044.0 
55.0 8400.0 197584.0 
55.0 8400.0 326628.0 
Breakdown of Agrichemical PAC Contributions 
Chemical Interests: 
Democrats 92 1005.1 747.9 150.0 
Republicans 132 1169.9 888.3 55.0 





Democrats 39 937.8 815.5 200.0 3250.0 36574.0 
Republicans 40 1079.0 1134.2 200.0 5700.0 43160.0 
Total 79 1009.3 986.0 200.0 5700.0 79734.0 
^ Unit is number of representatives who received PAC contributions 
from the interest groups identified. 
 ^Unit is dollar contributions received by representatives. 
Contributions were made to legislators during the 1985/86 legislative 
term, however, the votes on these amendments were not conducted until late 
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in 1986. While neither coalition knew exactly what a given legislator's 
vote would be, the coalitions were able to observe legislators' voting 
records on environmental issues. For example, the League of Conservation 
Voters compiles an index of voting on environmental and conservation 
issues (obtained from the Almanac of American Politics), which can be used 
to assess a given legislator's predisposition to vote in support of the 
environmental position. Therefore, the League of Conservation Voters 
index is used as a proxy for level of rent in both the environmental and 
agrichemical models (S^  and Sg, respectively). This variable ranges from 
0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect record in support of environmental 
issues. 
Coalition size variables are the same as described above. As with the 
legislator model, dummy variables for party affiliation and region are 
included in each of the empirical coalition models. Hence, the empirical 
models for the two coalitions are specified as 
N^, PY, NS), and 
Rg = RgfSg, Ng, PY, NS), 
which is a slight modification of (4.12). The coalition models will be 
estimated using the Tobit specification described above. 
Again while comparative static signs are not always easily determined, 
some mention can be made about signs that could be expected in the 
empirical model. Discussion in Chapter IV implied that increases in the 
level of (approximated by LCV index) would have a positive effect on 
the rent-seeking activity of the environmental coalition, while increases 
in the LCV index would have a negative effect on rent-avoiding activities 
of the agrichemical coalition. The sign of the effects of coalition size 
on rent-seeking was unknown after the discussion in Chapter IV. Recall 
that if increases in coalition size lead to increases in the marginal 
costs of rent-seeking, then increases in coalition size lead to decreases 
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in rent-seeking activities. Such a situation could occur when free-riding 
is a problem, as with public goods (e.g., environmental quality). 
Therefore, a negative sign on is possible. However, when increases in 
coalition size lead to decreased margihal costs of rent-seeking (or rent-
avoiding) , increases in coalition size have a positive effect on rent-
seeking activities. This situation is likely to occur in the agrichemical 
model, where free-riding problems probably are not significant. 
Democratic legislators may be more likely to be supported by the 
environmental coalition, due to the more liberal stance of the Democratic 
party (with the possible exception of southern Democrats), while the 
agrichemical coalition may favor Republicans. Southern legislators may 
also be more likely to receive contributions from the agrichemical 
coalition, because of their strong support of agrichemicals in the past. 
Tables 5.4 through 5.6 show summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables used in the two components for all legislators (Table 5.4), 
legislators voting on the Panetta Amendment (Table 5.5), and legislators 
voting on the Roberts Amendment (Table 5.6). 
Summary 
Procedures were given for the specification of qualitative and 
censored choice models, which are necessary for correct estimation of the 
regulator and coalition components as developed in the previous chapter. 
Qualitative and censored choice models fall under the category of "limited 
dependent variable models". Models with limited dependent variables are 
improperly estimated when using OLS techniques. Probit estimation is one 
technique for qualitative choice models, while Tobit estimation is 
employed when the dependent variable is censored. Use of the limited 
dependent variable models is necessary because the data that are 
observable will not allow continuous choice estimation. 
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Table 5.4. Summary statistics for explanatory variables used; 
All Representatives^ 
Variable Number Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ab 432 37.63 10.76 0.00 86.07 
432 0.98 0.03 0.81 1.00 
432 1006.90 938.47 168.00 3612.00 
"2^ 432 1.47 2.93 0.00 23.87 
«2^ 432 9277.90 14439.00 0.00 94986.00 
S9 386 57.02 25.87 0.00 100.00 
^ Excludes Alaska, Hawaii and District of Columbia. 
^ $1,000 (U.S. Deparment of Commerce, 1980; 1987d; Almanac of 
American Politics, 1986) . 
Non-farm income/total income by legislative district (Department 
of Commerce, 1987c). 
^ Estimated number of Sierra Club members by legislative district 
(Sierra Club, 1989). 
® 1,000,000 pounds active ingredient (Gianessi, 1986). 
^ Estimated number of American Farm Bureau Federation members by 
legislative district (American Farm Bureau Federation, 1988; U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1987a). 
^ League of Conservation Voters Index (Almanac of American Politics, 
1986) . 
A description of the data to be utilized in the empirical estimation 
of the model was provided. Legislators' votes on two amendments to (then 
pending) pesticide legislation will be examined in order to test the 
regulator component of the Appelbaum and Katz framework. Legislators' 
alternative income, party affiliation and regional representation serve as 
explanatory variables along with proxies for coalitions' size and share of 
rent that legislators receive from each coalition. Rent-seeking and rent-
avoiding activities are approximated by campaign contributions made by the 
two coalitions analyzed to each legislator. These activities are 
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explained by coalition size, voting records of legislators (a proxy for 
level of rent), and political characteristics of the individual 
legislators. 
Table 5.5. Summary statistics for explanatory variables used: 
Representatives voting on the Panetta Amendment 
Variable Number Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
A® 339 37.74 10.92 0.00 86.07 
339 0.98 0.03 0.81 1.00 
Nl' 339 989.27 914.38 168.00 3612.00 
339 1.55 3.11 0.00 23.87 
^2® 339 9305.40 14568.00 0.00 94986.00 
S^ 301 58.34 25.30 7.00 100.00 
^ $1,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980; 1987d; Almanac of 
American Politics, 1986). 
^ Non-farm income/total income by legislative district (Department 
of Commerce, 1987c). 
° Estimated number of Sierra Club members by legislative district 
(Sierra Club, 1989). 
1,000,000 pounds active ingredient (Gianessi, 1986). 
® Estimated number of American Farm Bureau Federation members by 
legislative district (American Farm Bureau Federation, 1988; U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1987a). 
^ League of Conservation Voters Index (Almanac of American Politics, 
1986). 
109 
Table 5.6. Summary statistics for explanatory variables used: 
Representatives voting on the Roberts Amendment 
Standard 
Variable Number Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
A^ 334 37.63 10.92 0.00 86.07 
«1^ 334 0.98 0.03 0.81 1.00 
334 971.36 884.67 168.00 3612.00 
334 1.57 3.13 0.00 23.87 
^2® 334 9270.30 14645.00 0.00 94986.00 
S^ 296 58.60 25.45 7.00 100.00 
^ $1,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980; 1987d; Almanac of 
American Politics, 1986). 
^ Non-farm income/total income by legislative district (Department 
of Commerce, 1987c). 
^ Estimated number of Sierra Club members by legislative district 
(Sierra Club, 1989). 
1,000,000 pounds active ingredient (Gianessi, 1986). 
® Estimated number of American Farm Bureau Federation members by 
legislative district (American Farm Bureau Federation, 1988; U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1987a). 
^ League of Conservation Voters Index (Almanac of American Politics, 
1986). 
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CHAPTER VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, results of the empirical estimation of the 
Appelbaum and Katz model are presented. The first section of this 
chapter addresses the empirical outcome of the legislator component. A 
probit model is used to analyze legislators' votes on two bills to 
regulate pesticides. Results show that political party affiliation was 
the most important factor influencing legislators' votes. Regional 
differences, agrichemical coalition size and percent of income from non-
farm sources in a district were also important factors. An analysis 
which included legislators who did not vote implied that abstainers 
represented a statistically significant group from those who voted. 
However, inclusion of this group did not contribute to model performance. 
When vote is examined conditional on party affiliation, the outcome 
suggests that the Appelbaum and Katz framework performs quite well in 
explaining votes of Democratic legislators, and less well for 
Republicans. Therefore, ideological factors, or'unspecified economic 
factors may have influenced Republicans' decisions on the votes analyzed. 
Finally, votes of legislators who voted against their party's position 
were examined. The most important factor influencing votes of this group 
of legislators appears to be support for a specific economic interest. 
The coalition component results and analysis are provided in the 
second section. Tobit analysis was used to explain the level of campaign 
contributions by the two coalitions to each legislator. The Appelbaum 
and Katz framework performed very well for the agrichemical coalition, 
with coalition size and level of rent set by the regulator having 
expected signs and significant effects on the dependent variable. The 
predictive power of this model was also good. However, only level of 
rent set by the regulator was significant in the environmental coalition 
model, and predictive power was low. An analysis of campaign 
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contributions conditional on party affiliation showed that the Appelbaum 
and Katz framework performed slightly better for Democrats than for 
Republicans. However, the difference was slight. A final section 
summarizes the results and analysis of the model. 
Regulator Component 
As described in the previous chapter, the legislator component was 
analyzed by considering legislator votes on two amendments to pending 
federal pesticide legislation. Votes on these amendments are proxies for 
the dependent variable, level of rent set by the legislator, which is 
unobserved in this case (only the qualitative choice, vote, is observed). 
The Panetta amendment would have permitted states to continue to 
regulate pesticide residues on food, even if state standards proved to be 
more stringent than those set by the federal government. The possibility 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuing uniform national 
standards would still have been permitted under the Panetta amendment, 
but only if it could prove a need for uniform standards. Since several 
states have stricter standards for pesticide residues in food than those 
set by the federal government (Wise and Johnson, 1991), environmental 
groups supported the Panetta amendment on the grounds that states should 
have the right to set tolerances as strictly as they see fit. Hence, a 
vote for the Panetta amendment is a vote for the environmental position. 
Alternatively, the Roberts amendment would have required EPA to 
issue uniform national standards for pesticide residues on food, thereby 
eliminating the possibility that states could set their own standards. 
Therefore, a vote for the Roberts amendment is a vote against the 
environmental position, and a vote for the agrichemical position (recall 
that the agrichemical coalition supported uniform national standards 
primarily because of cost considerations). It should be noted that the 
Panetta amendment, which supported states' rights but still allowed the 
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possibility of uniform standards, represented more of a moderate position 
than the Roberts amendment, which disallowed states' rights altogether. 
The two votes were analyzed by setting the variable representing a 
vote for the environmental position equal to one, and a vote against the 
environmental position (i.e., for the agrichemical position) equal to 
zero. The dependent variables in the legislator model, and Sg, which 
represents the level of rent set by the legislator, are proxied by the 
following values for the observed variable, vote: 
= 1 if the legislator voted "yes" on the Panetta amendment, 
= 0 if the legislator voted "no" on the Panetta amendment, 
and 
$2 = 1 if the legislator voted "no" on the Roberts amendment, 
S2 = 0 if the legislator voted "yes" on the Roberts amendment. 
Recall from Chapter V that the following are used as explanatory 
variables in the analysis: 
A = salary in an alternative occupation, 
«2 = percent of income from non-farm sources in the legislator's 
district (proxy for share of rent-seeking activities that the legislator 
captures), 
= estimated Sierra Club membership by district (proxy for 
environmental coalition size), 
«2 = pesticide use by district (proxy for share of rent-avoiding 
activities that the legislator captures), 
1^2 = estimated American Farm Bureau Federation membership by 
district (proxy for agrichemical coalition size), 
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PY = party affiliation (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican), and 
NS = regional dummy (1 = southern state, 0 = northern state). 
Comparative static signs were not derived in Chapter IV because of 
difficulties in signing components of the comparative static equations. 
However, as was described in Chapter V, it is possible to discuss signs 
which would seem reasonable a priori. For example, it is likely that a 
high percent of income from non-farm sources in a legislator's district, 
and a high level of membership in the Sierra Club could influence a 
legislator to support environmental legislation. A large Farm Bureau 
membership in a given district might have a negative effect on support 
for environmental legislation. High levels of pesticide use reflect the 
economic interests of the agrichemical coalition, however, high level of 
pesticide use could create a reaction against the chemicals by the 
environmental coalition. Therefore, the effect of this variable on 
support for environmental legislation could be positive or negative. 
Legislators who are members of the Republican party, and legislators from 
southern states may be more likely to oppose environmental legislation. 
Since the effects of these variables are at this point purely 
speculative, empirical results are necessary to show the actual effect of 
changes in the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. 
Results of the empirical analysis of the Panetta amendment are 
provided in Table 6.1. As described in Chapter V, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation of qualitative choice models may lead to problems of 
heteroskedasticity and prediction of values outside the 0-1 range. 
However, OLS results can be useful as a basis of comparison with the 
results from the probit estimation, which is a more appropriate 
procedure. 
The OLS results provided in the middle column of Table 6.1. shows 
that the independent variables explained 41 percent of the variation in 
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the vote on the Panetta amendment. Percent of income from non-farm 
sources (a^), Farm Bureau membership (Ng), party affiliation (PY), and 
region (NS) were all significant at the 0.01 level. Party affiliation 
clearly was the most significant factor in the analysis. While 
comparative static signs were not determined a priori in Chapter IV, 
signs of all the variables were plausible. The results suggest that 
Table 6.1. Analysis of votes on the Panetta amendment^ 
Dependent Variable = S^ 
Explanatory Variables Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Probit 
Intercept -2.376* -24.437*** 
(-1.805) (-3.119) 
A -0.002 -0.009 
(-1.089) (-1.164) 
"l 2.757** 24.107*** (2.079) (3.070) 
Ni 0.00002 0.0002 
(0.769) • (1.331) 
«2 0.006 0.119** 
(0.532) (2.032) 
Ng -0.000007*** -0.00004*** 
(-3.793) (-3.632) 
PY 0.526*** 1.791*** 
(11.899) (9.554) 
NS -0.217*** -0.661*** 
(-3.921) (-2.990) 
0.411 2 Cragg-Uhler R 0.543 
Log-Likelihood Value 
-145.57 
Percent of Correct Predictions 79.351 
^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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percent of income from non-farm sources (Q^) and being a member of the 
Democratic party (PY) both had a positive and significant effect on the 
propensity of legislators to support the environmental position. 
Alternatively, Farm Bureau membership (Ng) and being from a Southern 
state (NS) had negative and significant effects on the tendency to 
support the environmental position (i.e., they had a positive effect on 
the tendency to support the agrichemical,position). 
The coefficients on the variables Farm Bureau membership and Sierra 
Club membership were very small, indicating that very large changes in 
membership were necessary to affect a legislator's position on the issue 
of states' rights to regulate pesticides. Significance levels show that 
legislators were responsive to Farm Bureau membership, but were not very 
responsive to Sierra Club membership. One problem with the use of these 
variables as proxies for coalition size is their regional nature. Sierra 
Club membership is likely to be a significant factor on the west coast, 
but it may be a much less significant factor in the rest of the country, 
while the Farm Bureau has much more influence in the midwest than in 
other portions of the country. Therefore, there may be a regional bias 
with the use of these variables. To eliminate the regional nature of 
these variables, future research should incorporate interaction terms 
(e.g., membership multiplied by a regional dummy variable). 
Percent of income from non-farm sources was also significant, and 
the coefficient of this variable suggests that for every 0.1 percent 
increase in the percent of income from non-farm sources, the probability 
of supporting the environmental position increases by 0.28 percent. 
Results also indicate that for every 1 million pounds of pesticide active 
ingredient used in a district, the probability of support increases by 
0.006 percent. For every additional $1,000 that legislators could earn 
in an alternative occupation, the probability of support decreases by 
0.002 percent. Neither of these coefficients are significant, however. 
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The right-hand column of Table 6.1 shows results of the probit 
estimation of the vote on the Panetta amendment. It should be noted that 
the variable coefficients are not directly comparable under the two model 
specifications. OLS coefficient estimates represent the effect of a one 
unit change in the explanatory variable on the dependent variable 
(probability of support for the environmental position). However, 
parameter estimates for the probit model are not so straightforward. 
Recall that the probit specification employs a standard normal 
cumulative distribution function to approximate the probability of 
support. A one, unit change in any of the explanatory variables (holding 
all other variables constant), leads to a movement along the cumulative 
distribution function. Coefficients obtained via probit estimation are a 
measure of this movement. Since the probability of support is measured 
by the area under the cumulative distribution function, the probability 
of support due to a unit change in an independent variable is calculated 
by the product of the variable coefficient and the probability density 
function (Maddala, 1983). Therefore, the coefficients given in Table 6.1 
provide an indication of the direction of change in the probability of 
support, but not necessarily a measure of the magnitude of the change 
(Fomby, Hill and Johnson, 1984). 
Signs of all the variables were the same as those determined via OLS 
estimation, indicating that OLS and probit results were similar in 
direction. Pesticide use, which was insignificant in the OLS estimation, 
had a significant effect on the dependent variable in the probit model. 
All the other variables which were insignificant in the OLS estimation 
had somewhat greater levels of significance with the probit 
specification, but remained insignificant. Party affiliation and region 
were slightly less significant here than in the OLS estimation. The 
Cragg-Uhler coefficient was 0.54, and the model predicted the correct 
outcome 79.4 percent of the time. The value of the log-likelihood 
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function was -145.57, which when compared with the value of the log-
likelihood for the constant term only, easily led to rejection of the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory are all equal to 
zero. 
OLS and probit estimation results of the Roberts amendment vote are 
given in Table 6.2. As can be expected, results are very similar to 
those observed for the Panetta amendment. Overall, the model performance 
Table 6.2. Analysis of votes on the Roberts amendment^ 
Dependent Variable = S2 
Explanatory Variables Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Probit 
Intercept -1.873 -27.636*** 
(-1.405) (-3.017) 
A 0.00004 0.0004 
. (0.019) (0.048) 




"2 -0.008 0.134* (-0.730) (1.701) 
Ng -0.000005*** -0.00006*** 
(-2.898) (-3.548) 
PY 0.349*** 1.265*** 
(7.777) (6.788) 
NS -0.342*** -1.199*** 
(-6.093) (-4.767) 
0.351 2 Cragg-Uhler R 0.521 
Log-Likelihood Value 
-138.29 
Percent of Correct Predictions 80.838 
^ Figure in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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with an OLS procedure was not quite as good as that of the Panetta 
amendment. The explanatory variables were responsible for 35 percent of 
the variation on support for the environmental position. All of the 
explanatory variables had the same sign as in the Panetta amendment 
analysis, with the exception of pesticide use, which as noted above was 
insignificant in the OLS specification. Again, party affiliation was the 
most significant variable. 
Probit analysis of the Roberts amendment was also similar to the 
Panetta amendment analysis. Interestingly, the region variable was even 
more significant on this vote, hence being a legislator from a southern 
state was even more important a factor on the Roberts amendment vote than 
on the Panetta amendment vote. Since the Panetta amendment represented a 
more moderate position than the Roberts amendment, the significance of 
this variable on the more extreme bill reflects the intensity of feeling 
against the states' rights issue by southern legislators. This is an 
ironic position for southern legislators to take, given the fact that 
southern states have traditionally been strong supporters of states' 
rights, and in the last century, they fought a war over this very issue. 
Overall performance of the probit estimation of the Roberts vote was 
roughly similar to that of the Panetta amendment. The Cragg-Uhler R^ was 
0.521, and the model predicted correctly 81 percent of the time. The 
likelihood ratio test led to the rejection of the hypothesis that the 
model coefficients are all zero. 
More information on the effect of the independent variables on the 
vote can be obtained from Table 6.3, where elasticity measures are given 
for each of the variables on the two votes. Elasticities were calculated 
at the variable means. On both amendments, percent of income from non-
farm sources was the variable to which legislators were by far the most 
responsive. For the sake of brevity, elasticities will not be given for 
the other specifications of the legislator model described below, but it 
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jshould be noted that in the specifications described below, percent of 
income from non-farm sources continued to be the variable with the 
greatest degree of elasticity. 
Table 6.3. Elasticity measures for probit analysis of votes^ 
Explanatory Panetta Roberts 
Variables Amendment Amendment 
Intercept -23.061 -36.738 
A -0.332 0.020 
«1 22.377 35.496 
Nl 0.142 0.100 
«2 0.175 0.280 
N2 -0.318 -0.679 
PY 0.992 0.982 
NS -0.182 -0.458 
^ Elasticities were evaluated at the means. 
Marginal probability measures for the probit analyses of both votes 
are given in Table 6.4. These measures indicate the effect of a change 
in one of the independent variables (holding all others constant) on the 
probability of support for the environmental position. Therefore, the 
estimates given in Table 6.4 are analogous to the OLS coefficients given 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. However, marginal probabilities in the OLS model 
(which are equal to the model coefficients) are constant, while in the 
probit model, marginal probabilities vary depending on the original level 
of probability (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). When the probability of 
support for the environment is 0.5, the independent variables have their 
most powerful effect on vote. That is, legislators who are not 
predisposed in their support for either position are the most likely to 
be influenced by small changes in the independent variables. Conversely, 
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legislators with a strong predisposition toward either position would 
only be influenced by large changes in the independent variables. 
Marginal probability measures given here were evaluated at the point 
where probability of support equaled 0.5. Hence, these measures 
represent the upper limit of the independent variables' effects on the 
dependent variable at the margin. 
Table 6.4. Marginal probability measures for probit analysis 
of votes^ 
Explanatory Panetta Roberts 
Variables Amendment Amendment 
Intercept -9.749 -11.025 
A -0.004 0.0002 
«1 9.617 10.830 
Ni 0.00008 0.0003 
«2 0.047 0.053 
N2 -0.00002 -0.00002 
PY 0.715 0.505 
NS -0.264 -0.478 
^ Marginal probability measures were evaluated at probability = 0.5. 
The measures given in Table 6.4 indicate the change in the 
probability of support for the environmental position due to a one unit 
change in the independent variable. Therefore, on the Panetta amendment 
vote, for every $1,000 increase in a legislator's salary in an 
alternative occupation, probability of support for the environmental 
position decreases by 0.004. The high measure of marginal probability 
for (percent of non-farm income) is because of the scaling of that 
variable, which ranged from 0 to 1. Therefore, an increase in the 
percent of non-farm income of 1 percent (0.01 in the raw data set) should 
increase probability of support by 0.09617 (which is calculated by 
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9.617/100). Taken in this context, the effect of non-farm income on 
probability of support is still substantial. Changes in party and region 
have the largest effects on probability of support for the environmental 
position, while the effects of the two coalitions' sizes are minimal. It 
should be re-iterated that the marginal probability variables were 
calculated at their maximum values. 
The above discussion centers on analysis of actual votes on the 
Panetta and Roberts amendments. However, on each amendment, roughly 100 
legislators did not cast a vote. It may be useful to examine the 
characteristics of these legislators to see if including them improves 
model performance. One way to do this is to use an ordered probit 
technique. Ordered probit specification allows analysis of a dependent 
variable that is polychotomous (i.e., the choices can be greater than 
two), and which has a progressive nature. In this instance, we have 
polychotomous dependent variables which are proxies for an unobservable 
variable, support for the environmental position. The observed dependent 
variables are specified as 
= 2 if the legislator voted "yes" on the Panetta amendment, 
= 1 if the legislator did not vote, 
= 0 if the legislator voted "no" on the Panetta amendment, 
and 
S2 = 2 if the legislator voted "no" on the Roberts amendment, 
Sg = 1 if the legislator did not vote, 
$2 = 0 if the legislator voted "yes" on the Roberts amendment. 
Hence, there is an explicit assumption that legislators who abstained 
from voting on either amendment were indifferent to the amendment. This 
assumption is subject to debate, as no doubt some who abstained were 
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indifferent, but others may have been absent for reasons of illness, 
other commitments, etc. 
Before proceeding to describe the results of this analysis, a brief 
digression on the structure of the ordered probit specification is 
needed. Assume Uq is the utility level of a legislator prior to 
consideration of a change in existing pesticide policy. Let be the 
utility of that same legislator under alternative policy 1. The 
legislator supports policy 1 if utility from policy 1 is greater than 
utility from current policy. If utility from the two policies is 
similar, the legislator will be indifferent, and if utility from the 
current policy dominates utility from policy 1, it will be opposed by the 
legislator. Therefore, the legislator will select critical values for 
the difference in utilities under the two policy regimes which will 
enable him or her to determine which position will be taken. That is, 
the legislator's decision can be expressed as 
— — Ug < pi Oppose policy 1 
— Uq < Indifferent to policy 1 
2 H < — Uq < + CO Support policy 1, 
where |i and n are critical values which enable the legislator to 
determine which position to take. It should be noted that the value 
U^ — Uq is subject to error, e, which we assume has mean zero and 
variance o^. 
To empirically estimate this model, we assume that utility U^ can be 
approximated by 
"l = Plk^k + ®k 
where X represents the legislator characteristics 1,...,K, the 
effect of Xj^ on utility under policy 1, and ej^ is the error term. 
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Letting be the observed variable indicating level of support for 
policy 1, the empirical model is specified as 
'= 0 if — CO < YX + Vj^ < (6.1) 
Sji = 1 if < yX + Vj^ < 
= 2 if < 7X + Vj^ < + oo 
where Y = Pi — PQ' v^ = e^, — Oq. Specification (6.1) is an ordered 
probit if v^ is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. 
Therefore, the coefficients of the model provide information on the 
effect of a characteristic on utility under policy 1 relative to the 
characteristics effect on policy 0. Positive coefficients mean that such 
characteristics yield higher utility levels under policy 1 than the 
current policy. The opposite holds true for negative coefficients. 
Insignificant estimates reflect characteristics that have an equal effect 
on utilities under both policies (Orazem, Otto and Edelman, 1989) . 
All parameters, including chose associated with the critical values, 
and are estimated subject to a normalizing constraint on the 
critical value parameters. Following McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), who 
first developed this technique, was set equal to 0. This allows 
testing for the hypothesis that = |l^ via the t-test. If the 
coefficient of is significant, it implies that is significantly 
different from |l^, i.e., there is a statistically significant distance 
between the two critical values (for a graphical example, see McKelvey 
and Zavoina, pp. 117-119). Hence, if is significant, the hypothesis 
\l^ = |X^ can be rejected. Rejection of this hypothesis would suggest that 
the legislators who did not vote represent a group that is statistically 
distinct from both those who voted for and those who voted against the 
legislation. 
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As above, results are given in Table 6.5 for both OLS and ordered 
probit estimation of Panetta amendment votes. Under OLS estimation, the 
dependent variable can be interpreted as a proxy for strength of support 
for the environmental position. OLS results show that the variables 
alternative occupation salary, pesticide use, and Sierra Club membership 
had no significant effect on strength of support. Percent of income from 
non-farm sources and being a Democrat had a positive effect on the 
strength of support for the environmental position, while Farm Bureau 
membership, and being from the south had a negative effect. Explanatory 
power of the model was somewhat less than under the previous 
specification, with an coefficient of 0.308. 
Ordered probit results, which are given in the right-hand column of 
Table 6.5, show a similar story. Salary in an alternative occupation. 
Sierra Club membership, and pesticide use are all factors that reflected 
a lack of preference between the environmental position and the status 
quo position. Democratic legislators, and legislators whose 
constituencies obtained a high percentage of income from non-farm sources 
favored the environmental position over the existing regulatory 
structure. Southern legislators, and those with a large number of Farm 
Bureau members in their districts preferred the status quo. 
The significance of the coefficient suggests that abstainers are 
indeed a distinct group (recall that being significant is interpreted 
as a rejection of the hypothesis, = jj,^) . However, it is not clear 
that the ordered probit specification improves model performance. For 
example, the ordered probit model for the Panetta amendment predicts 
correctly only 55.6 percent of the time (as opposed to 79.4 percent under 
the probit specification). Ordered probit results for the Roberts 
amendment (given in Table 6.6) yield very similar results. 
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Table 6.5. Ordered probit analysis of votes on the Panetta amendment^ 
Dependent Variable = 
Explanatory Variables Ordinary Least Ordered 
Squares Probit 
Intercept -5.375** -14.619*** 
(-2.281) (-2.707) 
A -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.558) (-0.363) 
"l 6.146*** 14.617*** (2.591) (2.698) 
Ni 0.00004 0.00008 
(0.966) (1.008) 
«2 0.020 0.060 
(0.972) (1.513) 
Ng -0.00001*** -0.00002*** 
(-3.149) (-3.049) 
PY 0.775*** 1.123*** 
• (10.439) (8.717) 







Percent of Correct Predictions 55.60 
^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
* * * 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Given the lack of improvement in model results, and the questionable 
assumption that legislators who did not vote were indifferent to the 
policy outcome, further analyses will ignore the ordered probit 
structure. However, it is useful to know that legislators who did not 
vote comprise a statistically distinct group from those who did vote. 
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Therefore, results and implications of the analysis of the legislators 
who voted do not necessarily carry forth to those who abstained. 
Table 6.6. Ordered probit analysis of votes on the Roberts amendment^ 
Dependent Variable = S2 
Explanatory Variables Ordinary Least Ordered 
Squares Probit 
Intercept -4.185* -12.562** 
(-1.774) (-2.370) 
A 0.0009 0.002 
(0.267) (0.430) 
«1 4.930** 12.546** (2.076) (2.351) 
Ni 0.00003 0.00005 
(0.592) (0.608) 
®2 -0.010 -0.0009 
(-0.501) (-0.022) 
Ng -0.000008** -0.00001** 
(-2.444) (-2.450) 
PY 0.491*** • 0.706*** 
(6.599) (5.706) 







Percent of Correct Predictions 53.24 
^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Recall from Tables 6.1 and 6.2 that political party affiliation was 
the most significant factor affecting legislator vote on both the Panetta 
and the Roberts amendments. It may be of interest to examine voting 
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, apart from party influence to see if the model performance improves. Two 
approaches have been employed to examine voting while controlling for 
party influence. The first approach was to analyze voting conditional on 
party affiliation. Therefore, only Democrats were analyzed in one model, 
and only Republicans in another model. The second approach was to 
examine the vote of those legislators who voted against the party's 
position on the two amendments. 
Probit estimation results for Panetta amendment votes conditional on 
party affiliation are given in Table 6.7. What is striking in this 
particular set of results is that nearly all the explanatory variables 
were significant at the 0.05 level in the model for Democrats, while only 
two variables were significant for Republicans. Also of note is the fact 
that the direction of influence differed for two of the variables. While 
pesticide use had a positive effect on the tendency of Democrats to 
support the environmental position, it had the opposite effect on 
Republicans. Interestingly, Farm Bureau membership was significant in 
the model for Democrats, but not in the Republican model. Non-farm 
economic interests and Sierra Club members had a significant effect on 
Democrats as well, with both interests increasing the tendency of 
Democrats to support environmental legislation. Republicans were not 
significantly affected by the percent of income from non-farm sources, 
and they seemed to react against Sierra Club membership, as this variable 
had a negative (but not significant) effect on the probability of support 
for the environmental position. Again, the regional nature of the Sierra 
Club and Farm Bureau membership variables may be affecting this outcome. 
Independent variables explained about forty percent of the variation in 
the dependent variables in the two models. The model for Democrats 
predicted correctly about three-fourths of the time, while 81 percent of 
the predictions for the Republican model were correct. 
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Table 6.7. Probit analysis of vote on the Panetta amendment by party^ 
Dependent Variable = S^ 





































^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Results of the analysis on the Roberts amendment, as seen in Table 
6,8, were similar to those of the Panetta amendment analysis, especially 
for the Democrat model. Note that the regional variable was highly 
significant in the model of voting on the Roberts amendment by Democrats, 
while it was insignificant in the Panetta amendment model. Hence, 
southern Democrats appear to have held a strong position against states' 
rights to regulate pesticides. Southern Republicans also opposed states' 
rights to regulate pesticides, but perhaps not so forcefully, as the 
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regional variable was significant in the Republican model of the Panetta 
amendment (which takes a more compromising position), but was 
insignificant in the Roberts amendment model. Republicans did respond 
more significantly to both Farm Bureau and Sierra Club membership on the 
Roberts amendment vote, in a negative direction. Explanatory power and 
predictive power of the models of both parties were slightly greater for 
the Roberts amendment than for the Panetta amendment. 
Table 6.8. Probit analysis of vote on the Roberts amendment by party® 
Dependent Variable = S2 






































® Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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It should also be noted that while the factors represented by the 
independent variables do not appear to have a significant effect on 
Republicans legislators, the explanatory power of both the Republican 
models was higher than the explanatory power of the Democrat models. 
This outcome suggests the possibility of multicollinearity problems. 
Future research should involve a test to identify whether or not this is 
a problem. If multicollinearity is a problem, variables which are the 
source of the problem may be dropped, or else other variables may be 
substituted as proxies. 
The poor results of the models for Republican legislators also 
recalls the debate between economists regarding the influence of economic 
versus ideological interests. In Chapter II, a discussion of this debate 
was described, which is briefly reviewed here. Stigler (1971) first put 
forth the premise that economic interests seek to obtain favorable 
regulation in order that they might benefit from advantageous policies. 
Kau and Rubin (1979), in seeking to test Stigler's premise, found that 
ideology was also an important influence on legislators, not just 
economic interests. They rejected Stigler's theory as incomplete. 
Peltzman (1984) countered by suggesting that what may appear to be 
ideological influences may actually represent previously unspecified 
economic interests. Others have joined in the debate (e.g., Kalt and 
Zupan, 1984), and there still seems to be no consensus on the matter. 
Therefore, depending on the point of view, the poor results of the 
Republican models can be interpreted by saying that Republicans were 
influenced on these votes by either ideological influences, unspecified 
economic interests, or both. Other factors, more often addressed in the 
field, of political science, may also come into play, such as voting with 
the party leadership, or logrolling (vote-trading). It is clear, 
however, that the performance of Appelbaum and Katz framework seems to be 
stronger for Democrats than for Republicans. 
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Further estimation results of votes on the two amendments are 
provided in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. Here a different subset of the entire 
population was analyzed; those legislators who voted against their 
party's position on the two amendments. Therefore, Democrats who voted 
against the environmental position, and Republicans who voted for it were 
considered. 
Table 6.9. Probit analysis of vote on the Panetta amendment 
for legislators voting against their party^ 
Dependent Variable = 
















(2 .818)  
0.003**' 










^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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In comparing the results between the two amendments, it can be seen 
that the outcomes are fairly inconsistent. Variables which were 
significant in one model were marginally significant or insignificant in 
the other. Two variables, pesticide use and Farm Bureau membership, 
changed signs between the two sets of results (although Farm Bureau 
membership was insignificant in the case where it was positive, and the 
variable pesticide use could reasonably be expected to have either 
positive or negative effects on the probability of support). It is 
Table 6.10. Probit analysis of vote on the Roberts amendment 
for legislators voting against their party^ 
Dependent Variable = Sg 











* *  
(2.021) 





Log-Likelihood Value -22.745 
Percent of Correct 
Predictions 86.364 
^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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interesting to note that the significant variables in the Panetta 
amendment model tended to be associated with the environmental coalition, 
while Farm Bureau membership was the most significant variable in the 
Roberts amendment model. Therefore, legislators who voted against their 
parties' positions tended to do so to support an economic interest, 
rather than to oppose an interest. Regional interests were not very 
significant in this case. 
The explanatory power of both models was high: The Cragg-Uhler R^ 
is 0.759 for the Panetta amendment model, and .696 for the Roberts 
amendment model. Predictive power was also high in both these models, 
with the Panetta amendment model yielding the correct predictions 91 
percent of the time, and the Roberts model predicting correctly 86 
percent of the time. 
Coalition Component 
Recall that the level of rent-seeking and rent-avoiding activities 
by the two coalitions was proxied by campaign contributions to 
legislators during the 1985-86 legislative term. For the environmental 
coalition, the level of rent-seeking activities, Rj^ was estimated by the 
variables 
= estimated Sierra Club membership by district (proxy for 
environmental coalition size), 
S2^  = League of Conservation voters index of voting on environmental 
issues (proxy for level of rent set by legislators), 
PY = party affiliation (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican), and 
NS = regional dummy (1 = southern state, 0 = northern state). 
Derivation of the comparative static terms in Chapter IV led to the 
conclusion that the effect of coalition size (measured by Sierra Club 
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membership) on the level of rent-seeking activities (i.e., campaign 
contributions) was ambiguous, but that the level of rent set by 
legislators (League of Conservation Voters index) should have a positive 
effect on campaign contributions. Since the effects of party and region 
were not theoretically derived, signs cannot be determined for them a 
priori. 
Rent-avoiding activities of the agrichemical coalition were 
estimated with the following explanatory variables; 
Ng = estimated American Farm Bureau Federation membership by 
district (proxy for agrichemical coalition size), 
Sg = League of Conservation voters index of voting on environmental 
issues (proxy for level of rent set by legislators), 
py = party affiliation (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican), and 
NS = regional dummy (1 = southern state, 0 = northern state). 
As in the environmental coalition model, cdlnparative static analysis in 
Chapter IV yielded an ambiguous sign for the effect of coalition size 
(Farm Bureau members) on campaign contributions. League of Conservation 
Voters (LCV) index should have a negative effect on campaign 
contributions, according to the theoretical derivations in Chapter IV. 
Results of both OLS and tobit estimation procedures for the 
environmental coalition are given in Table 6.11. In the middle column of 
this table, OLS results are presented. The LCV index did have the 
hypothesized sign, and was very significant. Hence, the higher a 
legislator's voting index on environmental issues (i.e., the greater 
support for environmental legislation), the more he or she received in 
campaign contributions from the environmental coalition. Unfortunately, 
the proxy for coalition size. Sierra Club membership, was insignificant, 
as were the party affiliation and regional dummy variables. Explanatory 
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Table 6.11. Analysis of PAC contributions from environmental groups^ 
Dependent Variable = 
























Predicted Probability of R^ > 0 





 ^Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
power of the OLS specification was very low, with an coefficient of 
only 0.086. However, as described in Chapter V, OLS is an improper 
estimation technique, because biased and inefficient estimators are 
obtained. Tobit estimation addresses these problems. 
The right-hand column in Table 6.11 provides results of the tobit 
estimation of the environmental coalition's rent-seeking activities. As 
with probit estimation, OLS and tobit coefficients are not directly 
comparable. While OLS coefficients measure the effect of a one unit 
change on the dependent variable (campaign contributions), tobit 
coefficients are composed of two effects: the first is the effect on the 
probability of campaign contributions being above zero, and the second is 
the effect on campaign contributions when contributions are already above 
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zero (Maddala, 1983; Fomby, Hill and Johnson, 1984). Therefore, a 
positive coefficient means that an increase in the independent variable 
will increase both the probability that campaign contributions will 
exceed zero, and the expected value of contributions for those that are 
already positive. 
Results show that the LCV index was highly significant, even more 
significant than in the OLS estimation. Again, the LCV index had the 
correct sign. Therefore, legislators with a strong record of support for 
environmental legislation were more likely to receive campaign 
contributions from environmental groups than legislators with poor 
environmental records. In addition, the level of contributions increased 
as the LCV index increased. As in the OLS estimation, the variables 
Sierra Club membership, party affiliation, and region were all 
insignificant. Also, the predictive power of the model was quite poor. 
While the actual proportion of campaign contributions that were greater 
than zero was 18.65 percent of all observations, the predicted proportion 
was only 7.83. Hence, the model greatly underpredicted the probability 
that campaign contributions of the environmental coalition exceed zero. 
Table 6.12 shows OLS and tobit results for the agrichemical 
coalition. In the middle column of this table, OLS results yield the 
conclusion that coalition size had a very significant and positive effect 
on campaign contributions given by the agrichemical coalition. As 
hypothesized, LCV index had a negative effect on campaign contributions, 
and the effect was statistically significant. Republicans were slightly 
preferred by the agrichemical coalition, as were northern legislators. 
Explanatory power of the model was somewhat better than the OLS 
specification of the environmental coalition, but was still low. This is 
likely to be because of the improper estimation of the model. 
The tobit estimation results are provided in the right-hand column 
of Table 6.12. Farm Bureau membership was again significant, and with 
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Table 6.12. Analysis of PAC contributions from agrichemical groups' 
Dependent Variable = R2 
Explanatory Variables Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Tobit 
Intercept 1287.300*** 0.887*** 
(8.536) (5.245) 
Ng 0.013*** 0.00001*** 
(3.349) (2.925) 
Sg -8.580*** -0.011*** 
(-3.109) (-3.734) 
PY -206.970 -0.286* 
(-1.506) (-1.891) 




Predicted Probability of Rg > 0 




Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
the hypothesized sign. Hence, both the probability of contributions from 
the agrichemical coalition, and the level of those contributions 
increased as Farm Bureau membership increased in a legislator's district. 
The Lev index was also significant and negatively signed (as expected). 
Therefore, environmentally supportive legislators were less likely to 
receive any contributions at all from the agrichemical coalition. Those 
who did receive contributions could expect to get lower levels of 
contributions than their less environmentally supportive colleagues. 
Party affiliation was significant in this model, with the agrichemical 
coalition more likely to contribute (and to give larger amounts) to 
Republicans. Region became insignificant in this model, indicating that 
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the agrichemical coalition had no significant preference over regions 
when deciding to whom they would contribute, and how much. Predictive 
power of this model was quite good; the actual frequency of contributions 
greater than zero was 0.565, and the frequency predicted by the model was 
0.551. 
For an analysis of the rent-seeking activities of the environmental 
coalition between the two parties, observe Table 6.13. Tobit analysis 
results are provided for each of the two parties. The Democrat model is 
given in the middle column, and shows that LCV index is the only 
significant factor in the environmental coalition model. This model has 
much better predictive power than the full (both parties) version, 
however the model still underpredicts the probability that contributions 
exceed zero. 
Table 6.13. Tobit analysis of PAC contributions from environmental 
groups by party® 
Dependent Variable = 
Explanatory Variables Democrats Republicans 
• * • *** Intercept -3.260 -4.382 
(-5.436) (-4.098) 
Ni -0.00009 -0.00004 
(-0.906) (-0.096) 
• •• 
Si 0.036 0.051 
(5.008) (3.876) 
NS 0.002 -3.153 
(0.009) (-0.010) 
Log-Likelihood Value -635.396 -99.001 
Predicted Probability of R, > 0 0.193 0.001 
Observed Frequency of R2 > 0 0.263 0.067 
® Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Estimates of the model for campaign contributions to Republicans are 
displayed in the right-hand column of Table 6.13. Again, LCV index is 
the only significant variable. Predictive power of this model is very 
poor. 
Campaign contributions from the agrichemical coalition were also 
analyzed by party. Results given in Table 6.14 show that voting record 
on environmental issues was the only significant factor affecting 
contributions to Democrats. Predictive power of this model was very 
good, with the predicted probability of contributions exceeding zero at 
0.444, compared to the actual frequency of 0.449. For Republicans, Farm 
Bureau membership and region were both significant in determining the 
probability that contributions exceed zero, and the level of 
Table 6.14. Tobit analysis of PAC contributions from agrichemical 
groups by party^ 
Dependent Variable = R2 

















Predicted Probability of Rg > 0 







^ Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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contributions. The negative sign on region shows that legislators from 
the north were more likely to receive contributions, and that they 
received greater contributions from the agrichemical coalition than their 
southern counterparts. Voting record was significant at the 0.10 level. 
Predictive power of this model was also quite good. 
These results show that the Appelbaum and Katz framework seems to do 
very well for analysis of a group like the agrichemical coalition, which 
is a narrowly focused economic interest group. Such a group is easily 
identified, and is interested primarily in private gains (or avoidance of 
private losses). The positive signs of the coefficients for group size 
given in Tables 6.12 and 6.14 are an indication that the marginal costs 
of rent-seeking activities decreased as group size increased for the 
agrichemical coalition (recall the discussion following equation 4.5), 
hence free-riding was not a problem. 
On the other hand, the Appelbaum and Katz model did not perform as 
well for the environmental coalition. While the LCV index was 
significant and had the right sign, no other variable had any explanatory 
power. The insignificance of the coalition size variable may have been 
related to the poor quality of the data used to approximate it. In 
addition, use of Sierra Club membership as a proxy for coalition size may 
cause problems because of the regional variation in its influence. 
However, it is more likely that there were other more fundamental 
problems in applying this model to a group like the environmental 
coalition. The environmental coalition was a coalition of diffuse 
interest groups seeking to capture a gain in the form of a public good. 
Diffuse interests are more likely to succumb to free-riding problems than 
narrowly focused groups like the agrichemical coalition. Many 
environmental, consumer and public interest organizations expressed an 
interest in this legislation, but the extent of their interest is 
unknown. The pesticide issue is but one of many issues that may have 
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been addressed by these groups, while the agrichemical coalition was more 
likely to have focused on this one particular issue (or only a few 
others). Therefore, the diffuse nature of the coalition and the varied 
nature of their interests is likely to have resulted in poorer quality 
estimates. Another problem is that so few of the organizations in the 
environmental coalition gave campaign contributions to legislators. 
While rent-seeking activities are likely to have been conducted by these 
organizations (e.g., in the form of letter writing, volunteer work, 
etc.), data on such activities were not available. Hence analysis of the 
rent-seeking activities is not complete, causing further estimation 
problems. 
Summary 
Results of the empirical specification of the Appelbaum and Katz 
model have been mixed. In the legislator model, political party 
affiliation proved to be the most important factor in determining 
legislators' votes on the pesticide bills considered. Unfortunately, 
party affiliation was not a component of the original Appelbaum and Katz 
framework. However, when we examine voting conditional on party, the 
results show that the Appelbaum and Katz framework performs quite well in 
explaining the votes of Democrats, but less well in examining the votes 
of Republicans. Multicollinearity problems may explain some of the poor 
performance of the Republican model, and tests for such problems should 
be conducted in further research. An analysis of legislators who voted 
against the party position showed that positive influences of economic 
interests were a strong factor in their votes. An ordered probit model 
was used to include legislators who abstained from voting in the 
analysis. While this group was found to be a statistically distinct 
group, their inclusion did not improve model performance. 
Overall, the results show that income from an alternative occupation 
was not an important factor in influencing legislators' votes. Sierra 
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Club membership was generally not an important factor in influencing the 
group of legislators as a whole, although it did have an effect on voting 
conditional on party affiliation (positive for Democrats and negative for 
Republicans). Problems with the regional nature of this variable may 
have contributed its lack of significance. Percent of income from non-
farm sources was a significant factor, especially for Democrats. This 
variable had the greatest degree of elasticity of all variables for all 
the specifications of the legislator model (even for the Republican 
model, although the variable itself was insignificant in the Republican 
model). Hence, as the proportion of income from non-farm sources rose in 
a legislator's district, he or she became very responsive to the 
environmental position. Pesticide use generally tended to have a 
positive effect on the probability of support for the environmental 
position (except for Republicans), suggesting a negative reaction to 
pesticide use. Farm Bureau membership was consistently an important 
influence on this issue, as were regional interests. 
The coalition component of the Appelbaum and Katz model also yielded 
mixed results in its empirical specification. The model performed quite 
well in its analysis of campaign contributions by the agrichemical 
coalition. Variables had hypothesized signs, and were significant. 
Predictive power was good. However, estimation of the environmental 
coalition model was quite disappointing. While the variable LCV index 
was significant and had the correct sign, the variable approximating 
coalition sign was insignificant. In addition, the model underpredicted 
the probability that contributions would exceed zero. Therefore, the 
Appelbaum and Katz framework seems to work well for a more well-defined 
economic interest group, but not so well for the analysis of a group like 
environmental interests, where public goods are sought, group size is 
difficult to define, free-riding may exist, and rent-seeking activities 
may vary from the mainstream efforts of campaign contributions (e.g.. 
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letter-writing, volunteer work,'and other such activities for which data 
are hard to obtain). 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
Overview of Study 
The purpose of this research has been to test a theoretical model of 
rent-seeking as developed by Appelbaum and Katz. The Appelbaum and Katz 
framework considers the level of rent set by regulators to be 
endogenously determined by the interaction of rent-seeking firms (or a 
coalition of firms), regulators, and voters who support the regulators. 
The model was tested by applying it to the case of pesticide regulation. 
Here legislators are the regulators. 
In order to address the issue of pesticide regulation, several 
extensions were made to the model. One extension involves the inclusion 
of more than one group attempting to influence the regulator. As seen in 
Chapter III, various events have occurred in the past two decades which 
have resulted in greater influence of interest groups such as 
environmental and consumer groups in pesticide policy determination. Any 
analysis of pesticide policy development should include such groups. 
A second extension was to include an impure public goods framework 
in the voter component of the model. This extension was necessary to 
reflect the complex effects that changes in pesticide use have on the 
welfare of society. Pesticides are useful inputs in the production of 
agricultural commodities, however, their use imposes external costs on 
society. An impure public goods framework allows consideration of both 
the public and the private effects of pesticide use. 
The third extension of the Appelbaum and Katz model was a 
generalization to include the case where a policy change can have a 
positive (negative) effect on the welfare of the public as well as a 
positive (negative) effect on a coalition. This extension is also 
necessary to reflect the impact that pesticide policy changes have on 
societal and coalition welfare. 
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Reduced forms of the theoretical model show that the level of rent 
set by the regulator is a function of legislator's income as a 
legislator, income in an alternative occupation, the size of both rent-
seeking coalitions, and the share of rent-seeking activities that the 
legislator is able to capture from each coalition. Rent-seeking 
activities of the coalitions are determined by coalition size, and the 
level of rent set by the regulator. Comparative static signs in both the 
legislator and coalition components were largely undetermined a priori, 
because of the complexity of the model. 
Votes on two bills in the 1985/1986 legislative session to regulate 
pesticides were considered as proxies for the level of rent set by 
regulators. The Panetta amendment would have permitted states the right 
to regulate pesticide residues on food as stringently as they desired, 
unless the EPA could prove a need for uniform national standards of 
pesticide residues on food. This position was supported by the 
environmental coalition. The Roberts amendment would have required EPA 
to issue uniform national standards for pesticide residues on food, 
thereby preventing states from issuing their own more stringent 
standards. This position was advocated by the agrichemical coalition. 
Probit analysis was used to estimate legislators' vote on each bill 
as a function of various political and economic attributes. Probit 
analysis was used because of the problems associated with the use of 
ordinary least squares specification when the dependent variable has a 
dichotomous nature. In the empirical model, legislator's salary in an 
alternative occupation, and district level information on the percent of 
income from non-farm sources. Sierra Club membership, pesticide use and 
Farm Bureau membership were used as explanatory variables. Percent of 
income from non-farm sources and pesticide use were both proxies for 
share of rent-seeking activities by the two coalitions that is captured 
by the legislators, while Sierra Club membership and Farm Bureau 
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membership represented coalition sizes. Two Variables which were not 
part of the theoretical framework were included in the empirical 
specification because of their perceived importance. These variables are 
political party affiliation and region (North and South). 
Research Results 
Results showed that party affiliation was the single most important 
factor in determining votes on both bills. This is an unfortunate 
outcome in terms of testing the Appelbaum and Katz framework, as party 
was not a component of the original theoretical model (although it can be 
implicitly considered as a component of each legislators' taste 
preference). While comparative static signs were not determined in the 
theoretical analysis, the signs determined in the empirical analysis were 
plausible. Percent of income from non-farm sources and pesticide use 
both had significant and positive effects on the probability of support 
for the environmental position. Farm Bureau membership and being from 
the south had negative effects on the probability of support for the 
environmental position. However, the regional nature of the Sierra Club 
and Farm Bureau membership variables may have led to biases in 
estimation. 
Voting conditional on party affiliation was also examined. Here, 
the model performed well for Democrats, but not so well for Republicans. 
In the Democrat model, signs on the explanatory variables were the same 
as in the full model, with Sierra Club membership also having a 
significant and positive effect on probability of support for the 
environmental position. In the Republican model, the effects of 
pesticide use and Sierra Club membership on support for the environmental 
position were negative. Poor explanatory power of the Republican model 
recalls the debate between various scholars on the importance of ideology 
versus economic interests. This debate offers some possible explanations 
for the reasons why the Republican model did not perform as well as the 
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Democrat model. Multicollinearity problems may have also contributed to 
the poor results of this model. 
Next, an analysis of legislators who voted against their party's 
position was conducted. Results suggest that support for a particular 
interest group was the most important influence on the legislators in 
this particular analysis. In addition, legislators who did not vote were 
included in an analysis which showed them to be a statistically distinct 
group. 
Campaign contributions by the two coalitions were used as proxies 
for rent-seeking activities. Because many observations on these 
variables were zero, the tobit specification was used. For the 
environmental coalition, Sierra Club membership was used to measure 
coalition size, and the League of Conservation Voters index of voting on 
environmental issues was used as a proxy for rent set by the regulator. 
To estimate the campaign contributions of the agrichemical coalition. 
Farm Bureau membership was used to represent coalition size and the LCV 
index was again used as a proxy for the level of rent set by the 
legislator. Party affiliation and regional dummy variables were also 
used in the specification of these models. 
The outcome of the coalition component analysis was also mixed. The 
Appelbaum and Katz framework performed quite well for the agrichemical 
model, with variables having expected signs and high levels of 
significance. The predictive power of the model was good. However, only 
the LCV index was significant in the environmental coalition model. 
While the significance level of this variable was fairly high, and the 
sign was as expected, the predictive power of the model was low. In 
addition, an analysis of contributions conditional on party did little to 
improve the outcome. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis of the Appelbaum and Katz 
framework yields mixed results. Party affiliation proved to be the 
148 
single most important factor influencing legislators' votes on the bills 
studied. The fact that this variable was not part of the original 
theoretical framework, implies that additional changes should be made to 
the theoretical framework in order to apply it to the case where 
legislators are the regulators. For example, such changes could reflect 
ideological preferences of legislators. In addition, the low 
significance levels of the alternative income variable in every type of 
specification of the legislator model examined suggests that income is 
not a factor in legislative decision making (at least for the issue 
examined here). Since the rationale for including this variable in the 
original model was to reflect the opportunity costs of being a regulator, 
perhaps other means of more accurately reflecting the opportunity costs 
of legislators' decisions can be identified in future research. 
The Appelbaum and Katz framework performed poorly in the 
environmental coalition model. However, the reasons for this poor 
performance are most likely because of data problems. Identification of 
the coalition size is difficult because information on environmental and 
consumer interest group sizes is not readily available. While many 
environmental and consumer interest groups were concerned about the 
pesticide policy issue, this issue may have been only one of many issues 
of concern to such groups. Therefore, the true size of the coalition is 
unknown. Additionally, lobbying activities of this coalition are likely 
to be more extensive in scope, and harder to identify than those of the 
agrichemical coalition. Activities such as volunteer canvassing and 
letter writing campaigns are difficult to measure, hence, data on these 
activities are virtually nonexistent. Such problems will contribute to 
poor model performance. 
Research Contributions 
The above research has resulted in several unique contributions to 
the theory of rent-seeking. The first contribution represents an attempt 
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to integrate theory and empirics more closely than has been done in much 
of the other research on rent-seeking. This has been done by testing a 
specific theoretical framework as applied to a particular policy issue. 
In previous empirical research of legislator voting, specification of the 
reduced forms tended to be based on ad hoc equations derived from very 
general theoretical models. Often, such analyses seem to be motivated by 
a desire to advance empirical specification, or simply to consider the 
influences on legislators who voted on a specific issue. While such 
motivations are completely valid, they often do not say much about the 
underlying theoretical framework. This research represents an attempt to 
close that gap. 
Another contribution of the above research is to expand the scope of 
the rent-seeking framework to include more than one interest group in the 
rent-seeking process. Most theoretical and empirical research has 
focused only on the case where one group is involved in rent-seeking 
activities. However, in reality, several groups are likely to be 
competing for influence. Therefore, inclusion of more than one group 
allows for a richer, and more realistic analysis. 
A third contribution is represented by the inclusion of an impure 
public goods framework in the voter component of the model. With the 
impure public goods framework, the impact of a policy can be reflected in 
a much more complex manner than was possible in previous research. Such 
complexity is necessary in the analysis of pesticide policy, as pesticide 
use has both private and public effects on societal welfare. 
Finally, the original model was expanded to consider the case where 
the effect of a policy change on consumers can have the same directional 
effect on the voting public as it does on the coalitions. This 
contribution is unique, because it is often assumed that rent that is 
bestowed upon an interest group has a negative effect on society. In the 
case examined above, gains to the environmental coalition also represent 
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gains to public because of enhanced environmental quality. However, 
losses to the agrichemical coalition will ultimately be felt by consumers 
of agricultural commodities in terms of higher prices, and less 
attractive produce. 
Directions for Future Research 
For further study, several extensions to the above research can be 
made. First, more work needs to be done on the theoretical model to 
enable analysis of legislators as regulators. Specifically, the 
variables representing income as a legislator and income in an 
alternative occupation could be taken out. In their place, a proxy for 
wealth could be included, although empirical data on this type of 
variable are limited to categorical information. A variable representing 
ideological factors could also be included in the theoretical model for 
legislators. 
Empirical analysis of the legislator component could also be 
expanded. For example, it would be interesting to further pursue the 
analysis of the Republican model for the purpose of finding those factors 
which did influence Republican legislators' votes on the two pesticide 
bills. Such analysis may help to provide insight on the debate between 
ideology versus economic interests. These influences could also shed 
light on the need for further research on the theoretical model. A test 
to check for the possibility of multicollinearity in the Republican model 
is also warranted in future extensions of this research. In addition, a 
test of regional biases in the Farm Bureau and Sierra Club membership 
variables could easily be conducted by using an interaction term. 
Application of the Appelbaum and Katz model to other policy issues would 
provide more information about its usefulness. 
Further work also needs to be done on the coalition component. 
First, a seemingly-unrelated regressions approach could be used to check 
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for contemporaneous correlation of the errors in the two coalition 
models. Another approach could be to test the assumption of Nash 
behavior between the two coalitions. 
Finally, much work could be done in attempting to improve the 
estimation of the environmental coalition model. Primarily, the 
theoretical framework for this coalition could be tailored more 
specifically to the case of a group engaged in rent-seeking activities to 
acquire public goods. Perhaps some of the recent work on the economics 
of non-profit organizations could shed light on directions for model 
improvement. Analyses of the activities of environmental organizations 
are virtually nonexistent, yet the influence of such groups on 
environmental policy determination has been extensive in recent years. 
Hence, further analyses of environmental groups' influence-seeking 
activities could represent an important area of future research. 
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